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V-Dem is a unique approach to 
measuring democracy – historical, 
multidimensional, nuanced, and 
disaggregated – employing state-
of-the-art methodology.
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Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) produces the largest 
global dataset on democracy with some 19 million 
data for 201 countries from 1789 to 2017. Involving 
over 3,000 scholars and other country experts, 
V-Dem measures hundreds of different attributes 
of democracy. V-Dem enables new ways to study 
the nature, causes, and consequences of democracy 
embracing its multiple meanings.
We are pleased to present our second Annual Democracy Report. 
We are proud and delighted to count you among our readers, and 
we hope that you find the report interesting, timely, and useful. 
In the 2018 Democracy Report we find that global levels of democ-
racy are still close to an all-time high. However, even though the 
electoral aspects of democracy have improved in many countries 
in recent years, freedom of expression, media, and civil society are 
under threat in other parts of the world. The report identifies dis-
quieting trends in several key countries, such as Brazil, India, poland, 
Russia, Turkey, and the united States. 
The V-Dem project is a global collaboration headquartered at the 
V-Dem Institute, Department of political Science, Gothenburg uni-
versity. While more than 3,000 scholars and experts constitute the 
global V-Dem team, the Institute is run by us - a team of 19 people. In 
addition to our aim of producing cutting edge research, we work all 
year round employing unique, state of the art techniques to provide 
you and other users with global data of the highest possible quality. 
over the past year, we have focused on improving and expanding 
the vast V-Dem dataset even further – culminating in the release of 
version 8. For the very first time, data from ‘Historical V-Dem’ is in-
tegrated – expanding the coverage to 228 years from 1789 to 2017. 
We are excited that the dataset now includes more than 200 politi-
cal units and over 450 indicators and indices of democracy. 
Team spirit and a collaborative nature are key elements of V-Dem 
and the Institute. It permeates all the work we do and all parts of 
the team, from the principal Investigators – michael Coppedge, 
John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I lindberg, Svend-erik 
Skaaning, Jan Teorell – and the core group of scholars who are pro-
ject managers, to the global network of Country experts, Country 
Coordinators and Regional managers. We work with some 3,000 
individuals from almost all the countries in the world in order to as-
semble the 19 million data points in the V-Dem datasets. Without 
our truly experienced and knowledgeable experts providing nu-
anced, precise, and local expertise, V-Dem would not exist today. 
We would like to extend a big thank you to our Country experts, 
Country Coordinators and Regional managers!
even though V-Dem is an academic mission at heart, we always 
strive to be relevant to the “real world”. over the past years, we have 
had the opportunity to collaborate and engage with many inter-
national organizations, governments, and nGos, ranging from the 
World Bank, to the Swedish government, organizations like Bibli-
otheca Alexandrina, and grassroots groups in nepal. With our V-
Dem Regional Centers around the globe that we are so proud of, 
our outreach activities continue to grow. We look forward to anoth-
er year of fruitful collaboration with our partners around the world. 
We also hope that you will also find the series of working papers, the-
matic briefs, country briefs, and policy briefs available on the website 
(www.v-dem.net) helpful to support of democracy in practice.
We would like to thank everyone who has made, and continues to 
make, the V-Dem journey possible.
Sincerely, 
The V-Dem Institute Team
A Word from the Team
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the focus of the V-Dem Annual Democracy report 2018 is 
“Democracy for All?” for two reasons.
executive summary
fIrSt, cItIzenS – not just the territorial unit in which 
they live – are central to democracy. In addition to the 
conventional averages across countries, we therefore 
analyze liberal and electoral democracy across the 
world weighted by the size of each country’s popula-
tion. this metric captures better how many people in 
the world enjoy democratic rights and freedoms.
SeconD, eVen In DemocrAcIeS, some groups – 
women, social groups, and the poor – are systemati-
cally disadvantaged from access to political power. 
We therefore analyze political exclusion by gender, 
social groups, and socio-economic status.
the key findings are as follows.
global levels of democracy remain high, but autocratization – the decline of 
democratic attributes – affects 2.5 billion people and is gaining momentum
 Democracy is still in good standing across the world. Global 
levels of democracy remain close to their all-time high.
 For the first time since 1979, the number of countries back-
sliding (24) on democracy is again the same as the number of 
countries advancing.
 Autocratization is now manifesting in a number of large 
countries including Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey, and the united 
States.
 Autocratization affects one third of the world’s population, or 
some 2.5 billion people. This represents a massive reduction 
in the global protection of rights and freedoms.
multiparty elections continue to improve, but are at 
risk of losing their meaning
 Core electoral aspects of democracy continue to improve in 
many countries.
 Aspects of democracy that make elections truly meaningful 
are in decline. media autonomy, freedom of expression and 
alternative sources of information, and the rule of law have 
undergone the greatest declines among democracy metrics 
in recent years. This trend affects both autocracies and de-
mocracies.
Despite gradual advances, inclusion remains an illusion
 liberal democracies are systematically better than other politi-
cal regimes at ensuring the de facto ability of all citizens to in-
fluence the political process – including women, various social 
groups, and individuals with different socio-economic status.
 even in democracies, however, some groups – women, minori-
ties and the poor – are systematically disadvantaged in their 
access to political power. political exclusion reduces the scope 
of liberal and electoral democratic rights and freedoms.
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global average levels of inclusion of women and 
minority social groups remain stable
 Global average levels of inclusion of women and minority so-
cial groups remain stable.
 Several countries have continued to advance in terms of in-
clusion for women.
 only 15 percent of the world’s population, or 1.1 billion peo-
ple, live in a society where political power is distributed at 
least somewhat equally by gender.
 Half a billion people live in countries with higher levels of ex-
clusion of minority social groups than ten years ago.
political exclusion due to socio-economic status is 
making the rich even more powerful
 exclusion due to socio-economic status has continuously 
become more severe since the 1970s. Intensified political ex-
clusion now affect poorer groups in countries home to one-
quarter of the world’s population, or almost 2 billion people.
 only six countries registered a higher level of inclusiveness 
in the distribution of political power by socio-economic sta-
tus between 2007 and 2017, while 14 nations declined signifi-
cantly. The countries with the greatest backsliding are Burun-
di, mauritania, Iraq, Yemen, and panama.
 Insufficient access to healthcare or education limits the abil-
ity for political participation for an increasing share of the 
population in 16 and 15 countries respectively, while only five 
(health) and four (education) countries improved.
7exeCuTIVe SummARY
V-Dem In numberS
 Dataset Version 8  
•	 201	countries	with	 
a yearly coverage: 1789-2017
•	 12	new	indices
•	 19	million	data	points
 publications  
•	 66	V-Dem	Working	Papers	
•	 26	Country	Briefs/Reports	
•	 15	Briefing	Papers	
•	 23	papers	published	in	
academic journals
 outreach 
•	 More	than	480	presentations	at	academic	conferences	and	policy	forums
•	 Over	65	visiting	scholars	at	V-Dem	Institute	since	2014
•	 Total	dataset	downloads:	24,000	times	from	more	than	150	countries
•	 Users	of	Online	Analysis	Tools:	more	than	40,000	users.	
•	 Website	V-Dem.net:	150,000	unique	visitors	from	195	countries,	and	
2,360,000 page views
 5 Indices for   
 Democracy Ideals   
•	 Electoral,	liberal,	
participatory, deliberative, 
and egalitarian democracy 
and their component indices
•	 47	mid-level	indices	and	
•	 350+	specific	indicators
 A Vast International   
 Collaboration  
•	 6	Principal	Investigators	and	14	
project managers
•	 V-Dem	Institute	with	17	staff
•	 30	Regional	Managers,	170	Country	
coordinators
•	 3,000	Country	Experts	from	177	
countries
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V-Dem methodology: Aggregating 
expert Assessments
V-Dem hAS DeVelopeD innovative methods for aggregating 
expert judgments in a way that produces valid and reliable esti-
mates of difficult-to-observe concepts. This aspect of the project 
is critical because many key features of democracy are not directly 
observable. For example, it is easy to observe and code whether 
or not a legislature has the legal right to investigate the executive 
when it engages in corruption. However, assessing the extent to 
which the legislature actually does so requires the evaluation of ex-
perts with extensive conceptual and case knowledge.
In general, expert-coded data raise concerns regarding compa-
rability across time and space. Rating complex concepts requires 
judgment, which may vary across experts and cases. moreover, be-
cause even equally knowledgeable experts may disagree, it is im-
perative to report measurement error to the user. We address these 
issues using both cutting-edge theory and methods, resulting in 
valid estimates of concepts relating to democracy.
We have recruited over 3,000 country experts to provide their judg-
ment on different concepts and cases. These experts come from al-
most every country in the world, which allows us to leverage the 
opinions of experts from a diverse set of backgrounds. We typical-
ly gather data from five experts for each observation, which ena-
bles us to statistically account for both uncertainty about estimates 
and potential biases that experts may evince, using a custom-built 
Bayesian measurement model.
We ask our experts very detailed questions about specific con-
cepts. In addition to being of interest in their own right, experts 
are better suited to the task of coding specific concepts rather than 
broader concepts such as “democracy.”  Box m.1 provides the V-
Dem question on academic freedom as an example.
As Box 1 makes clear, we endeavor to both make our questions clear 
to experts and craft response categories that are not overly open to 
interpretation. However, we cannot ensure that two experts under-
stand descriptions such as ‘somewhat respected’ in a uniform way 
(a response of “2” in Box m.1)—even when ‘somewhat’ is accompa-
nied by a carefully formulated description. put simply, one expert’s 
‘somewhat’ may be another expert’s ‘weakly’ (a response of “1” in 
Box m.1), even if they perceive the same level of freedom of expres-
sion in a particular country. of equal importance, all experts code 
more than one indicator over time, and their level of expertise may 
vary, making them more or less reliable in different cases.
laura maxwell, Kyle l. marquardt and Anna lührmann
box m1. question: Is there academic freedom and free-
dom of cultural expression related to political issues?
responses:
0: not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimi-
dation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural ex-
pressions are severely restricted or controlled by the gov-
ernment.
1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom 
and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasion-
ally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met 
with repression.
2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic free-
dom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced rou-
tinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes 
met with repression.
3: mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limita-
tions on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expres-
sion, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.
4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restric-
tions on academic freedom or cultural expression.
pemstein et al. (2018) have developed a Bayesian Item-Response 
Theory (IRT) estimation strategy that accounts for many of these 
concerns, while also providing estimates of remaining random 
measurement error. We use this strategy to convert the ordinal re-
sponses experts provide into continuous estimates of the concepts 
being measured. The basic logic behind these models is that an 
unobserved latent trait exists, but we are only able to see imper-
fect manifestations of this trait. By taking all of these manifest items 
(in our case, expert ratings) together, we are able to provide an es-
timate of the trait. In the dataset, we present the user with a best 
estimate of the value for an observation (the point estimate), as well 
as an estimate of uncertainty (the credible regions, a Bayesian corol-
lary of confidence intervals).
The IRT models we use allow for the possibility that experts have 
different thresholds for their ratings. These thresholds are estimat-
ed based on patterns in the data, and then incorporated into the 
final latent estimate. In this way, we are able to correct for the pre-
viously-discussed concern that one expert’s “somewhat” may be 
another expert’s “weakly” (a concept known as Differential Item 
Functioning). Apart from experts holding different thresholds for 
each category, we also allow for their reliability (in IRT terminolo-
gy, their “discrimination parameter”) to idiosyncratically vary in the 
IRT models, based on the degree to which they agree with other 
experts. experts with higher reliability have a greater influence on 
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concept estimation, accounting for the concern that not all experts 
are equally expert on all concepts and cases.
To facilitate cross-country comparability, we have encouraged coun-
try experts to code multiple countries using two techniques. We re-
fer to the first as bridge coding, in which an expert codes the same 
set of questions for the same time period as the original country they 
coded. This form of coding is particularly useful when the two coun-
tries have divergent regime histories because experts are then more 
likely to code the full range of the ordinal question scale, providing 
us with more information as to where an expert’s thresholds are. By 
extension, this information also provides us with a better sense of 
the thresholds of her colleagues who only coded one of the coun-
tries she coded. The second technique is lateral coding. This has 
the purpose of gaining a great deal of information regarding an indi-
vidual expert’s thresholds by asking her to code many different cases 
that utilize a wide variety of other experts. By comparing her codings 
to those of many other experts, we are able to gain a greater sense of 
how she systematically diverges from experts who code other cases; 
conversely, we also gain information on how those other experts di-
verge from her. Both of these techniques provide us with more pre-
cise and cross-nationally comparable concept estimates.
Finally, we employ anchoring vignettes to further improve the 
estimates of expert-level parameters and thus the concepts we 
measure. Anchoring vignettes are descriptions of hypothetical 
cases that provide all the necessary information to answer a given 
question. Since there is no contextual information in the vignettes, 
they provide a great deal of information about how individual ex-
perts understand the scale itself. Furthermore, since all experts can 
code the same set of vignettes, they provide insight into how ex-
perts systematically diverge from each other in their coding.  In-
corporating information from vignettes into the model thus pro-
vides us with further cross-national comparability in the concept 
estimates, as well as more precision in the estimates themselves.
The output of the IRT models is an interval-level point estimate of the 
latent trait that typically varies from -5 to 5, along with the credible 
regions. These estimates are the best to use for statistical analysis. 
However, they are difficult for some users to interpret in substantive 
terms (what does -1.23 mean with regard to the original scale?). We 
therefore also provide interval-level point estimates that have been 
linearly transformed back to the original coding scale that experts 
use to code each case. These estimates typically run from 0 to 4, and 
users can refer to the V-Dem codebook to substantively interpret 
them. Finally, we also provide ordinal versions of each variable. each 
of the latter two is also accompanied by credible regions.
references
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Joshua Krusell, and Farhad miri. 2018. “The V-Dem measurement 
model: latent Variable Analysis for Cross-national and Cross-Tem-
poral expert-Coded Data.” University of Gothenburg, Varieties of De-
mocracy Institute: Working paper no. 21, 3d edition.
pemstein, Daniel, eitan Tzelgov and Yi-ting Wang. 2015. “evaluating 
and Improving Item Response Theory models for Cross-national 
expert Surveys.” University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy In-
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SuffIx ScAle DeScrIptIon recommenDeD uSe 
None Interval Original output of the V-Dem measurement model   Regression analysis 
_osp Interval Linearized transformation of the measurement  Substantive interpretation of graphs and data
  model output on the original scale  
_ord Ordinal Most likely ordinal value taking uncertainty Substantive interpretation of graphs and data
  estimates into account
_codelow / Interval One Standard deviation above (_codehigh)  Evaluating differences over time within units
 _codehigh  and below (_codelow) the point estimate 
 
_sd Interval Standard deviation of the interval estimate Creating confidence intervals based on user needs
tAble m.1: VerSIonS of the V-Dem InDIcAtorS.
box m.2. Key terms.
point estimate: A best estimate of a concept’s value.
confidence Intervals: Credible regions for which the up-
per and lower bounds represent a range of probable values 
for a point estimate. These bounds are based on the interval 
in which the measurement model places 68 percent of the 
probability mass for each score, which is generally approxi-
mately equivalent to the upper and lower bounds of one 
standard deviation from the median.
Significant Differences or changes: When the upper and 
lower bounds of the confidence intervals for two point es-
timates do not overlap, we are confident that the difference 
between them is real and not a result of measurement error.
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First Release of Historical V-Dem
this year, for the very first time, we release the historical V-Dem data. the historical V-Dem 
project is a unique data collection effort coding numerous indicators of democracy and 
other institutional features dating from the french revolution and continuing all the way 
through to the early twentieth century, covering 91 polities. by including historical V-Dem, 
around 200 of the V-Dem indicators extend as far back as 1789.
covers 91 polities from 1789
The Historical V-Dem sample includes 14 polities from Africa and 
the middle east, 21 from the Americas, 14 from Asia and the pacific, 
and 42 from europe. Altogether 91 polities are covered, although 
coverage is somewhat lower for most indicators. The integration 
of Historical V-Dem in the V-Dem dataset means that many coun-
tries have data coverage on numerous V-Dem indicators from 1789 
to the present. These include all major countries with continuous 
lineage as independent states from the 18th or 19th centuries, but 
also some major colonies such as India and Indonesia that are cov-
ered for the full time period. Historical V-Dem also contains several 
additional historical polities that have ceased to exist, for example 
Bavaria and the Two Sicilies.
new indicators
In addition to extending existing V-Dem indicators and indices – 
such as  V-Dem’s electoral Democracy Index; see Figure H.1 – His-
torical V-Dem introduces 70 new indicators. These include both 
indicators coded by country experts and many indicators coded 
by research assistants. The new indicators pertain to various in-
stitutional features, some of which were particularly relevant for 
19th century polities. For example, as the 19th century was an era 
of state building, Historical V-Dem includes new indicators focus-
ing on the state and features of bureaucracy, as well as indicators 
on the support coalitions of political regimes.
carl henrik Knutsen, moa olin and jan teorell
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the creation of historical V-Dem/methodology
The Historical V-Dem project started in 2013 and has since acquired 
significant human and financial support. A number of research as-
sistants from several universities have been involved in coding in-
dicators that did not require the attention of country experts. In 
addition, one or sometimes two highly qualified country experts 
were identified and recruited to code each polity for indicators of a 
more evaluative nature. The ideal Historical V-Dem country expert 
has an accomplished academic record of working on the political 
history of the country, identifiable competencies in a broad range 
of political-institutional features and comparative knowledge of 
other countries. The historical country experts conducted their 
coding through the V-Dem web-platform, which was customized 
for Historical V-Dem’s purposes. The country expert coding started 
in December 2015 and is still ongoing to improve the coverage for 
some countries.
For the V-Dem dataset, released in April this year, the Historical V-
Dem data is merged with existing V-Dem indicators. Hence, many 
of the V-Dem indicators now extend back to 1789. In order to en-
sure comparability of the V-Dem and Historical V-Dem scores, and 
that the data from 1789 to 2017 constitute consistent time series, 
several measures have been taken. To indicate one example, His-
torical V-Dem experts always code twenty years of history from the 
20th century, thus providing “coding overlap” with other V-Dem 
experts. These measures provide valuable pieces of information, 
which are leveraged by the V-Dem measurement model that, to 
the extent it is possible, minimizes coder error and addresses issues 
of comparability across countries and over time.
the historical V-Dem team
The Historical V-Dem project is managed from lund university in 
Sweden and the university of oslo in norway. The project works 
in collaboration with the V-Dem Institute at Gothenburg univer-
sity, Aarhus university, Boston university, Harvard university, and 
the university of Texas at Austin. Jan Teorell (lund university) and 
Carl Henrik Knutsen (university of oslo) are the principal investiga-
tors on the project. 
Historical V-Dem is mainly funded through two large research 
grants from the norwegian and Swedish Research Councils.
hIStorIcAl V-Dem In Short
•	 Extends	existing	V-Dem	data	back	 to	1789	and	adds	new	
indicators 
•	 Includes	around	250	indicators	of	democracy	and	other	in-
stitutional features
•	 Covers	91	polities
•	 Releases	data	incorporated	in	the	V-Dem	V8	dataset
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fIgure h.1: electorAl DemocrAcy InDex (eDI) In frAnce 
SInce the french reVolutIon, 1789-2017.
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V-Dem collAborAtIonS AnD eVentS
Notre Dame, USA
Lisbon, Portugal
Gothenburg, Sweden
Lusaka, Zambia
“
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Tartu, Estonia
Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic
Lusaka, Zambia
“
15V-Dem CollABoRATIonS AnD eVenTS
While the global level of democracy is not changing dramatically, and the majority of the world’s population lives in a democracy, one third of the world’s population – 2.5 billion people – live in countries with declining democratic traits. the most visible feature of democracy – elections – remains robust and is even 
improving in some places.  Where backsliding occurs, it does so in more obscure ways, such as 
by undermining media freedom, freedom of expression, and the rule of law. With continued 
decline in these areas, the meaningfulness of elections may also become threatened.
Section 1: State of the World 2017  
– liberal and electoral Democracy
hoW DemocrAtIc is the world today? When addressing this 
question, most analyses report on the number or share of coun-
tries that are democratic, authoritarian, or change. Yet citizens—
not just the territorial unit in which they live—are central to de-
mocracy. Bhutan’s recent transition to democracy serving 800 000 
people is laudable but 1.4 billion people still breathe under dicta-
torship in China. The recent significant declines in liberal democ-
racy in India and the united States alone have affected some 1.6 
billion people, while less than 1 million people benefited from the 
improvements in Bhutan and Vanuatu.
This first section of the Democracy for All? Democracy Report 2018 
analyzes the state of democracy in the world as of 2017. In view of 
this year’s theme we introduce a new metric, in addition to conven-
tional country average measures:  levels of democracy weighted 
by the size of each country’s population. These measures better 
reflect how many people in the world enjoy democratic rights and 
freedoms. Furthermore, countries with larger populations typical-
ly exert influence over neighbouring countries and in the interna-
tional arena in ways that small countries do not. our dual metric 
approach recognizes the importance of each state, but also each 
individual’s rights.
Democracy in the World 2017
The state of the world in terms of liberal democracy 2017 is de-
picted in Figure 1.1. It is based on V-Dem’s liberal Democracy Index 
(lDI), where each quintile on the 0-1 scale has been given its own 
color-code. This is a broad stroke that does not take into account 
the confidence intervals around each country’s point estimate. lib-
eral democracy is measured as the existence of electoral democ-
racy in combination with three additional components: rule of law 
ensuring respect for civil liberties, and constraints on the executive 
by the judiciary, as well as by the legislature.1 
By this measure, as the world map shows, liberal democracy is by 
the end of 2017 still most well-established and remains relatively 
strong in portions of the Americas, europe, Southern Africa, and 
South-east Asia. The exact ratings and changes over the last ten 
1. The V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index reflects both the liberal and electoral principles of democracy, each of which constitutes one half of the scores for theLiberal Democracy Index 
(LDI). V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) is the first systematic measure of the de facto existence of all institutions in Robert Dahl’s (1971, 1989) famous articulation of “polyarchy” as 
electoral democracy. For details about the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of all V-Dem’s democracy indices, see Coppedge et al. (2018b) and Pemstein et al. (2018).
fIgure 1.1: the StAte of lIberAl DemocrAcy In 2017.
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years for all countries are found below in Figure 1.6, and the more 
detailed statistics across all varieties of democracy are in the Ap-
pendix. But what are the trends and main recent changes in the 
world?
A global trend of Autocratization  
– except in Africa
Figure 1 displays the average global level of liberal democracy, 
based on 178 countries in the world, from 1972 to 2017, accompa-
nied by confidence intervals capturing the full range of uncertainty 
associated with the estimates.2 It also depicts the average levels for 
each of the regions of the world. The left-hand panel is based on 
traditional averages across all countries. It captures the well- known 
“third wave” of democratization, which began with the 1974 over-
throw of the Estado Novo dictatorship in portugal. Subsequent dec-
ades, characterized by the end of the Cold War and frequent pro-
tests across the Global South, saw a gradual but steady increase in 
liberal democracy until around the year 2005. Since then, levels of 
democracy have been relatively stable across the world. 
notably, however, there is a small decline, although this is within 
the confidence bounds, over the past few years. It is particularly 
noticeable for the three regions with the highest average levels 
of democracy: Western europe and north America, latin America 
and the Caribbean, and eastern europe. Thus, the autocratization3 
trend we are witnessing today seems to occur primarily in the more 
democratic regions of the world. Yet, that depiction conceals that 
some of the most populous countries are part of this autocratiza-
tion trend.
Therefore, the right-hand panel in Figure 1.2 displays levels of de-
mocracy weighted by the size of each country’s population. Cal-
2. Following V-Dem’s methodology, “countries” includes semi-sovereign political units like Palestine. The number of 
countries in the dataset varies in the chosen period, from 157 in 1972 to 178 in 2017, dependent on the emergence of 
new countries and the dissolution of others. For a full account of the political units, see Coppedge et al. (2018d).
3. Autocratization naturally has a “floor effect” in that extremely 
autocratic countries cannot become much worse, but in principle 
autocratization can affect countries at any level on the scale.
The term autocratization means democratization in 
reverse. It denotes a decline of democratic qualities. Simply 
put, regardless whether the country is a democracy or 
autocracy, it is becoming worse. We use autocratization and 
backsliding interchangeably.
fIgure 1.2: lIberAl DemocrAcy: globAl AnD regIonAl AVerAgeS  
(rIght pAnel populAtIon-WeIghteD).
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4.  The confidence intervals, or highest posterior densities, that V-Dem brings along from all the baseline country-level indicators, indicate that with some amount of possibility, we could still be 
at 2012 levels of democracy in the world. At the same time, these also indicate, with the same probability, that we could possibly already have reversed back to 1978-levels of democracy. While 
taking the estimations of uncertainty seriously, we have chosen here, in this report, to focus on the point estimates that are the levels with the highest probability, for the sake of parsimony and 
to avoid making the text unnecessarily dense to digest (see methodology section at the beginning of this report). 
5. See methodology section at the beginning of this report. 
fIgure 1.3: number of countrIeS WIth SIgnIfIcAnt chAngeS on 
lIberAl DemocrAcy InDex (rIght pAnel populAtIon-WeIghteD).
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Advancers Backsliders
culating the averages in this manner allows us to understand the 
level of democracy that the average citizen in each region is living 
under. First, the levels of liberal democracy and its components are 
overall much lower when weighted by population. This reflects the 
fact that that a number of small states score very high on the lDI, 
while countries like China with large populations, do not.
Second, the current reversal is much more pronounced when 
we take the size of the population into account. The population-
weighted estimates show a particularly steep decline in the last 
few years, suggesting that recent trends in autocratization are af-
fecting large portions of the global population. From this perspec-
tive, the global level of democracy peaked around 2004 and in 
terms of these point estimates, we now back to the global level of 
democracy recorded shortly after the end of the Soviet union in 
1991. The last six years has brought us back 25 years in time.4
In terms of the share of the population enjoying democratic rights 
and freedoms, Western europe and north America are back to lev-
els of liberal democracy last seen nearly 40 years ago, and latin 
America some 25 years ago. These are, indeed, worrying findings. 
The only region that does seem to be relatively resilient to the cur-
rent autocratization trend is sub-Saharan Africa, which in the popu-
lation-weighted metric even shows a small increase in the region’s 
level of democracy.
A growing challenge  
Another way to look at the global development of democracy is 
displayed in Figure 1.3.
The left-hand panel displays the number of countries experiencing 
significant change over the prior ten years in terms of the lDI, for 
each year since 1972. The right-hand panel depicts it weighted by 
population size.
We measure change by taking the difference of the score at time 
t and time t
-10
. This ten-year measure is designed to capture both 
rapid and gradual change. We report only significant changes, by 
which we mean that the confidence intervals provided in the V-
Dem data do not overlap.5 These confidence intervals can be rela-
tively wide, meaning that our measure is conservative since it is 
more likely to err on the side of not reporting a change. 
The dashed green line depicts the number of countries each year 
for which there was advancement on the lDI. The solid red line 
shows the number of countries that experienced backsliding. By 
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6. This builds on the regime-classification by Lührmann et al. (2018). While using V-Dem’s 
data, this measure is not officially endorsed by the Steering Committee of V-Dem (only the 
main V-Dem democracy indices have such an endorsement).
7. Lührmann et al. (2018).
fIgure 1.4: ShAre of populAtIon by regIme type In 2017.
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these measures, the height of the third wave occurred between 
1993 and 1999 when over 70 countries made significant advances 
on the lDI each year, while only four to six countries were sliding 
back. In fact, this imbalance in favour of democratic advances over 
setbacks has persisted every year to varying degrees since 1978 – 
until 2017.
There is a clear downward trend in the number of countries mak-
ing democratic advancements since at least 2008. Conversely, the 
number of countries registering significant change towards autoc-
racy has increased since roughly around the turn of the century. 
last year, the number of backsliding countries recorded is the same 
(N=24) as the number of countries making advancements. This has 
not occurred since 1979.
one aspect that makes this even more worrying is that the popu-
lation living in the 24 countries backsliding on liberal democracy 
by 2017 outnumbers the population living in advancing countries. 
The share of the world population living in countries experiencing 
an advancement or decline over the same period depicted in the 
right-hand graph in Figure 1.3 testify to this.
During the last two years, there is a striking rise in the share of the 
world’s population living in countries backsliding on democracy. 
By 2017, one third of the world’s population – or 2.5 billion people – 
lived in countries that are part of a global autocratization trend. The 
countries with the largest population exhibiting decline in 2017 are: 
India, the united States, Brazil, Russia, Democratic Republic of Con-
go, Turkey, Thailand, ukraine and poland. Thus, key countries across 
the democracy-autocracy spectrum are shrinking whatever demo-
cratic space was present. This is one important metric to capture 
what is actually happening: a much larger share of the world popu-
lation is experiencing autocratization than the share experiencing 
democratization. 
A majority of the population Still live in 
Democracies
until now, we have analysed trends based on significant changes 
along the spectrum that V-Dem’s indices and indicators provide. 
Another important perspective is qualitative shifts from one type 
of regime to another, in particular when such transitions cross the 
democracy-autocracy divide. Despite evidence of a trend towards 
autocratization, a majority of the world’s population (52 percent) 
still live in democracies, as Figure 1.4 shows6, but only 14 percent in 
the liberal variety. The largest share, 38 percent, of the world popu-
lation, lives in the more limited form of electoral democracy. never-
theless, these statistics show that for a majority of people the most 
common form of rule is still democracy.
The bar for being classified as an “electoral democracy” is reasonable 
but not exceedingly demanding: holding fairly free and fair multi-
party party elections and an average score on V-Dem’s electoral De-
mocracy Index (eDI) above 0.5, reflecting achievement of Dahl’s in-
stitutional prerequisites of democracy to a reasonable extent.7 There 
were 56 electoral democracies in the world in 2017. liberal democra-
cies fulfil a more demanding notion of democracy that also includes 
the rule of law and horizontal constraints on the executive. only 39 
countries met this standard in 2017. In total 95 out of the 178 coun-
tries in the V-Dem dataset were classified as democracies in that year.
In electoral autocracies, elections are held and some political and 
civil liberties exist but their meaningfulness is undermined by 
government repression, censorship, and intimidation. Another 56 
countries had this type of regime in 2017. Countries rated extreme-
ly low in terms of democracy, where the chief executive is not ac-
countable to citizens, are classified as closed autocracies. We find 
27 such countries in 2017.
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8.  Lührmann et al. (2018).  9. Coppedge (2018).
Advancers and backsliders
Where are citizens most likely to experience declines or advance 
in access to democracy, political rights, and civil liberties? Here we 
report the findings for all countries, focusing on states where there 
have been significant changes. We start with the regime perspec-
tive, in which countries are classified as liberal- and electoral de-
mocracies, or as electoral- and closed autocracies. We then look at 
more fine-grained changes along the V-Dem indices, focusing on 
significant changes over the last ten years, followed by a look at the 
alterations of the past two years.
regime breakdowns and  
transitions to Democracy
Based on the Regimes of the World classification, Table A7 in the Ap-
pendix shows the status and changes in regime type between 2007 
and 2017 for all 178 countries.8 looking at changes over the past 10 
years, 20 countries have slipped down one category. Among them 
we find four members of the eu lost the status as liberal democ-
racy to become electoral democracies: Hungary, poland, lithuania, 
and Slovakia. But three other countries are also downgraded from 
liberal to electoral democracies: Israel, mauritius, and South Africa.
notably, eight democracies broke down over the past ten years 
and are now classified as electoral autocracies: Comoros, Hondu-
ras, Iraq, nicaragua, Tanzania, Turkey, ukraine, and Zambia. Four 
countries that used to be electoral democracies are now classified 
as closed: palestine (West Bank), Syria, Yemen, and uzbekistan.
fIgure 1.5: chAngeS on the lIberAl DemocrAcy InDex, 2007-2017.
Among the 17 countries that improved, six closed autocracies have 
advanced significantly: nepal and Bhutan became electoral de-
mocracies, and Fiji, myanmar, Bangladesh and maldives electoral 
autocracies. Tunisia is the only country that transitioned from au-
tocracy to become a liberal democracy, while eight additional 
countries advanced to become electoral democracies, including 
Guinea-Bissau, moldova, and malawi.
countries with Significant changes  
in the past ten years
Figure 1.5 plots the changes taking place over the past ten years, 
comparing levels of liberal democracy in 2007 to levels in 2017 and 
the more fine-grained V-Dem index for liberal democracy. labelled 
countries are those with significant changes over the past ten years.
There are also a number of countries with significant advances in var-
ious liberal-democratic traits over the past ten years (N=24). These 
countries have made significant improvements on the lDI but most 
of these are countries with rather small populations, save nigeria.
Yet, a large number of countries register significant and substan-
tive rates of autocratization. We find the world’s most populous de-
mocracies – the united States and India – as backsliders on democ-
racy for the first time in the V-Dem data. They are thus joining other 
democracies we registered as backsliders already last year, such as 
Brazil, Hungary, poland, and Suriname. Several world and regional 
powers are found among the backsliders, which gives additional 
cause for concern since diffusion is “no illusion.”9 In particular, the 
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bAcKSlIDerS 
 change  lDI 2017 lDI 2015
Brazil -0.19 0.57 0.76
Poland -0.19 0.60 0.79
Turkey -0.16 0.12 0.27
Croatia -0.13 0.55 0.68
Romania -0.12 0.49 0.61
United States -0.12 0.73 0.85
ADVAncerS 
 change  lDI 2017 lDI 2015
Burkina Faso 0.20 0.50 0.30
Gambia 0.19 0.30 0.11
tAble 1.1: mAIn ADVAncerS AnD bAcKSlIDerS, 
pASt tWo yeArS.
united States’ decline combined with an explicit denunciation of 
democracy as a foreign policy priority by the Trump administra-
tion does not bode well. Three emerging powers among the BRICS 
nations also register significant backsliding – Brazil, Russia and In-
dia. China remains at the end of the autocratic regime spectrum. 
Among the eastern european countries, poland and Hungary are 
key regional power players that are backsliding significantly. 
countries with Significant changes  
over the last two years
Some of the significant changes displayed in Figure 1.5 have oc-
curred only recently. Table 1.1 presents a list of the countries signifi-
cant changes have occurred over the last two years. For example, 
democratic backsliding in the united States has taken place pri-
marily during these past two years. Turkey continues its descent 
into dictatorship with every passing year, but it has now comes 
close to hitting rock-bottom on the scale with a score of 0.12. Bra-
zil, Croatia, poland, and Romania are now at middling levels on the 
lDI after also suffering from significant declines over the last two 
years. In poland, swift and far-reaching constitutional changes have 
reduced checks and balances, affecting in particular the judiciary.10 
Similarly, the Romanian government has limited the rule of law and 
individual liberties – allegedly in order to curb corruption.11
Both two cases of significant democratization over the past two 
years are from West Africa – Burkina Faso and the Gambia. In par-
ticular, the case of Burkina Faso is remarkable since it shows that au-
tocratization can be rapidly reversed: In 2014 president Blaise Com-
paore, who had held power since 1987, attempted to modify the 
constitutional term limits but was ousted after massive protests. 
After a short period of uncertainty and military rule, the Burkinabe 
10.  Rohac, Dalibor (2018).  
11.  Clark, David (2017).
Note: The table displays only countries with significant (without overlapping 
confidence intervals) and substantively relevant changes (more than 0.1 
difference on the LDI scale).
12. OSF (2015).
people participated in peaceful and competitive multi-party elec-
tions in november, 2015. Burkina Faso’s rating on the lDI has now 
reached an all-time high. Gambia’s incumbent autocrat of 23 years, 
president Yahya Jammeh, lost the 2016 elections and eventually 
stepped down in the midst of eCoWAS’s intervention in January 
2017. It remains to be seen if the new Gambian government will fa-
cilitate a full transition to democracy.
last ten years – overview of All countries
The last ten years’ developments on the index of liberal democ-
racy for all countries, and taking the confidence intervals into ac-
count, is provided in Figure 1.6. Here the reader finds every country 
among the 178 contemporary states V-Dem measures, and their 
status as of 2017 compared to 2007. Green country names and dots 
with confidence interval bars indicate significant advancers, while 
red names, dots, and bars designate the significant backsliders. 
The reader should note that a few of the latter are countries at the 
very lowest levels of democratic quality. They are simply extremely 
undemocratic in all respects with a high degree of certainty, and 
therefore very small substantive changes register as significant. But 
there are also some countries, presented in grey because the con-
fidence intervals overlap, for which the substantive changes are 
large and those should be noted. Among these we find, for ex-
ample, Greece with the lDI dropping by 0.12 points. However, this 
drop is not noted as significant, possibly because V-Dem experts 
disagree about what the economic crisis and subsequent political 
changes in Greece mean for the quality of democracy. on the oth-
er hand, V-Dem experts agree that media freedom has declined 
in Greece over the last ten years, reflecting the fact that both the 
Syriza government and its predecessor have taken measures un-
dermining media pluralism.12 
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fIgure 1.6: countrIeS by Score on V-Dem’S lIberAl DemocrAcy InDex (lDI) 2017 AnD 2007.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●Sierra Leone
Niger
Tanzania
Mali
Bolivia
Moldova
Lesotho
India
Solomon Islands
Nigeria
Seychelles
El Salvador
Albania
Sri Lanka
Paraguay
Malawi
Indonesia
Mexico
Nepal
Romania
Guyana
Liberia
Colombia
Burkina Faso
Guatemala
Timor−Leste
Bhutan
Hungary
Mongolia
Ghana
Georgia
Croatia
Brazil
Botswana
Senegal
Israel
Namibia
Bulgaria
Poland
Peru
São Tomé and Príncipe
Panama
Benin
Suriname
Tunisia
South Africa
Argentina
Vanuatu
Trinidad and Tobago
Barbados
Taiwan
Greece
Mauritius
Spain
South Korea
Cape Verde
Jamaica
United States of America
Slovakia
Lithuania
Cyprus
Latvia
Luxembourg
Japan
Austria
Italy
Czech Republic
Uruguay
Canada
Ireland
Chile
Slovenia
United Kingdom
Iceland
Germany
France
Netherlands
Belgium
Portugal
New Zealand
Australia
Finland
Costa Rica
Denmark
Switzerland
Estonia
Sweden
Norway
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Liberal Democracy index
● ● ● ●2007 2017 2017 − Advancer 2017 − Backslider
Score and Confidence Intervals
22 SeCTIon 1: lIBeRAl DemoCRACY – STATuS AnD TRenDS
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●North Korea
Eritrea
Syria
Saudi Arabia
Yemen
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Equatorial Guinea
Bahrain
Burundi
China
Tajikistan
Azerbaijan
Palestine/Gaza
Cuba
Cambodia
Qatar
Laos
Chad
Swaziland
Thailand
Democratic Republic of Congo
Sudan
Ethiopia
United Arab Emirates
Republic of the Congo
Russia
Nicaragua
Turkey
Belarus
Venezuela
Egypt
Djibouti
Oman
Kazakhstan
Somalia
Angola
Maldives
Iran
Cameroon
Mauritania
Zanzibar
Bangladesh
Algeria
Libya
Palestine/West Bank
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Zimbabwe
Rwanda
Malaysia
Guinea
Afghanistan
Central African Republic
Ukraine
Jordan
Armenia
Togo
Comoros
Dominican Republic
Myanmar
Madagascar
Haiti
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Honduras
Morocco
Zambia
Uganda
Kuwait
Pakistan
Gabon
Iraq
Kosovo
Somaliland
The Gambia
Serbia
Hong Kong
Lebanon
Guinea−Bissau
Papua New Guinea
Mozambique
Fiji
Kenya
Macedonia
Kyrgyzstan
Montenegro
Singapore
Ecuador
Philippines
Ivory Coast
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Liberal Democracy index
● ● ● ●2007 2017 2017 − Advancer 2017 − Backslider
Score and Confidence Intervals
23SeCTIon 1: lIBeRAl DemoCRACY – STATuS AnD TRenDS
13.  These capture all the institutional requisites of Dahl’s formulation of polyarchy. 
See Teorell et al. (2018).
electoral  Democracy Index
Which Aspects of Democracy  
Are at risk?
until now, the analysis has focused on the V-Dem liberal Democra-
cy Index (lDI), which captures both liberal and electoral aspects of 
democracy by joining the liberal Component Index (lCI) and the 
electoral Democracy Index (eDI). The nuanced nature of the V-Dem 
data makes it possible to discern unevenness in trends across these 
different traits, down to the level of specific indicators. 
To help the reader follow this “drilling-down” into the various as-
pects of democracy, Figure 1.7 presents the conceptual structure 
of the lDI and eDI, their main- and subcomponents, and the indi-
vidual indicators of those subcomponents.
The lDI has two main components: the eDI and the lCI. The lib-
eral component (lCI) in turn has three sub-components, while the 
electoral (eDI) has five13, each measured by a series of indicators. 
The lDI pattern has already been discussed above and we start the 
analysis here at the next level in the conceptual scheme: the lDI 
and its components and the eDI and the three components of the 
liberal dimension.
The lDI has two main components: the eDI and the lCI. The lib-
eral component (lCI) in turn has three sub-components, while the 
electoral (eDI) has five13, each measured by a series of indicators. 
The lDI pattern has already been discussed above and we start the 
analysis here at the next level in the conceptual scheme: the lDI 
and its components and the eDI and the three components of the 
liberal dimension.
The left-hand graph in Figure 1.8 is again based on traditional aver-
ages across countries and it shows that the liberal subcomponents 
measuring judicial constraints on the executive and rule of law al-
ready had relatively high global average levels before the “third 
wave” of democratization.14 With the third wave starting in 1974, 
these improved further. At the same time, this period meant that 
the third subcomponent capturing the extent to which legislatures 
can also constrain the power of the executive, caught up to a sig-
nificant extent. While rule of law seems to have clearly reached the 
highest average levels globally, it is also the subcomponent with 
the most measurable decline in recent years. The electoral democ-
racy component was, and still is, at significantly lower levels. 
When weighted by population size, as in the right-hand panel, the 
recent trend of autocratization is more pronounced, in ways simi-
lar to the regional comparisons in the previous section. It seems 
to affect all aspects to some extent but he electoral democracy 
measure (eDI) in particular, registers a steep downward curve after 
around 2010. It seems that a large portion of the downward trend 
in the overall levels of liberal democracy is in fact due to this auto-
cratization in the electoral arena.
In order to analyze what aspects of the eDI are driving this change, 
Figure 1.9. drills down into developments amongst the constitu-
ent components of the eDI, from 1972 until 2017. As above, the 
V-Dem lIberAl DemocrAcy InDex
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fIgure 1.7: explAnAtIon of lIberAl DemocrAcy, electorAl DemocrAcy, AnD theIr componentS.
14. See Figure A.2 in Appendix, which illustrates how they have developed over time 
and in different regions.
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left-hand graph shows the levels of democracy averaged by coun-
try, while the right-hand graph depicts the levels of democracy 
weighted by the size of the population.
The straight averages across countries in the left-hand graph show 
that three out of the four subcomponents started with levels be-
tween 0.3 and 0.4. Suffrage was already in the early 1970s some-
thing of a non-issue. The elected officials index improves steadily 
throughout the period. The big boost in scores in 1992-93 registers 
in particular for freedom of expression and freedom of association, 
reaching around 0.7 before a small decline appears at the end of 
the time series for the latter and a much more marked, steeper de-
cline in the former.
The improvements in the quality of elections (Clean elections in-
dex) during the same period were much more modest in terms 
of magnitude. However, during the 2000s, until the end of the se-
ries, the Clean election Index is the only one for which we register 
a small, but steady, increase on its scores. In short, whatever small 
decline we find in the overall levels of electoral democracy on this 
unweighted metric are due to a small decline in more recent years 
on freedom of expression in particular. The right-hand, popula-
tion weighted metric makes the autocratization trend more pro-
nounced after around 2010. In particular, a shrinking space for free-
dom of expression is particularly obvious in the right-hand graph 
in Figure 1.9 after 2012. While the subcomponent measuring free-
dom of expression also takes a dip, and somewhat later, the elec-
toral components seems to be hovering around a relatively con-
stant level – or even increase as is the for the elected officials Index. 
Thus, the decline in the overall eDI measure is to a large degree due 
to autocratization in the form of reduction of freedom of expres-
sion and alternative sources of information.
fIgure 1.8: trenDS In 
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changes – by components of liberal and 
electoral Democracy
Given the trends discussed above, there is a need to further dissect 
what has happened in the past ten years with the subcomponents 
of the liberal and electoral democracy aspects.
Figure 1.10 displays the number of countries that have improved or 
declined substantially on indices capturing the subcomponents of 
the lCI and the eDI. For subcomponent indices appearing above 
the diagonal line, more countries have improved than have de-
clined, and the reverse is true for those appearing below the diago-
nal line. Figure A2 in the online appendix specifies which countries 
have changed on these indices, as well as on additional aspects of 
democracy.   
Disaggregating the subcomponents reveals additional information 
about the ongoing autocratization trend. In particular, it demon-
strates why it is so hard to detect. Key characteristics of democracy, 
such as the Clean election Index (capturing how free and fair elec-
tions are), and the index measuring the extent to which elected 
officials are actually vested with power on a national level (elected 
officials Index), have improved significantly in a large number of 
countries over the last ten years, while declining in only a few. Such 
trends give the appearance of robust democracy, particularly to 
outsiders or when taken on the aggregate level.
Figure 1.10 also show that despite advances in the electoral fac-
ets of democracy, less visible changes in rights, freedoms, and the 
rule of law are undermining democracy. These important aspects 
of democracy are in significant decline in many countries, while 
improving in only a few. In particular, this concerns the subcompo-
nent measuring freedom of expression and alternative sources of 
information that has been affected negatively in 19 countries over 
the last ten years, while improving in only eleven. The subcompo-
nents measuring rule of law and freedom of association also regis-
ter more backsliders than advancers.
Since these are key institutional requisites of electoral democracy, 
as Dahl once argued,15 we pursue the disaggregation further to the 
most precise level of analysis: the individual indicators. Figure 1.11 
shows the same type of graph as Figure 1.10, comparing 2007 to 
2017, but displays now the 25 specific indicators that constitute the 
components of the eDI. For ease of use, we have coded indicators 
by components.16
All indicators measuring the freedom of expression and alternative 
sources of information component, are found below the diago-
nal line. All indicators measuring electoral aspects in the index for 
clean elections are either above or very close to the line. In particu-
lar, two of the most fundamental indicators related to elections – 
the extent to which the elections were multiparty in practice and 
national officials are subject to elections -– record more countries 
improving than declining. The freedom of association indicators 
are mostly close to the line with two exceptions  found below the 
line that both measure the extent to which civil society can operate 
freely from government interference or repression, and one above 
the line that measures an electoral characteristic.
Figure 1.11 thus gives a precise picture of how the current trend of 
autocratization is unfolding, and how some ruling elites go about 
fIgure 1.10: by componentS of lIberAl AnD electorAl DemocrAcy: 
number of countrIeS WIth SIgnIfIcAnt chAngeS, 2007-2017.
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15.  Dahl (1971, 1989). 
16. The Elected Officials index (v2x_elecoff) is an index that is constructed from 16 factual indicators 
that are conditional on each other in a complex formula. See Teorell et al. (2018) for details.
17. For instance, Bermeo (2016) argues that contemporary backsliding is not characterized 
by the disappearance of electoral regimes but by more clandestine strategies such as 
manipulations of the media.
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pursuing undemocratic agendas. It corroborates findings in some 
of the earlier research on backsliding but provides much greater 
detail.17 The institutions surrounding elections that are emblem-
atic of democracy typically remain in good standing or even im-
prove. elections are very visible events that attract attention, not 
only from national groups but also from international media, multi-
lateral organizations, and other watch-dog institutions. Changes in 
electoral institutions and practices also tend to be more verifiable 
than many other aspects of democracy, and there are normally a 
number of processes available to conduct such verification.
By contrast, we find that the most negative developments occur 
in ways that are less conspicuous violations. Government censor-
ship of the media and harassment of journalists can occur gradual-
ly by relatively obscure means such as inducements, intimidations, 
and co-optation. These tactics lead naturally to increasing levels 
of self-censorship and fewer explicit criticisms of the government 
expressed in the media. The predictable result is a narrower range 
of political perspectives in the public sphere, as well as a general 
decline in the freedom of expression. Correspondingly, leaders can 
incrementally constrain the permitted space for autonomous aca-
demia, civil society organizations, and cultural institutions to impair 
their abilities to function as pro-democratic actors, while carving 
out an increasing level of acceptance for such measures.
While elections typically occur once every four or five years, these 
rights, freedoms, and the rule of law are either maintained or com-
promised on an everyday basis. each step can appear relatively in-
significant. The effects add up and are now apparent in Figure 1.11. 
Critically, the rights and institutions being diminished are the ones 
that make electoral processes meaningful and fully democratic. 
This is a worrisome set of developments, posing a clear challenge 
to the future of democracy.
The pattern of backsliding in the most populous democracy – In-
dia – exemplifies this trend. We discuss it more in detail at the end 
of this section. In India, the infringements on media freedom and 
the civil society activities of democracy following the election of 
a Hindu-nationalist government have started to undermine the 
longest-standing and most populous democracy in the Global 
South. Yet, the main indicators of the core electoral aspects of de-
mocracy do not show significant decline.  It remains to be seen if 
this trend will be reversed in the coming years or if India will de-
scend further into the authoritarian regime spectrum – as during 
their authoritarian interlude from 1975-77.
Following the election of Donald Trump, the united States is now 
significantly less democratic in 2017 than it was in 2007 but the pat-
tern is slightly different. The backsliding is mainly found in the liber-
al components of democracy. measures of effective oversight and 
use of the legislature’s power to investigate the executive, opposi-
18. The picture is only slightly different when looking at the regime categories based on countries’ status in 2007: one third of countries that qualified as liberal democracy in 2007 experienced 
significant changes by 2017, compared to 58 percent of electoral democracies, 64 percent of electoral autocracies and 71 percent of closed autocracies. 
tion party oversight, compliance with the judiciary, and executive 
respect for the constitution have all declined. Thus, the V-Dem data 
testifies that the principal issue testing the resiliency of American 
democracy concerns the role of Congress in holding the execu-
tive responsible for following the constitution and adhering to the 
law. At the same time, we also register some significant negative 
changes in the overall fairness of elections, freedom of discussion, 
and the range of political perspectives in the media.
Different patterns of Autocratization
Another important finding in the annual Democracy Report 2018 
is that there are different patterns of decline in the more demo-
cratic countries compared to the less democratic ones. V-Dem is 
the first dataset to capture not only liberal and electoral aspects of 
democracy, but also to measure the egalitarian, participatory and 
deliberative components of democracy. The figure below depicts 
that breadth and provides an overview of which subcomponents 
across all the varieties of democracy that register significant chang-
es – without overlapping confidence intervals – over the last ten 
years, comparing scores from 2007 to 2017. Countries are sorted, 
first by Regimes of the World-type, and second, within each cat-
egory, on how many aspects have changed, from many to few, 
based on the summary scores in the right-most columns. The tint-
ed colors indicate cases in which the index did not change, but one 
or more of its constitutive indicators did.
The figure enables comparison across categories, from liberal- and 
electoral democracy to electoral- and closed autocracies, with re-
gard to the number of changes that occurred in each and whether 
such changes represented advances or backsliding. one can also 
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compare within categories to see if countries tended to advance or 
backslide and in which aspects of democracy these changes reg-
istered.  The figure also provides column summary scores, making 
it easy to identify the subcomponents of the different varieties af-
fected the most, and the least, by positive or negative develop-
ments over the past ten years, from 2007 to 2017.
our first observation is that volatility – the number of aspects that 
are improving or declining – is overall lower in both democratic 
regime categories, than in the two autocratic ones. Democratic 
countries tend to be more stable. one third of all liberal democ-
racies record some significant changes, and the same is true for 
about half of all electoral democracies. Conversely, some change 
is registered in two thirds of countries in the electoral- and closed 
autocratic regime categories.18
Second, there are only nine countries that have changed signifi-
cantly in more than five areas of democracy during the last ten 
years. These include developments in Tunisia, Bhutan, myanmar, 
and libya, as well as drastic deteriorations in Burundi, Yemen, Tur-
key, Venezuela and Thailand. Somalia also exhibits a high level of 
volatility as the textbook example of a fragile state.
most other countries have changed significantly only with regards 
to one or two selected aspects, whereas most components are sta-
ble. For instance, in the united States it is mainly the legislative con-
straints on the executive that have weakened significantly along 
with the quality of public reasoning. In Greece the main negative 
developments are in the area of freedom of expression and local 
elections, and so on. In sum, most democratic change, whether 
positive or negative, is gradual and affecting only an area or two at 
a time, even in this medium-term, ten-year perspective.
A third observation that stands out is that not a single democracy 
– neither in the liberal nor in the electoral category – has record-
ed significant decline in the purely electoral aspects of democracy 
or in freedom of association. These highly visible and symbolically 
important aspects are not affected by the current global trend of 
autocratization. Rather, positive changes tend to be found in these 
aspects. Among liberal democracies most declines are found in 
the quality of public debates – namely in the united States, Albania 
and Ghana – and freedom of expression (Greece and Spain). Addi-
tionally, legislative constraints on the executive are evidently under 
stress in the united States, as is the rule of law in Australia.
In electoral democracies the picture is similar, with five countries 
declining in terms of freedom of expression and four on public de-
liberation. Judicial constraints on the executive have declined sig-
nificantly in poland, Haiti, macedonia and Suriname, whereas leg-
islative constraints on the executive have improved significantly in 
Bhutan and peru.
In short, decline among democracies take place in areas that are 
less visible and that can be derailed significantly before the threat 
to democracy becomes obvious to the extent that other countries 
and international bodies react. At the same time, degeneration of 
the democratic quality in such areas threatens to undermine the 
viability and meaningfulness of core institutions, such as elections 
and freedom of association.
In electoral autocracies patterns of autocratization reflect a much 
more direct, widespread attack on core democratic institutions 
and freedoms. Freedom of expression and the quality of public 
debate are on a downward trajectory in many countries, and this 
is also true for freedom of association and the liberal subcompo-
nents of democracy. In five countries elections are now significant-
ly less free and fair than ten years ago – Burundi, Turkey, Venezuela, 
Zambia, and Comoros.
Among the 56 countries that are classified as electoral autocra-
cies in 2017, seven of them had qualified as electoral democracies in 
2007 – Turkey, ukraine, nicaragua, Serbia, Comoros, Honduras and 
Iraq. Hence, these are countries that we can now, unfortunately, 
identify as instances of democratic breakdown. Yet, we should also 
note that there are five countries in this regime category with sig-
nificant improvements in several areas, myanmar, Zimbabwe, Fiji, 
and Gambia. However, on balance there are still many more coun-
tries with more negative changes than positive, in this regime cat-
egory. The trend of autocratization in the world seems to affect 
electoral autocracies considerably.
even in closed autocracies, some rulers seem to make an attempt 
at improving the outlook of (mainly legislative) elections, as indi-
cated by the seven countries with positive significant changes on 
subcomponents related to elections. This further illustrates the cur-
rent trends in the world. even in countries with among the most 
authoritarian political systems, rulers try to improve their image by 
making the symbolic elections look a little more democratic. We 
also note that in uzbekistan, freedom of expression and quality of 
deliberation have improved slightly - but remain at very low levels.
Among the more substantial changes, we note that in Yemen, Bah-
rain, and Thailand even the very limited freedom of expression and 
association is under attack, and the rule of law and quality of de-
liberation have also declined. However, in this regime category the 
numbers have to be interpreted with care. The confidence intervals 
tend to be much narrower for countries in this regime category 
than for countries in the other categories. This is simply because 
the V-Dem country experts tend to have a high degree of agree-
ment that the situation in closed autocracies scores extremely low 
on most indicators. Thus, with tight confidence intervals around 
point estimates, even small changes become significant, but they 
are not always substantially noteworthy.
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fIgure 1.12A: ten-yeAr chAngeS In Sub-componentS of DemocrAcy by country.
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fIgure 1.12b: ten-yeAr chAngeS In Sub-componentS of DemocrAcy by country.
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In THe SpoTlIGHT
The United States’ ranking on the V-Dem Liberal Democ-
racy Index fell from seven in 2015 to 31 in 2017. There is 
clear evidence of autocratization on several indicators. 
The lower quality of liberal democracy stems primarily 
from weakening constraints on the executive. 
V-Dem data indicate that the united States is significantly less 
democratic in 2017 than it was in previous years. We can at-
tribute this decrease to changes that have occurred in the last 
two years—specifically, to weakening executive constraints.  
Figure 1.13 shows how indicators have changed between 2015 
and 2017; labeled variables are those that significantly changed 
in the past two years.  Indicators that fall to below the diago-
nal line have decreased since 2015, while positive changes are 
above the line.  notably, the greatest number of declines—as 
well as the declines of greatest magnitude—have occurred for 
indicators of legislative constraints. This includes the extent to 
which opposition parties exercise oversight, investigatory func-
tions, and the likelihood that Congress or another body would 
investigate the executive and render an unfavorable decision 
unIteD StAteS
liberal Democracy under Stress
in the presence of unconstitutional activities. The u.S. ratings 
are also plunging for the extent to which the executive branch 
respect the constitution, which is one indicator of judicial con-
straints on the executive.
The negative changes associated with executive respect for 
the constitution and legislative constraints are congruent 
with the untempered behavior of the current president and 
the unwillingness of the Gop—which controls the legislative 
branch—to censor him.  Some of president Trump’s actions 
in 2017 that exemplify this trend include legally question-
able immigration bans, executive orders to withhold federal 
money from sanctuary cities, expanding the scope of the 
presidential pardon, diplomacy by social media, and potential 
violations of the emoluments Clause. Despite the Trump ad-
ministration’s actions, u.S. legislators appear either unable or 
unwilling to take formal actions to prevent them.
party loyalties and increased polarization between Democrats 
and Republicans have undermined congressional oversight 
functions as Republican leaders so far double down in sup-
port of the president. This was made apparent by the House 
Intelligence Committee investigation over possible collusion 
between the president and Russia, which House Democrats 
argued was prematurely ended and shelved. Its conclusion 
in 2018 illustrated the weakness of opposition party oversight 
and the decreased likelihood of Congress investigating and 
rendering an unfavorable decision against the executive.
The other main component of liberal democracy, which 
the V-Dem electoral Democracy Index measures, shows the 
united States falling from 8th place in 2015 to rank 32 out of 
178 countries in 2017. This decline is largely due to significant 
decreases in the freedom of discussion and in the fairness of 
elections in the past two years.
Across the last decade, significant declines have also regis-
tered in election intimidation and the range of media per-
spectives provided. Changes in the indicators reflect allega-
tions of election meddling and unlawful election practices in 
the 2016 election, as well as the acuteness of citizen antipathy 
toward opposing political views. electoral integrity in the 
united States has been negatively affected by partisan disa-
greements over voting procedures and attempts to control 
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Figure 1.13. Aspects of Liberal Democracy in the 
United States, 2015 and 2017.
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or suppress voting, as exemplified by challenges to voter ID 
laws and gerrymandering practices that were put before fed-
eral courts in 2017 and 2018.
party polarization has also resulted in a noticeable lack of 
confidence among Americans in the media; declarations that 
particular outlets constitute ‘fake news’ likely exacerbates this 
lack of confidence. The change in values of the overall elec-
toral Democracy Index is not significant, however, suggesting 
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Figure 1.14. United States ranking on select 
indicators, 2007-2017.
The most populous democracy in the world, India, is at 
risk. Its level of democracy has declined significantly 
over the last decade. The disquieting trend particularly 
concerns freedom of speech and alternative sources of 
information, civil society, the rule of law, and some elec-
toral aspects.
much of these changes have taken place after the Bharatiya 
Janata party won the parliamentary elections in 2014 and its 
InDIA
the Decline of Democracy in India
that the integrity of electoral democracy in the united States 
has remained robust despite these threats to election quality 
and the expression of alternative views.
Democratic backsliding in the united States is thus largely 
confined to constraints on the executive. Figure 1.14 com-
pares the u.S. to other countries by ranking it on opposi-
tion party oversight, legislative investigation, and executive 
respect for the constitution, all of which have significantly 
decreased in the last two years. The figure also shows how 
the u.S. ranks on compliance with the judiciary, which is sig-
nificantly lower in 2017 than it was ten years ago.  For the in-
dicators of executive constraints on which the united States 
shows significant decreases, it has fallen below the upper 
quartile of highest-ranking countries.
In summary, the V-Dem data shows evidence that there 
has been a significant democratic backsliding in the united 
States which is attributable to weakening constraints on 
the executive.  electoral democracy remains fairly strong in 
the united States and there is little change in freedoms and 
the rule of law. The biggest issues testing the resiliency of 
American democracy concern the ability of Congress and the 
courts to hold the executive responsible to the constitution.
Shreeya pillai
leader, the current prime minister, narendra modi assumed 
office. Described as a hard-line Hindu nationalist, he and his 
party ran on a campaign promise to revitalise India’s slump-
ing economy.
However, multiple indicators in the V-Dem liberal Democ-
racy Index show that this pursuit has come at the expense 
of a reduction in the overall quality of India’s democracy. 
Figure 1.15 depicts all indicators, with the score for 2007 on 
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the horizontal axis and the score for 2017 on the vertical axis. 
Indicators that are below the diagonal line have declined and 
indicators above the line have improved in this ten-year peri-
od. only indicators with significant changes are labelled. only 
one indicator – for the quality of the voters’ registry – has 
improved. All others have either stayed the same or declined 
over the last ten years, and the latter include no fewer than 
19 indicators. Several of them measures aspects of how free 
and fair the elections are, a couple taps into freedom of asso-
ciation but the greatest number are indicators of freedom of 
expression and alternative sources of information. These are 
key institutional prerequisites of electoral democracy accord-
ing to the famous democracy theorist Robert A. Dahl (1971). 
We therefore discuss them in the context of India in some 
further detail.
Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of  
Information in India
While there are about 12,000 newspapers circulating in In-
dia today, the media is increasingly being censored. Several 
newly introduced or more harshly enforced laws hinder free 
speech and encourage censorship. For example, India’s law 
on defamation contains prison sentences of up to two years 
and is used to silence critical journalists at an increasing rate.1 
moreover, sedition laws that were upheld by the courts in 
2016 even allow harsh punishment of people accused of in-
citing “dissatisfaction” – disloyalty and all feelings on enmity – 
towards the government.2 Its existence serves as a deterrent 
and encourages self-censorship.
Harassment of journalists is also on the rise. many journalists 
have been murdered or threatened for reporting critically on 
the actions of the ruling party. Three journalists were killed 
in march 2018 alone.3 For example, the editor Gauri lankesh, 
who was a known feminist and critic of the caste system as 
well as of the Hindu nationalists, was shot dead in September 
Figure 1.15. Aspects of Liberal 
Democracy in India, 2007 and 2017.
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2017.4 A hard line Hindu nationalist was arrested in connec-
tion to her murder but no sentence has been handed down.5
The sharp decline in the V-Dem indicators on Freedom of 
expression − in particular self- censorship and media har-
assment − reflect the increasingly adverse environment for 
members of the media.
Freedom of Association and Civil Society
The autocratization-process in India has also led to a partial 
closing of the space for civil society. The government increas-
ingly restricts the entry and exit of civil society organizations 
by using a law on foreign funding for nGos, the Foreign 
Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA). As of 2017, 20,000 CSos 
– mainly working on human rights and environmental issues 
– have lost their licenses. After that only 13,000 CSos remain 
to continue working unconstrained.6 Three un special rap-
porteurs have urged prime minister modi to repeal the FCRA, 
claiming it is progressively used more to “silence organisa-
tions involved in advocating civil, political, economic, social, 
environmental or cultural priorities, which may differ from 
those backed by the government.”7 A noticeably large drop 
in the V-Dem indicators on the ease of entry and exit, and 
the level of repression of civil society organizations in India, 
reflects the current challenges.
These above also illustrate that law enforcement is gradually 
becoming less predictable, and that the state fails to effec-
tively protect its citizens from politically motivated killings. 
A decline in the respective V-Dem indicators reflects these 
adverse changes.  other liberal aspects of democracy – such 
as legislative and executive oversight − remain at a constant, 
but relatively modest level. 
Elections in India
elections in Asia’s oldest democracy have remained free 
and fair and open to multi-party competition. nevertheless, 
several indictors capturing how clean elections are, have de-
clined. In particular, intimidation and violence have increased 
at polling stations. party agents intimidate, harass and bribe 
voters, in effect preventing them from casting their votes 
freely. electoral violence includes deadly attacks against poll-
ing officials and voters on their way to polling stations.
1. human Rights Watch (2017).
2. Reporters Without Borders (2017); The Constitution of India (2017).
3. Reporters Without Borders (2017).
4. Reporters Without Borders (2017).
5. The Guardian (2018).
6. human Rights Watch (2017).
7. The Guardian (2016).
8. Foreign Policy (2013).
9. The New york Times (2014).
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political exclusion is undermining the relevance of democratic rights and freedoms. After 40 years of mostly steady growth, several egalitarian aspects of democracy are now on the decline and this trend affects about 2 billion people in the world. As a result, only one-in-seven people now lives in a society where political power is distributed at least 
somewhat equally by gender and socio-economic status. the rich have gained significantly 
more power in countries that are home to one-fourth of the world’s population over the past 
decade.  Among different regime types, only liberal democracies tend to provide consistent 
safe-guards for its citizens against exclusion based on structural inequalities.
Section 2:  
Inclusion is an Illusion
eVen Where DemocrAcy is advancing, social complexity 
and competition often produce inequalities that advantage some 
groups over others.1 Such inequalities affect the extent to which 
groups can participate meaningfully in the political process.2 Thus, 
democracy risks becoming less legitimate and effective,3 threaten-
ing also the survival or further advancement of democracy.4 politi-
cal inequality and exclusion are also associated with poverty5 and 
violent conflict.6 When exclusion of various groups is severe, de-
mocracy is undermined as a viable system of rule. It is therefore 
important to consider not only changes in the liberal and electoral 
facets of democracy, but also the degree to which the countries in 
the world attain the principles of equality and inclusion.
political inclusion here refers to the ability of all individuals and 
groups to influence the political process.7 Whereas liberal concep-
tions of democracy tend to emphasize institutional guarantees 
of rights and freedoms in addition to the rule of law, democratic 
inclusion emphasizes de facto use of rights and access to power 
across societal groups.8 even Dahl’s influential discussion of the 
prerequisites for polyarchy – the basis for the V-Dem’s understand-
ing of electoral democracy − calls for a system in which “preferenc-
es [ought to be] weighted equally in government.”9 Based on that 
insight, this section focuses on political inclusion.
the V-Dem egalitarian Index
The V-Dem egalitarian Component Index captures whether mate-
rial and immaterial inequalities fundamentally constrain citizens’ 
actual exercise of formal rights and liberties.10 The measure encom-
passes to what extent differences in socio-economic status, gen-
der, and social group (such as caste, ethnicity, language, race, re-
gion, religion, or some combination thereof) affect the protection 
of civil liberties (equal protection Index), access to political power 
(equal Access Index), and access to resources such as education 
and health care to the extent that individuals’ political efficacious-
ness is derailed (equal Distribution of Resources Index). A detailed 
description of the measure and a table with country scores can be 
found in the Appendix.
Figure 2.1 shows the global trends in the egalitarian indices from 
1972 to 2017. What is striking in this graph is that after 40 years of 
mostly steady growth, levels of equality have been worsening again 
over the past five years, slightly less so for equal Access to power.
When weighted by population (right-hand panel), the egalitarian 
indices paint a more pessimistic picture. First, the growth in index 
scores prior to 2010 seen in the unweighted measures (left-hand 
panel) disappears, turning into a decline. The level recorded in 
2017 is lower than in 1972 for all of the indices. This is because large 
countries such as China have remained politically unequal or have 
seen growing economic inequality. But it tells us that the positive 
development of decreasing inequality displayed in the first graph 
is eradicated when we take the size of population into account, and 
that the positive developments have therefore affected countries 
with a small fraction of the world’s population. notably, for a large 
proportion of the world’s population, the equal Access to power 
Index has declined substantially in the past five years to a degree 
similar to, or even greater than, the equal protection Index. political 
exclusion is in this perspective on the rise.
regime types and patterns of Inclusion
Figure 2.2 compares levels of egalitarian Component Index across 
regime categories in 2017.11 Countries labelled above the box are 
over-performers for their regime type, while countries below it are 
under-performers. The line in the box plot indicates the median 
level of inclusion for all countries in that category.
1. young (2000).  2. For an overview of the relationship between inequality and participation, see Sigman and Lindberg (2018).  3. Dahl (1971).   4. Boix (2011); houle (2009); Svolik (2008).   
5. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013).  6. Cederman et al. (2010).  7. c.f. World Bank (2013).  8. This focus on de facto inclusion is central to V-Dem’s principle of egalitarian democracy, see Sigman and 
Lindberg (2018).  9. Dahl (1971) our emphasis.  10. Sigman and Lindberg (2018).  11. This builds on the regime-classification by Lührmann et al. (2018; see also section 1 of this report). While using 
V-Dem’s data, this measure is not officially endorsed by the Steering Committee of V-Dem (only the main V-Dem democracy indices have such an endorsement).
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fIgure 2.1: globAl trenDS In egAlItArIAn InDIceS, 1972-2017  
(rIght-hAnD WeIghteD by populAtIon).
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In general, democracies fare better in terms of egalitarianism than 
autocracies. notably, almost all liberal democracies score higher on 
the egalitarian Component Index than most autocracies, as well as 
a majority of electoral democracies. liberal democracies tend to 
excel in achieving equal distribution of political power across struc-
tural inequalities. Hence, when countries backslide from liberal de-
mocracy, inclusion may be threatened.
exceptions to this pattern are Albania, Chile, Ghana, and the unit-
ed States – countries that are liberal democracies but stand out 
with noticeable low egalitarian scores. Among the liberal democ-
racies, several nordic and Western-european countries – norway, 
Denmark, netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Germany – have the 
highest levels of egalitarian democracy, as expected.
That said, there is a large amount of variation among countries clas-
sified as closed and electoral autocracies, as well as those classified 
as electoral democracies. Countries across regime categories score 
comparably on the egalitarian component. For example, closed 
autocracies such as Cuba and Hong Kong, electoral autocracies like 
Belarus and Singapore, and Benin, Bulgaria, and Hungary among 
electoral democracies have largely indistinguishable ratings.
At the other end of the spectrum, Guatemala and Haiti are both 
electoral democracies but register very similar levels on the egali-
tarian component index to electoral autocracies such as Afghan-
istan, Chad, and Tajikistan, as well as Angola, Syria and Somalia 
among the closed autocracies.
The most important take-away is that only liberal democracies 
seem to be able to safe-guard their citizens from gross inequalities 
in the protection of civil liberties, access to political power and the 
distribution of politically relevant resources, across gender, social 
groups, and socio-economic status.
fIgure 2.3: regIonAl trenDS In equAl DIStrIbutIon of reSourceS InDex AnD equAl AcceSS to poWer InDex.
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regional trends
Trends in the equal Distribution of Resources Index and the equal 
Access to power Index – two key aspects of the egalitarian compo-
nent index – also vary considerably across regions (Figure 2.3). The 
levels have declined on both indices in eastern europe and Central 
Asia since the end of the Cold War. more recent declines on these 
indices are most evident in latin America and Asia. Decline on the 
equal Distribution of Resources Index also registers in Western eu-
rope and north America, as well as in the menA region. Sub-Saha-
ran Africa is the only region with continued upward trajectories, 
most definitely so on the equal Access to power Index.
Regional comparisons also show that the equal Access to power 
and equal Distribution of Resources indices do not necessarily main-
tain similar levels within a single region, nor do they change in tan-
dem. In the menA region, for example, levels of equal Distribution 
are considerably higher than levels of equal Access.  The opposite is 
true in latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, where levels of equal 
Access tend to be considerably higher than levels of equal Distribu-
tion. These different regional configurations suggest that political 
inclusion (equal Access) and socio-economic inclusion (equal Distri-
bution) are in fact distinct aspects of egalitarian democracy.
Additionally, it is clear that the two indices do not necessarily de-
velop together at the same time in the same places. particularly in 
the menA region and in Sub-Saharan Africa, the equal Access to 
power Index has improved in the last several years while the equal 
Distribution of Resources Index remains stagnant. The improve-
ments in the equal Access to power Index may reflect the fact that 
more countries have adopted gender quotas and power-sharing 
arrangements between social-groups. However, the distribution of 
power based socio-economic status has become less substantially 
equal in recent years. Furthermore, there is little evidence, to sug-
gest that such improvements in access to power necessarily lead to 
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changes in equal distribution of resources, such as in the provision 
of health and education.
In figure 2.3, we consider three cleavages of particular significance 
for power distribution in greater detail: gender, social group, and 
socio-economic position.
power Distributions Are mostly unequal
Figure 2.4 provides a snapshot of all three of V-Dem’s unique in-
dicators measuring the distribution of political power by gender, 
social group, and socio-economic status in 2017.12  each indicator 
ranges from 0 (monopoly of power by one group) to 4 (roughly 
equal power distribution between groups).
The figure shows that only a very small proportion of the world’s 
population has enjoyed more or less equal distribution of political 
power by gender, social group, and socioeconomic status. Almost 
no one lives in societies with equal power by gender, less than four 
percent of the population lives in countries where power is distrib-
uted evenly between social groups, and political equality by socio-
economic status is also virtually non-existent.
even for the lower bar, “somewhat equal” power distribution, it is 
not much better. only 14 percent of the world population lives in 
countries achieving this standard for gender, 27 percent for social 
groups, and about 14 percent of citizens enjoy this regardless of 
socio-economic status.
The vast majority of the world’s population lives in countries where 
12. V-Dem gave the following instructions to its expert coders: “Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) 
actively participate in politics (by voting, etc.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political 
decisions, and (f) influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all these factors when answering the following questions.” V-Dem Codebook V8, p.184.
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power distributions are somewhat unequal (61 percent for power dis-
tribution by social group, and 61 to 73 percent for power distributions 
by socio-economic status and gender). For each of the three catego-
ries, three to four percent of the population live in places where pow-
er distributions are completely monopolized by a dominant group.
This means that 5.5 billion people live in countries where women 
are discriminated against when it comes to political rights and free-
doms. States that allow the less wealthy to be partly excluded from 
the political process account for 4.6 billion people today.
Figure 2.4 reveal that men and people in higher income groups tend 
to have a strong hold on political power in countries where 86 per-
cent of the world population resides. unequal distribution of power 
by social group, where one or more social groups have more politi-
cal influence than others, affects some 69 percent of the population.
The overall situation is getting worse, not better. By 2017, one-
fourth of the world’s population – or almost 2 billion people – lived 
in countries where the rich have gained significantly more power 
compared to 2007. The growing inequalities are affecting massive 
amounts of people.
In the subsequent sections we continue to analyze the state of po-
litical inclusion. The next subsection 2.1 focuses on inclusion by 
gender, while 2.2 and 2.3 explore whether inequalities in social and 
socio-economic characteristics affect political inclusion. We high-
light the global trends and discuss important changes in specific 
regions and countries.
fIgure 2.4: ShAre of populAtIon by DIStrIbutIon of polItIcAl poWer, 2017.
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for the first time in about 70 years, the global level of women’s political inclusion and empowerment is no longer advancing. At the same time, global gender equality is not in decline, which means that the recent trend of democratic backsliding is not affecting women disproportionally.
Section 2.1: Women’s Inclusion  
and Access to power
Sirianne Dahlum and moa olin
DemocrAtIc freeDomS are unevenly distributed between 
men and women in many places. Although women’s political 
inclusion and equal access to power is prominent on the global 
agenda, as reflected in the united nations Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals1 for example, many democracies (and autocracies) fail 
to include women on an equal footing with men in political pro-
cesses. This subsection analyzes the extent to which democratic 
components such as elections, civil liberties, and civil society au-
tonomy also apply to women.
1.  UN (2015). 2. Sundström et al. (2015).
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We first examine global and regional trends in the Women’s po-
litical empowerment Index. Second, we look more closely at re-
cent changes in women’s empowerment, including differences 
between countries, and present lists with the top ten advancers 
and backsliders. We also examine which aspects of women’s po-
litical empowerment have been most affected. Finally, we identify 
countries that have a “gender gap,” in the sense that they under-
perform or over-perform on gender equality relative to their de-
mocracy level.
We find that although women’s political empowerment has im-
proved dramatically over the past century, stagnated set in over 
the last ten years. However, there is no evidence of a recent back-
sliding on political gender equality. Among the different compo-
nents, women’s political participation has changed the most over 
the past ten years, with many countries experiencing an increase. 
We also show that among the main under-performers on the gen-
der gap are several countries in the middle east, Japan, and India, 
while the over-performers are predominantly post-communist 
states.
Women’s political empowerment Index
V-Dem’s Women’s political empowerment Index builds on a defini-
tion of women’s political empowerment as “a process of increasing 
capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and par-
ticipation in social decision-making”.2 Women’s political empower-
ment is a complex concept, and the index seeks to capture differ-
ent aspects by building on three different sub-indices – Women’s 
Civil liberties Index, Women’s Civil Society participation Index, 
and Women’s political participation Index. These three indices are 
weighted equally in the overall index. The Women’s Civil liberties 
Index includes indicators on freedom of domestic movement, free-
dom from forced labor, the right to private property, and access to 
justice. The Women’s Civil Society participation Index includes in-
dicators on freedom of discussions on political issues, participation 
in civil society organizations, and representation among journalists. 
Finally, the Women’s political participation Index includes indica-
fIgure 2.5: regIonAl AVerAgeS In Women’S 
polItIcAl empoWerment InDex, 1900-2017.
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tors of women’s share in the overall distribution of power, as well 
as the percentage of female legislators. All indices range from zero 
to one, where “0” represents a low degree of women’s political em-
powerment, and “1” represents a high degree.
global and regional trends
Figure 2.5 illustrates that the global level of women’s political em-
powerment has advanced substantially since 1900, with most of 
that improvement occurring from the late 1940s until the mid-
2000s. However, this gradual advancement of women’s political 
empowerment stagnated, and levels have been relatively stable 
for the past ten years. At the same time, there is no evidence sug-
gesting a backlash against women’s political empowerment at the 
global level. Hence, although the first section of this Democracy 
Report 2018 shows evidence of democratic backsliding, this has 
not affected women disproportionately in a negative way.
All regions of the world experienced significant and gradual im-
provements in women’s political empowerment from 1900 to 2017. 
not surprisingly, Western europe and north America show a higher 
level of political empowerment for women throughout the entire 
period. Western europe and north America, eastern europe, and 
Central Asia while at different levels, developed very similar over 
time, albeit with slightly stronger swings in eastern europe. eastern 
europe also had comparably high levels of women’s political em-
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fIgure 2.6: globAl AVerAgeS of Women’S polItIcAl empoWerment InDex AnD ItS Sub-InDIceS 
compAreD to electorAl DemocrAcy SInce 1972 (rIght-hAnD WeIghteD by populAtIon).
powerment during the 1920s and 1930s, but dropped drastically 
during World War II, to recover again during the 1950s and 1960s.
latin America and the Caribbean and Asia-pacific also improved 
gradually and had levels of women’s political empowerment hov-
ering around the global average level until the late 1980s, when 
latin America and the Caribbean improved substantially, and are 
today at the same level as eastern europe and Central Asia.
The menA region with the lowest level of women’s political em-
powerment in the world throughout most of the period, still im-
proved gradually over the last century, albeit at a somewhat slower 
pace than the rest of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa had approx-
iamately the same and low level of women’s political empower-
ment as the menA region until the 1970s, after which it picked up a 
steeper upward trajectory.
Which Aspects are changing?
While Figure 2.5 illustrates developments in the aggregate Wom-
en’s political empowerment Index, we also want to explore wheth-
er there are differences between the sub-components. For in-
stance, is women’s political participation improving more or less 
than women’s civil liberties? In Figure 2.6, we compare the Wom-
en’s political empowerment Index, its three sub-indices and the 
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electoral Democracy Index, focusing on the more recent period, 
1972-2017.
overall, all three sub-indices have improved gradually since 1972 
and among them the Women’s Civil liberties Index the most. 
While both that measure and Women’s Civil Society participation 
Index stabilized around 2000, Women’s political participation Index 
continues to improve even during the recent years’ global demo-
cratic backsliding.
When weighting country-states based on population, the im-
provements in women’s political empowerment since 1973 appear 
somewhat more moderate (see Figure 2.6, right-hand side graph). 
Although also the population-weighted level of gender equality 
indicates a substantive improvement since 1970, this change may 
not be significant (as indicated by the confidence intervals). on the 
other hand, the population-weighted measures show little evi-
dence of a downward trend in levels of women’s civil society par-
ticipation and civil liberties.
Disaggregating further, we also consider changes in all the differ-
ent indicators that constitute the three subcomponent-indices of 
women’s political empowerment. There is noteworthy variation 
between different indicators of women’s political empowerment, 
which adds further nuance to the analysis.
The most striking finding in Figure 2.7 is the large group of coun-
tries that have improved their share of female to male journalists. 
fIgure 2.7: by InDIcAtorS of Women polItIcAl 
empoWerment: number of countrIeS regISterIng 
SIgnIfIcAnt chAngeS.
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While two countries have experienced significant decline in share 
of female journalists, more than 24 countries have improved. Fig-
ure 2.7 also shows that there is some advancement on indicators 
such as share of female legislators, property rights for women, and 
power distributed by gender.
By contrast, many more countries register a decline (14) in their 
level of freedom from forced labor than nations advancing (5). 
Freedom of discussion for women has also declined overall, with 
around 22 countries experiencing significant decline on this indi-
cator compared to only 13 registering an improvement. The lat-
ter development is in line with a general backsliding in democracy 
components related to elections and civil society – for both men 
and women – in many countries around the globe.
regressing and Advancing countries
While the graphs presented so far show developments at either 
the global or regional level, this section compares the recent tra-
jectories of different countries. Figure 2.8 plots changes over the 
past ten years, comparing levels on Women’s political empower-
ment Index in 2007 to levels in 2017. labeled countries are those 
with significant changes.
Figure 2.8 confirms that the level of gender equality has been rela-
tively stable over the past ten years. only two countries have reg-
istered a significant decline in women’s empowerment from 2007 
to 2017 - the maldives and Thailand. meanwhile, eleven countries 
have improved their level of women’s political empowerment, in-
fIgure 2.8: regreSSIng AnD ADVAncIng 
countrIeS, 2007-2017.
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fIgure 2.9: leVel of Women polItIcAl empoWerment InDex AcroSS regIme typeS, 2017.
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cluding Algeria, Bhutan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Tunisia. Several of the ad-
vancers are countries in menA, the region historically lagging behind the rest of 
the world when it comes to gender equality (and democracy).
over-performers and under-performers
Figure 2.9 visualizes how countries perform in terms of women’s political em-
powerment compared to other countries within the same regime category but 
also how regime categories tend to compare to each other.3 Countries posi-
tioned above the box perform better on gender equality than expected given 
their regime type, while countries positioned below are under-performers.
Four noteworthy patterns stand out. First, countries with a socialist or commu-
nist past tend to perform better on gender equality than other countries in the 
same regime category, probably reflecting the legacy of women’s high degree 
of involvement in the labor market in those societies. This applies across both 
regions and regime types, from the closed autocracies of Hong Kong, Cuba 
and Vietnam, over electoral autocracies of Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Kyrgyzstan, to the electoral democracies of lithuania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. 
Beyond the post-communist states, nepal and Jamaica over-perform on gen-
der among the electoral democracies.
Second, almost all of the under-performers in the group of closed autocracies 
are from the menA region, including Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Given 
that many of them are harshly autocratic regimes, their underperformance on 
gender equality highlights just how poor women’s conditions in these coun-
tries are. menA countries also appear as under-performers on gender inclu-
sion among electoral autocracies (egypt and Turkey) and electoral democracies 
(lebanon).
Third, two African countries – Rwanda and Tanzania – stand out as over-per-
formers in gender inclusiveness among the electoral autocracies, reflecting 
their embrace of progressive gender policies in recent decades. For instance, 
gender quotas in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide in 1994 guarantee that 
30 percent of parliamentary seats are reserved for women. The government 
also implemented targeted policies encouraging girls’ education and the ap-
pointment of women to leadership roles (e.g. government ministers and police 
chiefs). Today, around 60 percent of parliamentarians in Rwanda are women.
Finally, there is also some variation in gender inclusiveness within the group of 
liberal democracies. The Scandinavian countries score the highest, but these 
countries are also the most democratic among the full democracies, suggest-
ing that they do not necessarily over-perform compared to their democracy 
level. When accounting for the level of democracy, Germany is the main over-
performer in this group. Conversely,
Japan is the worst under-performer among liberal democracies. Its low score 
reflects its low proportion of female lawmakers and cabinet ministers, low fe-
male labor participation, and a large gender wage gap. In fact, Japan scores 
worse on gender inclusion than inclusive autocracies such as Hong Kong and 
Vietnam.
3. This categorization is based on the Regimes in the World regime classification - closed autocracy, electoral 
autocracy, electoral democracy, and liberal democracy (see Lührmann et al. 2017).
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Since the third wave of democratization in the early 1970s, power distribution by social groups and social group equality in respect for civil liberties have advanced in all regions of the world. yet, over the last five years and coinciding with the democratic decline reported in the first section of this year’s Democracy 
report, there is evidence of countries backsliding also in terms of inclusion of social 
groups. As a result, over half a billion people live in countries with higher levels of social 
exclusion than ten years ago.
Section 2.2:  
Inclusion of Social Groups
laura maxwell and constanza Sanhueza petrarca
to WhAt extent do different social groups have access to pow-
er and enjoy the same levels of civil rights around the globe? In 
this section we examine political inclusion and the protection of 
rights for social groups. V-Dem defines social groups as being dis-
tinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste. 
The first indicator we use in the analysis below is “power distribu-
tion by social group.” It evaluates the degree of inclusion in politics 
of all relevant social groups.1 The second indicator is “social group 
equality in respect for civil liberties,” which measures the extent to 
which civil liberties are equally protected for all social groups.2 Both 
indicators range from zero to four. Zero corresponds to a complete 
absence of inclusion and protection, and a score of four indicates 
that these social groups are included and protected.
The inclusion and protection of social groups and democratiza-
tion have improved in close association during the three waves of 
democratization. V-Dem’s electoral Democracy Index is positively 
correlated with power distribution by social groups (correlation = 
0.75) and the equal protection of civil liberties for all social groups 
(correlation = 0.63) from 1900 to today.
Distribution of power by Social group
Figure 2.10 presents the global development, as well as regional 
variation, of power distribution by social group from 1972 to 2017. 
The left-hand panel is based on unweighted country averages. This 
metric shows an incremental but steady upturn in the global level 
of power distribution by social group, while there is significant re-
gional variation.
Western europe and north America, as well as eastern europe and 
Central Asia, remain virtually unchanged in their level of power dis-
tribution by social group from the late seventies up until the past 
decade, when there is some variation. The level in Western europe 
and north America declined from around 2012, and power has be-
come slightly more monopolized also in eastern europe and Cen-
tral Asia in more recent years.
By contrast, in latin America, Asia-pacific and sub-Saharan Africa 
there have been steady gains in the last decades. Considerable im-
provements ensued in latin America and Asia-pacific during the 
third wave of democratization. The most significant improvements 
are recorded in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, coinciding 
with massive improvements in South Africa after the end of Apart-
heid and the introduction of multi-party elections in a vast major-
ity of countries across the continent. The menA region lags behind 
others despite significant improvements in the period leading up 
to and during the Arab Spring.
The right-hand side of figure 2.10 shows the global and regional 
averages weighted by population. Compared to the simple coun-
1. question: “Is political power distributed according to social groups?” Response options: “0: 
Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. 
This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 1: Political power 
is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This 
monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 2: Political power 
is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This 
monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 3: Either all social groups 
possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different 
social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power 
for a period of time, followed by another – but all significant groups have a turn at the seat 
of power. 4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong 
ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group 
characteristics are not relevant to politics.” Source: Coppedge et al. 2018b, p184.
2. question: “Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, 
region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a 
more favorable position?” Response options: “0: Members of some social groups enjoy 
much fewer civil liberties than the general population. 1: Members of some social groups 
enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population. 2: Members of some 
social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population. 3: Members 
of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population. 4: 
Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.” Source: Coppedge 
et al. 2018b, p164.
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try averages, it shows more noticeable declines in levels of power 
distribution by social group for an increasing share of the world’s 
population during the last five years.
The greatest difference when weighting by population is found in 
the eastern europe and Central Asia region. The largest country in 
the region drives the sudden drop in the late 1980s – Russia – fol-
lowed by improving levels of power distribution by social group in 
poland and ukraine when they democratized. more exclusive poli-
tics dominates the region since then with worsening levels as a re-
sult, pushing the regional average back closer to the world mean.
Social group equality in respect  
for civil liberties
Figure 2.11 depicts the global average and regional variation of so-
cial group equality in respect for civil liberties. The left-hand panel 
shows a gradual global increase from 1972 to 2012 and a slight neg-
ative trend in the last five years. The decline is more pronounced 
in Western europe and north America, eastern europe and Central 
Asia, and menA. While at different average levels, latin America, 
sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-pacific follow the global trend closely 
and only very minor declines in the past five years.
Regional variation in declines in civil liberties for social groups be-
come more apparent when population size is taken into account 
(right-hand panel in Figure 2.11). In Western europe and north 
America, the population-weighted averages are lower than the 
simple averages for every year displayed in this plot testifying that 
equality is higher in smaller countries on average. The recent de-
clines in Western europe and north America are also more pro-
nounced when taking population into account, reflecting mainly 
the developments in the united States.
Interestingly, the situation seems to be the opposite in sub-Saharan 
Africa. When population weights are taken into account, average 
levels are higher throughout the period, and there is no decline in 
recent years. It seems that in this region, the larger and more popu-
lous countries are better on average than small countries in pro-
tecting social group equality in respect for civil liberties.
Finally, the menA region appears more volatile when the size of 
populations are taken into account, closely following the trends of 
the large countries Iraq and Turkey, and more recently, the declines 
in egypt.
backsliding and Advancing countries
Which countries have changed the most? Figure 2.12 details the 
specific countries in which power distribution by social group and 
social group equality in respect for civil liberties advanced or fell 
back between 2007 and 2017. Countries with labels above the line 
advanced while countries with labels below the line backslid sig-
nificantly. For power distribution by social group (left-hand panel in 
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Figure 2.12), the number of advancers (eight) and backsliders (nine) 
is rather even. most of the significant changes in either direction 
befell countries that had a highly unequal distribution of power in 
2007 (below 2). Among them power distribution by social group 
improved significantly in for example the Gambia, Guyana, libya, 
and Tunisia over the past ten years. Below the line, Haiti, nicaragua, 
Turkey, and Zimbabwe are among the backsliders.
By contrast, more countries have regressed (16) than advanced (ten) 
on social group equality in respect for civil liberties (right-hand pan-
el in Figure 2.12). The majority of the significant improvements oc-
curred in countries with already decent levels of equality in 2007, 
while backsliders are found across the spectrum. The most pro-
nounced improvements were accomplished in Gambia, Greece, 
Ivory Coast, and uruguay. Backsliders include lithuania, macedonia, 
malawi and Sierra leone, while the largest deteriorations occurred 
in Dominican Republic, ethiopia, north Korea and Turkey.
What is driving the decline of power distribution by social group 
and social group equality in respect for civil liberties? In order to 
shed light on this question, we present two cases where power 
distribution by social group and protection have developed in op-
posite directions: egypt and Greece. Furthermore, we discuss the 
dramatic upsurge of exclusionary politics in Turkey. Figure 2.13 pre-
sents the country trends.
During the Arab spring, citizens from diverse social groups in egypt 
became more involved in politics, reflected by a substantial uptick 
in 2012 of power based on social groups shown in Figure 2.13. At 
the same time, social group equality in respect for civil liberties fell 
substantially after 2012. This reflects disquieting developments fol-
lowing the november 2011 elections won by president mohamed 
morsi and prime minister Hisham Qandil forming a government 
largely from the muslim Brotherhood, a period of autocratic ex-
cesses, protests, and then a new military overthrow lead by, now 
president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
Across the mediterranean in Greece, changes are in the opposite 
direction compared to egypt: equality of respect for civil liberties 
improved while power distribution declined. naturally, Greece 
started from a higher level than egypt. The improvement of social 
group equality in respect for civil liberties in the past year coincides 
with the Greek government beginning to include refugee children 
into the school system, along with a long-awaited vote in parlia-
ment to begin the construction of an official mosque in Athens. 
However, as shown in Figure 2.13, Greece’s rating on power distri-
bution by social group declined significantly after 2012, amid the 
debt crisis, an influx of immigration and a parliamentary election. 
nationalist parties like Golden Dawn and Independent Greeks, that 
are anti-immigrant and opposed to multiculturalism gained signifi-
cant representation in parliament. This reflects a political climate 
increasingly hostile to immigrants and ethnic minorities.
Finally, Turkey plunges on both aspects after 2012, among many 
other things probably reflecting the crackdown on the Gezi park 
protests, as well as an increase in detention of those that criticize 
Islam and the government of president Recep Tayyip erdoğan, as 
well as the increasingly harsh repression of social minorities includ-
ing the Kurds.
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Inclusive Democracies?
How does social inclusion relate to levels of democracy? In Figure 
2.14 we examine the relationship between regime type3 and pow-
er distribution by social group in 2017. Countries labeled above the 
box are over-performers in their regime type category, while coun-
tries with labels below the box are under-performers. The line in 
the box plot indicates the median level of power distribution by 
social group across all countries in that category.
There is a clear relationship between regime type and the level 
of equality in the distribution of power by social group. even so, 
within each regime type, there is substantial variation, especially 
among autocracies. As expected, liberal democracies tend to have 
higher scores on social group inclusion, compared to all other re-
gime types. exceptions to this pattern are Austria, Canada, Cyprus, 
Greece, and latvia, which coincides with the presence of far-right 
populist parties or institutionalized separatist movements.
Among electoral democracies, we find the under-performers with 
the lowest power distribution by social group in Haiti, Guatemala 
and the philippines, registering social inclusion scores lower than 
the average closed autocracy.
Among the autocratic regimes, many under-performing countries, 
such as ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Turkey have a 
history of ethnic conflict. There is also a pattern among the over-
performers in these less democratic settings. Communist and 
post-communist/socialist societies such as Armenia, Belarus, Bul-
garia, Cuba, Kosovo, lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Tanzania, Vietnam, 
and Zambia do well in terms of social group inclusion compared to 
other countries of their regime type.
migration and Democracy:  
minorities in the making?
Today, 258 million people live outside of their country of birth and 
this represents a large recent increase – it is 49 percent more than 
in 2000.4 Thus, it is important to analyze the relationship also be-
tween migration and democracy. By combining the V-Dem’s de-
mocracy data with bilateral migration stocks,5 we examine the re-
lationship as of 2017.
Fig. 2.15 displays the regime type of sending and receiving coun-
tries by share of the migratory population. The left side of the fig-
ure depicts countries of origin by regime type and by the propor-
tion of emigrants. The right side shows the destination countries by 
the same parameters.
By 2017, half of all the stock of migrants are from countries located 
on the autocratic side of the spectrum, one third left electoral de-
mocracies, and 19 percent immigrated from liberal democracies.
In terms of the destination countries, liberal democracies stand out 
as the modal destination for migrants. liberal democracies collec-
tively has been the destination for over half of the total stock of 
migrant population, moreover, compared to the proportion of the 
total population that lives in liberal democracies (14 percent), the 
stock of migrant population disproportionately decide to migrate 
to the most free regime type, by far.
It is also notable that migrants leaving liberal democracies only in 
extremely rare cases destinies for less democratic countries. The 
flows from liberal democracies to any kind of autocracy almost 
never happens.
even electoral democracies is a much less favored destination than 
liberal democracies, recipients of 13 percent of the stock of mi-
grants. About half of that flow is from autocracies. A vast majority 
of migrants leaving electoral autocracies head for another democ-
racy. only a smaller share ends up in autocracies.
The exception to this overall pattern of pro-democratic favoritism 
among migrants, is people leaving electoral autocracies. A slim 
majority of them head for another autocracy, sometimes to the 
worse category of closed ones.
Combining the information about the sending and receiving coun-
tries, we find that by 2017, 45 percent of the migrant population 
moved to a country that is more democratic than their country of 
origin, with an additional 35 percent living in a country of the same 
regime type. Thus, only 20 percent of all immigrants have moved to a 
country of a more autocratic regime type than their country of origin.
It is notable that more than 13 percent of the stock of migrant pop-
ulation still lives in closed autocracies, though in terms of propor-
tions this is much less than the global population living in closed 
autocracies (25 percent).
However, despite migrating to relatively democratic countries, the 
political inclusion of migrants is not guaranteed. Almost 8 per-
cent of migrants live in countries that have experienced significant 
backsliding in terms of social inclusion and protection over the 
past ten years.6
In addition to democracy, economic factors are naturally impor-
tant for migration patterns. Countries with both higher levels of de-
mocracy and greater GDp per capita typically receive higher shares 
of migrants.7 european and north American countries − and the 
united States, Germany, and the uK in particular − are home to the 
3.  As defined by the Regimes of the World measure (Lührmann et al. 2018).  4. UN DESA (2017).  5. The UN bilateral migration dataset measures the stock of migrants between directed pairs of 
countries in 2017. The migrant population is defined as the collection of people “who change his or her country of usual residence” (UN DESA 2017).  6. This is nearly identical to the portion of the 
global population (7.5 percent) living in countries backsliding on these indicators.  7. We examined the relationship between the Electoral Democracy Index (V-Dem Data Set Version 8), GDP per 
Capita (World Bank) and Migration Population in 2017 (World Bank).
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fIgure 2.14: regIme type AnD poWer DIStrIbutIon by SocIAl group.
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largest proportions. notably, among closed autocracies, there are 
several countries with highly developed economies – Saudi Arabia, 
oman, and Qatar – which are the country of destination for about 
two-thirds of those immigrants living in closed autocracies. These 
are predominantly economic migrants.
It is difficult to disentangle whether democracy or economic de-
velopment are the most relevant pull-factors for mass migration 
because more democratic countries also tend to be richer. never-
theless, the analysis shows that migrants tend to migrate from less 
to more democratic countries.
many public authorities restrict the freedom of citizens to travel 
from and to the country, a practice that is often aggravated by 
severe punishment for transgressors and their families. Among 
the worst cases are north Korea, which has imposed restrictions 
on foreign movement since 1947, eritrea, with tough restrictions 
since 2002, and Sudan, which has implemented restrictions 
since 1989. moreover, laos, palestine, Yemen, Syria, uzbekistan, 
South Sudan and Turkmenistan also restrict the freedom of 
movement of their citizens.
Spotlight: 
limited freedom of foreign movement around the World
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the polItIcS SurrounDIng socio-economic inequality are 
increasingly more palpable. Anti-elite rhetoric, large-scale populist 
movements, and nationalist backlashes to global economic inte-
gration are now commonplace in many countries. These develop-
ments put the future of democracy at risk when combined with 
undemocratic agendas pursued by political leaders.
The liberal perspective, taking center stage in the first part of this 
report, emphasizes institutional guarantees of rights and free-
doms of democracy, such as the right to vote and participate 
politically, freedom to express oneself, and legal protections for 
access to justice. However, the mere guarantee of rights and free-
doms does not mean that all individuals are capable of exercising 
their rights and enjoy the freedoms equally. lack of economic or 
social means can prevent people from doing so, and economic 
inequalities can make less wealthy individuals vulnerable to po-
litical domination.
In this section, we therefore focus on the ways that social and so-
cio-economic inequalities augment current trends of democratic 
backsliding. We explore how inequalities in health, education, and 
the distribution of power by socio-economic group have changed 
in the last ten years. We find that such inequalities have worsened 
in recent years. This suggests that democracy is becoming less and 
less accessible to poor people across the world.
Which Aspects of  
Socio-economic Inequality  
have changed the most?
Figure 2.16 reports the number of countries that have advanced 
(above the diagonal line) or declined (below the diagonal line) over 
the last ten years on indicators of socio-economic inequality. The 
three indicators constituting V-Dem’s equal Access Index are in red 
fIgure 2.16: by ASpectS of SocIo-economIc 
InequAlIty: number of countrIeS WIth SIgnIfIcAnt 
chAngeS, 2007-2017.
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and the four indicators of the equal Distribution of Resources Index 
are displayed in green. 
The largest magnitude of backsliding has affected indicators meas-
uring the share of the population whose political efficaciousness is 
undermined by educational and health inequalities, and the level 
of equality in terms of distribution of power by socio-economic 
group. This finding indicates that socio-economic inequalities is a 
grave concern in a growing number of countries.
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political and economic inequalities threaten to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of democracy (Dahl, 1971). this section shows that socio-economic inequalities are increasing in many parts of the world in ways that reinforce democratic backsliding. In particular, recent declines in health and educational 
equality, as well as the distribution of power by socio-economic status throughout the 
world, give cause for concern.
Section 2.3: political exclusion Based on 
Socio-economic Inequality
Valeriya mechkova, moa olin and rachel Sigman
V-Dem AnnuAl RepoRT 2018
The level of equal distribution of power by socio-economic status 
declined significantly in 14 countries, while the number of coun-
tries with positive changes is only six. The countries with the larg-
est increases in inequality on this measure on the past ten years are 
Burundi, Iraq, mauritania, panama, and Yemen.
The countries registering the biggest improvements are all emerg-
ing from tumultuous periods of political instability: egypt, Somalia 
and Tunisia. However, even after the upturns in recent years, the 
scores for egypt and Somalia are still in the lower half on the scale 
reflecting a situation in which more wealthy people enjoy a domi-
nant or very strong hold on political power.1
A matching concern is unequal access to healthcare and education 
that lead to inability to participate in political activities (such as vot-
ing and engagement in political parties). The level of equality in ac-
cess to healthcare or to education declined significantly in 16 and 
15 countries respectively, while progressing in only five (for health) 
and four (for education).
Figure 2.17, left-hand panel, shows unweighted global over-time 
developments for the same three indicators. By these measures, 
both education and health equality improved gradually but sig-
nificantly from 1972 until the 1990s to then journey slightly down-
wards again in recent years. Despite the improvements, the global 
averages reach just above the middle of the scale, which corre-
sponds to a situation in which the ability of ten to twenty-five per-
cent of adult citizens to participate is impaired due to poor access 
to healthcare and education.
The scores on these two measures of equality are even lower when 
we look at the scores weighted by population (right-hand panel 
of Figure 2.17), and the declines in recent years are also more pro-
nounced. In other words, equality tends to be better in smaller 
countries than in more populous ones, and the decline in recent 
years has affected larger countries more.
The dissimilarities between country average measures and the 
scores weighted by population are the largest for the indicator of 
power distribution by socio-economic position. The estimations 
1. The scale on this indicator is from 0 to 4, where 0 stands for a virtual monopoly on political power by wealthy people, and 4 corresponds to more or less equally distributed power across 
economic groups (see Coppedge et al. 2018b, p. 184).
fIgure 2.17: globAl trenDS In eDucAtIon AnD heAlth equAlIty, AnD poWer 
DIStrIbuteD by SocIo-economIc poSItIon (rIght pAnel populAtIon-WeIghteD).
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weighted by population fall markedly between 1975 and 2017. This 
finding again indicates that more populous countries are becom-
ing increasingly unequal, and that negative change is affecting a 
large share of the world’s population.
In the next section, we explore these trends in greater detail by 
looking at which regions and countries are driving these changes.
health and education (In-)equality
Figure 2.18 shows that health and education equality are, as of re-
cently, declining in all regions, except sub-Saharan Africa where it 
has remained stable since the 1980s albeit at a very low level. Asia 
and the pacific, the menA region, and latin America and the Carib-
bean also have comparatively low levels of health and education 
equality. eastern europe and Central Asia have a somewhat higher 
level than those other regions but also register the steepest sub-
fIgure 2.18: regIonAl trenDS In eDucAtIon AnD heAlth equAlIty SInce 1972.
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2. Reuters (2017).
heAlth equAlIty 
ten-year losses   ten-year gains
Venezuela -2.03 Swaziland 0.89
Romania -1.47 Namibia 0.85
Turkey -1.31 Eritrea 0.61
Sri Lanka -1.14 Oman 0.59
Iran -1.01 Timor-Leste 0.58
Libya -0.99  
Mauritania -0.97  
Cambodia -0.89  
Burundi -0.85  
Syria -0.84  
Slovenia -0.84  
Central African Republic -0.76  
Iraq -0.75  
Somaliland -0.53  
Lithuania -0.46  
Spain -0.45  
tAble 2.1: All countrIeS regISterIng SIgnIfIcAnt poSItIVe AnD negAtIVe chAngeS In 
eDucAtIon AnD heAlth equAlIty, 2007-2017.
eDucAtIon equAlIty 
ten-year losses   ten-year gains
Syria -1.21 Eritrea 1.25
Central African Republic -1.02 Tanzania 0.98
Mauritania -0.91 Saudi Arabia 0.96
Afghanistan -0.84 Rwanda 0.73
Laos -0.82  
Ukraine -0.78  
Romania -0.76  
Spain -0.71  
Bulgaria -0.71  
Maldives -0.70  
Brazil -0.69  
Armenia -0.57  
haiti -0.49  
Sudan -0.48  
United States -0.48  
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stantive decline following the fall of the Soviet union in the early 
1990s. The highest and most stable levels of health and education 
equality are recorded for Western europe and north America.
Table 2.1 lists all the countries with significant positive and nega-
tive changes in health and education equality over the past ten 
years. of the 16 countries backsliding on health equality between 
2007 and 2017, the decline in Venezuela is the worst. Following an 
economic inflation rate of 2,616 percent in 2017, millions of people 
suffered from severe shortages of food, medicine and healthcare.2 
Iran, Romania, Sri lanka, and Turkey have also experienced severe 
declines in healthcare equality.
educational equality declined significantly in four of the post-com-
munist countries over the last ten years: Armenia, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia and ukraine. Yet the biggest declines in education equality are 
found in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, laos, mauritania 
and Syria. only four countries – eritrea, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia and 
Tanzania register – positive changes.
In sum, global levels of inequality in terms of education and health 
make substantial portions of the world’s population partly incapa-
ble of fully using their political rights and freedoms, even where 
these are institutionally guaranteed. Recent backsliding on health 
and education equality threaten to further undermine the possibil-
ity for individuals to fully exercise their rights and freedoms. Con-
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versely, the countries registering improvements – such as eritrea 
and Swaziland – are still found at the bottom end of the index 
because the gains were relatively small. These are also countries 
where such improvements mean little since there are few political 
rights and freedoms to begin with.
power Distributed by Socio-economic position
While measures of health and educational equality help us to un-
derstand whether citizens are equally empowered to participate 
politically, V-Dem’s measure of power distribution by socio-eco-
nomic status measures the extent to which poorer groups in socie-
ty can actually access positions of power or exert political influence.
Figure 2.19 illustrates the global average of power distribution by 
socio-economic status as well as the regional developments. While 
the unweighted global levels (left-hand panel) have remained 
comparable during the last decades, global levels weighted by 
population (right-hand panel) have decreased substantially since 
1972. more and more people live in nations where the rich have 
much more access to political power than poorer people.
eastern europe and Central Asia, hence many post-communist coun-
tries, are driving much of this global decline in power distribution by 
socio-economic group, alongside a drastic decline is also evident in 
Asia-pacific in recent years and smaller drops in other regions.
fIgure 2.19: regIonAl trenDS In poWer DIStrIbutIon by SocIo-economIc poSItIon 
(rIght-hAnD WeIghteD by populAtIon)
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notably for Western europe and north America power distribution 
by socio-economic position only shows a decline in the popula-
tion-weighted figure, which reflects a trend of less equal access to 
power in large countries like the united States.
Improvements during the 1980s and 1990s are clearly visible in lat-
in America and the Caribbean in particular when considering the 
population size of countries, but also a substantial drop the last few 
years.
Table 2.2 shows that substantially more countries register losses (14 
countries) than gains (six countries) in access to power by socio-
economic group over the past ten years. Burundi is the worst back-
slider on this metric. other countries with a significant and substan-
tial decline in power distribution by socio-economic status include 
Fiji, India, Iraq, mauritania, panama, and Yemen.
The only country over this period that transitioned from an autoc-
racy to a liberal democracy – Tunisia – also saw the largest advance 
on power distribution by socio-economic group, but egypt, Soma-
lia, Venezuela, and ecuador also register significant increases but 
also from quite low levels.
Are Democratic countries more Socio-
economically Inclusive?
Figure 2.20 shows V-Dem’s measure of power distribution by socio-
economic position across regimes types. There is a clear J-shaped 
relationship. The median scores for closed and electoral autocra-
cies cluster at lower levels compared to those for electoral and lib-
eral democracies and between the two latter liberal democracies 
score much higher than electoral. However, there is also substantial 
variation within all regime types.
notably, liberal democracies tend to be rated at high levels on this 
indicator. Substantively, this means that economic stratification 
tends not to translate directly to very unequal political power in 
these countries. There are a few exceptions to this pattern, includ-
ing Albania, Chile, Costa Rica, the united States, and uruguay. They 
are liberal democracies but stand out with substantively lower 
scores on this indicator compared to other countries in the same 
category. In this group, liberal democracy is coupled with substan-
tially more power accruing to the wealthier part of the population, 
and poorer citizens having real influence only over issues that do 
not matter much to wealthy people.
At the other end of the scale, the nordic countries, alongside The 
netherlands, Belgium, Greece and Germany, have the highest lev-
els of inclusion. In these liberal democracies, wealthy people tend 
not to have much more influence over political decisions than 
poorer segments of the population, according to the V-Dem coun-
try experts.
 
ten-year losses   ten-year gains
Burundi -1.84 Tunisia 0.98
Mauritania -1.47 Egypt 0.95
Iraq -1.46 Somalia 0.81
yemen -1.10 Venezuela 0.74
Panama -1.02 Ecuador 0.69
India -0.85 Greece 0.57
Fiji -0.82  
Iran -0.82  
Burma/Myanmar -0.71  
Mali -0.63  
Bangladesh -0.61  
Vanuatu -0.60  
Pakistan -0.58  
Turkmenistan -0.43  
tAble 2.2: All countrIeS regISterIng SIgnIfIcAnt 
poSItIVe AnD negAtIVe chAngeS In poWer DIStrIbutIon 
by SocIo-economIc poSItIon.
Among electoral democracies, lithuania, poland, and several coun-
tries from latin America and the Caribbean – Bolivia, ecuador, Ja-
maica, peru and Suriname – stand out as over-performers in terms 
of this indicator of political equality, with scores similar to the av-
erage liberal democracy. Conversely, Guinea-Bissau is an outlier, 
with scores that match most closed and electoral autocracies, with 
a score indicating that wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on 
power and even people of average income have little say.
Some electoral autocracies are extreme over-performers (Bela-
rus and Venezuela), and compare favorably even to many liberal 
democracies. Countries such as Bangladesh, mauritania, Sudan, 
Tajikistan and ukraine are on the opposite end of the spectrum. 
These countries have highly skewed distributions of political pow-
er based on socio-economic status, even compared to other elec-
toral autocracies.
Several closed autocracies undergoing or coming out of recent 
conflicts are also under-performing with respect to egalitarianism: 
Angola, Syria and Yemen. Cuba and libya score far higher on egali-
tarian democracy than the average in this category.
Some of the former Soviet Republics – Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan and ukraine – are found at the bottom of the scoreboard 
in terms of levels of power distributed by wealth and are under-
performers when compared to their level of democracy.
The key conclusion from this section is that while there are excep-
tions, liberal democracies tend to provide more or less equal pos-
sibilities for people of all income groups to access and influence 
politics.
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fIgure 2.20: poWer DIStrIbutIon by SocIo-economIc poSItIon AcroSS DIfferent regImeS.
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What do you use the V-Dem data for?
 #1: practitioners  
Article 19
ARTICle 19 joined with V-Dem to launch a unique, authoritative 
assessment of freedom of expression and information worldwide 
in november 2017. ARTICle 19 has worked with V-Dem to select 32 
indicators out of the 350 measured by V-Dem to provide a rich and 
multi-faceted view on the challenges facing freedom of expression 
and information globally. These indicators have been aggregated 
into five indices based on ARTICle 19’s assessment of the five defin-
ing elements of freedom of expression, as set out in our expression 
Agenda strategy:  protection of Journalists and human rights de-
fenders; media pluralism and Freedom; Civic Space; Transparency 
and Accountability; and Freedom of expression in the Digital Age. 
With V-Dem’s new approach to measuring democracy, the findings 
of our expression Agenda (xpA) metric reveal the key threats fac-
ing freedom of expression and information, enabling us not only to 
target our advocacy more effectively, but to measure the impact of 
our work, as well as provide a lobbying tool for our partners around 
the world and a reliable new source of insight for journalists, 
activists, and policymakers.
Quinn McKew, Deputy Executive Director, Article 19
International IDeA
International IDeA (IDeA) launched its first Global State of Democ-
racy report “exploring Democracy’s Resilience” in november 2017. 
The report was also accompanied by the release of “The Global 
State of Democracy Indices,” which is IDeA’s first comprehensive 
democracy measure. The first edition of the Global State of De-
mocracy Indices (GSoD Indices) measures democracy across 5 at-
tributes and 16 sub-attributes of democracy and includes 98 in-
dicators from 14 different sources. The partnership between the 
Varieties of Democracy Institute and IDeA has been essential for 
the development of the GSoD Indices. V-Dem data is one of the 
key data sources due to its extensive coverage in terms of coun-
tries, years and indicators. The development of the GSoD Indi-
ces was guided by Svend-erik Skaaning, a pI from V-Dem, and our 
expert advisory board benefitted from the participation of many 
of the V-Dem experts. I hope that the collaboration between IDeA 
and V-Dem on this project can be a source of inspiration to others 
as to how the data can be used in different initiatives. 
Mélida Jiménez, Acting Programme Manager, International IDEA
Since 2016 we have been engaged in a knowledge transfer project, 
in which we aim to illustrate the complex nature of democracy 
using the insights gained from empirical research on democracy, 
most importantly those provided by the Varieties of Democracy 
project and the Democracy Barometer project. using game devel-
opment as an innovative teaching approach in higher education, 
we invited students to become actively involved in the process of 
designing a non-digital game about democracy. As a means to il-
lustrate the empirical complexity and normative nature of different 
models of democracy, we drew on both the conceptual documen-
tation as well as the data set of the Varieties of Democracy pro-
ject. The set goal for the students was to develop a game proto-
type that includes both a cooperative element, in which players, 
acting together, need to ensure a minimum level of democracy 
(i.e. electoral democracy) to win the game; as well as a competitive 
element, such that each player should aim to maximize different 
aspects of democracy, striving to implement different models of 
democracy (majoritarian, consensus, liberal, deliberative, participa-
 #2: Academics 
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tive, or egalitarian). The course led to a two-year teaching project 
at the university of Zurich, and the development of game-based 
learning material.
Dr. Saskia Ruth, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Dr. Rebec-
ca Welge, Freelance Trainer & Demokrative and Robert Lovell, Instruc-
tional Game Designer
university of Alabama
undergraduate students on my courses on Democratization and 
African politics at the university of Alabama have increasingly relied 
on V-Dem’s online data analysis tools for depicting cross-time 
and cross-country variations in democracy. For instance, during 
fall 2017, students conducted a group presentation on democrat-
ic trends in latin America and used V-Dem’s electoral democracy 
index (variable graph) to depict democratic changes across latin 
America in general, as well as in the individual countries of Brazil, 
Argentina, mexico, Venezuela and Honduras between 1990 and 
2017. In the same semester, students on my African politics course 
made use of the clean elections index to explore trends in elec-
tion quality over time for countries in Southern Africa. Although 
I expose students to several expert-based sources for measuring 
democracy, students seem to prefer V-Dem, in part because the 
project includes a wide 
array of democracy-relat-
ed indicators, but also be-
cause of the relative ease 
with which students can 
manipulate data and gen-
erate graphs for presenta-
tions and research papers.
Nicholas Kerr, Assistant  
Professor, University of  
Alabama
experience with V-Dem data as a student
As a student enrolled on the political Science master’s program at 
the university of Gothenburg, I chose to take the “V-Dem-course.” It 
was an intensive two months, which consisted of producing papers 
and attending weekly seminars.  not only did we get an in-depth 
understanding of the theory behind V-Dem, but we were also in-
troduced to the dataset and online analysis tools. The opportunity 
to use the V-Dem dataset, and particularly the online analysis tools, 
during the V-Dem course, opened up new possibilities for pro-
ducing interesting and trustworthy research material quick-
ly. What was also beneficial was that the data considers almost all 
countries across a very long period of time. I used V-Dem data in a 
paper in which I compare democratic de-
velopment in South Africa and Tunisia. lat-
er on, I used an aggregated index made 
by V-Dem called “Women’s political em-
powerment” in order to test whether the 
number of women in the workforce in a 
country is positively correlated with wom-
en’s political empowerment. However, to 
be honest, what I maybe liked the most is 
that the analysis online tool produces re-
ally good looking graphs!
Tove Wikelhult, Program Coordinator, the 
QoG Institute
the museum of World culture in gothenburg
In the exhibition “Crossroads” at the museum of World Culture in 
Gothenburg, the audience can explore the motion Charts provid-
ed by V- Dem. This enables them to explore how the relationship 
between two variables changes over time. For the average visitor 
to the museum the tool is quite complicated to fully comprehend, 
however, it enlightens the audience as to the complexity of 
democracy. The data serves as a good starting point for explora-
tion and ongoing discussions for visiting schools and other groups. 
An extension of the work to include the principles of democracy 
is found in the interactive exhibition “demokrativäven” (A weave 
of Democracy) where visitors can choose their “must-have” demo-
cratic principle that together with others creates a weave of De-
mocracy. 
Lina Malm, Exhibition producer, Museum of World Culture
 #3: Students 
 #4: museums 
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political Regimes and Institutions: 
Change and measurement
multiple measurements, elusive Agreement, 
and unstable outcomes in the Study of 
regime change.
2018 | Journal of Politics. 80:2, 736-741
“This comprehensive analysis of regime change indicators re-
veals that problems of conceptualization and measurement are 
major reasons why current quantitative research fails to draw 
compelling conclusions that foster cumulative knowledge. The 
article first proposes the distinction between two forms of re-
gime change—rupture and reform—and discusses the specific 
conceptual and measurement challenges scholars encounter 
yet largely fail to address when studying either form of change. 
Second, the article shows that agreement between indicators 
of regime change is low and driven by focal points such as elec-
tions and coups, suggesting that such measures often reflect 
notable events instead of regime change per se. This implies 
that indicator choice determines the set of cases for causal in-
ference. Finally, a robustness check of nine articles on regime 
change published in top journals demonstrates that findings 
are often not robust to alternative indicators, implying that indi-
cator choice influences the results of quantitative studies.”
ellen lusthans lueders
regimes of the World (roW): opening new 
Avenues for the comparative Study of 
political regimes
2018 | Politics and Governance 6(1): 60-77.
“Classifying political regimes has never been more difficult. 
most contemporary regimes hold de-jure multiparty elections 
with universal suffrage. In some countries, elections ensure 
that political rulers are—at least somewhat—accountable 
to the electorate whereas in others they are a mere window 
dressing exercise for authoritarian politics. Hence, regime types 
need to be distinguished based on the de-facto implementa-
tion of democratic institutions and processes. using V-Dem 
data, we propose with Regimes of the World (RoW) such an 
operationalization of four important regime types—closed 
and electoral autocracies; electoral and liberal democracies—
with vast coverage (almost all countries from 1900 to 2016). We 
also contribute a solution to a fundamental weakness of extant 
typologies: The unknown extent of misclassification due to un-
certainty from measurement error. V-Dem’s measures of uncer-
tainty (Bayesian highest posterior densities) allow us to be the 
first to provide a regime typology that distinguishes cases clas-
V-Dem puBlICATIonS
A general theory of power concentration: 
Demographic Influences on political 
organization
Forthcoming 2018 | European Political Science Review.
“Why is the exercise of political power highly concentrated in 
some polities and widely dispersed in others? We argue that 
one persistent causal factor is demographic. populous polities 
are characterized by less concentrated structures of authority. 
To explain this relationship we invoke two mechanisms: effi-
ciency and trust. The theory is demonstrated with a wide vari-
ety of empirical measures and in two settings: (1) cross-country 
analyses including most sovereign states and extending back 
to the 19th century and (2) within-country analyses focused on 
states, counties, and localities in the united States.”
sified with a high degree of certainty from those with “upper” 
and “lower” bounds in each category. Finally, a comparison of 
disagreements with extant datasets (7%–12% of the coun-
try-years), demonstrates that the RoW classification is more 
conservative, classifying regimes with electoral manipulation 
and infringements of the political freedoms more frequently 
as electoral autocracies, suggesting that it better captures the 
opaqueness of contemporary autocracies.”
marcus tannerbergAnna lührmann
Staffan I. lindberg
matthew maguirejohn gerring jillian jaeger
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beyond Democracy-Dictatorship measures: 
A new framework capturing executive bases 
of power, 1789-2016
Forthcoming | Perspectives on Politics.
“This paper attempts to integrate the literatures on authori-
tarian regime types and democratic forms of government. 
We propose a theoretical framework of five dimensions of 
executive appointment and dismissal that can be applied in 
both more democratic and more authoritarian regimes: the 
hereditary, military, ruling party, direct election and confi-
dence dimensions, respectively. Relying on the Varieties of 
Democracy data, we provide measures of these five dimen-
sions for 3,937 individual heads of state and 2,874 heads of 
government from 192 countries across the globe from 1789 
to the present. After presenting descriptive evidence of their 
prevalence, variation and relationship to extant regime typol-
ogies, a set of exploratory probes gauge the extent to which 
the five dimensions can predict levels of repression, corrup-
tion, and executive survival, controlling for aspects of democ-
racy. This leads to generation of a set of original hypotheses 
that we hope can serve as building blocks for explanatory 
theory. We conclude by discussing some limitations of these 
novel data.”
Staffan I. lindbergjan teorell
measuring Subnational Democracy: toward 
Improved regime typologies and theories of 
regime change
2018 | Democratization 25(1): 19-37.
“Social scientists and practitioners have been limited in their 
work by the paucity of data about subnational institutions 
and practices. Such data could help scholars refine regime 
typologies, improve theories of democratization and regime 
change, better understand subnational democracy, and il-
luminate issues of development, conflict, and governance. 
They could also enable democracy and development ad-
vocates to design more effective programs and officials to 
create better policies. This paper addresses the lack of data 
by introducing 22 subnational measures from a new data-
set, Varieties of Democracy. Validity tests demonstrate that 
the measures’ strengths outweigh their weaknesses. The 
measures excel in covering all subnational levels for most 
countries, capturing different elements of subnational elec-
tions, and including a variety of dimensions of elections and 
civil liberties. The measures also offer unmatched global 
and temporal coverage. The paper demonstrates how these 
strengths can provide scholars and practitioners with the 
benefits described above.” See more research Spotlights and V-Dem 
publications on our Website:
www.v-dem.net
Kelly m.  mcmann
how much Democratic backsliding?
2017 | Journal of Democracy 28(4): 162-169..
“Democracy is facing challenges across the world, yet sugges-
tions of a global crisis are not warranted. Based on data from 
the largest democracy database ever compiled, the Varieties 
of Democracy project (V-Dem), we find that the number of de-
mocracies worldwide declined slightly from 100 in 2011 to 97 
today, and 16 countries transitioned to democracy over the last 
ten years, including Tunisia, nepal, and nigeria. However, there 
is a fair degree of volatility. In 2013 alone, five countries transi-
tioned to democracy but nine went the other way. Worrisome 
trends include gradual erosion of freedom of expression and 
association in several countries, among them Turkey, Hungary, 
poland, and Brazil.”
Anna lührmannValeriya mechkova
Staffan I. lindberg
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The role of political Institutions for 
policy outcomes: environmental 
sustainability, peace and growth
Democratization in conflict Studies: how 
conceptualization Affects operationalization 
and testing outcomes
2017 | International Interactions 43(6): 941-966.
“using the debate over democratization and conflict, we 
demonstrate how the connection between conceptualiza-
tion and operationalization can play a decisive role in testing 
falsifiable hypotheses. We discuss seven different opera-
tionalizations of regime change based on three different 
conceptualizations of democracy. Although we find high 
correlations between different measures of democracy, when 
they are used to capture regime change, the correlations 
drop precipitously. In multivariate estimations of the effect of 
regime change on a range of conflict variables, we gener-
ate widely disparate results, providing no consistent support 
that democratization affects conflict. We thus demonstrate 
that decisions about conceptualization and subsequent op-
erationalization have decisive impact on the inference we 
produce. In contrast, our controls for the effect of institution-
alized democracy consistently show a negative relationship 
between joint democracy and conflict. Finally, autocratic 
regime change seems to be more robustly correlated with a 
range of conflict behaviors than heretofore recognized in this 
literature.”
Ömer faruk Örsünmichael bernhard
reşat bayer
‘gimme Shelter’: the role of Democracy 
and Institutional quality in Disaster 
preparedness
2017 | Political Research Quarterly 70(4): 833-847.
“natural disasters cause suffering for millions of people around 
the globe every year, and as climate change unfolds, the like-
lihood of natural catastrophes is increasing. While weather 
shocks such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods are beyond 
our control, the governments’ capacity to protect populations 
largely determines the degree of human suffering in disasters. 
Democracies, with freedom of speech, broad public participa-
tion, and representation, are believed to protect their popula-
tions better than nondemocratic regimes. However, demo-
cratic institutions are insufficient for securing protection from 
disasters in contexts of corruption, poor planning, and public 
administration incompetence. We argue that the effect of de-
mocracy on the extent of human suffering in disasters is con-
tingent on the ability of governments to implement their tasks 
or the quality of implementing institutions. We test this inter-
action hypothesis using time-series cross-sectional data from 
the Varieties of Democracy project, the Quality of Government 
dataset, and the Centre for Research on the epidemiology of 
Disasters. The results show that more democracy is associated 
with fewer people being affected by natural disasters only in 
V-Dem puBlICATIonS
Do political Institutions moderate the gDp-
co2 relationship?
2018 | Ecological Economics 145: 441-450.
“empirical studies of the relationship between GDp per capita 
and country-level Co2emissions tend to focus on the direct 
effect of per capita GDp growth, rarely taking political institu-
tions into consideration. This paper introduces theoretical 
insights from environmental political science research, which 
suggests that Co2 emission models would gain explanatory 
leverage if moderators gauging political institutions were 
considered. We test these theories by estimating the poten-
tially moderating effects of democracy, corruption, number of 
veto points and players, and civil society activity. We find that 
the per capita Co2 elasticity of GDp becomes non-monotonic 
and diminishing as GDp per capita increases in countries with 
democratic non-corrupt governments and high civil society 
participation. The moderating impact of this political-institu-
tional configuration is relatively small, suggesting only limited 
support for theories in environmental political science. How-
ever, the results are robust and add an important specification 
to the studies in environmental economics that find positive 
and monotonic GDp-Co2 relationship: the adverse effect of 
GDp per capita on Co2 emissions is not profound in rich well-
governed countries with active civil societies.”
marina povitkinaole martin lægreid
62
settings where institutional quality is high. When institutional 
quality is low, more people seem to suffer in democracies than 
in authoritarian states.”
marina povitkinatove Ahlbom
party Strength and economic growth
2018 | World Politics 70(2): 275-320.
“While a large literature suggests an important role for political 
parties in development, this article is the first attempt to layout 
and test a comprehensive theory connecting parties to eco-
nomic growth. The authors argue that strong parties broaden 
the constituencies to which policymakers respond and help 
politicians solve coordination problems. These features help 
to ensure better economic management, public services, and 
political stability. And this, in turn, enhances economic growth. 
Drawing on a novel measure of party strength from the Varie-
ties of Democracy data set, the authors test this theory on data 
drawn from more than 150 countries observed annually from 
1901–2010. They identify a sizeable effect that is robust to vari-
ous specifications, estimators, and samples. The effect oper-
ates in both democracies and autocracies, and is fairly stable 
across regions and time periods.”
john  
gerring
fernando  
bizzarro
Allen 
hicken
carl-henrik  
Knutsen
Svend-erik 
Skaaning
michael 
bernhard
Staffan 
I. lindberg
michael 
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economic Development and Democracy:  
An electoral connection
2018 | European Journal of Political Research
“Scholars continue to debate whether economic develop-
ment affects regime type. We argue that a clear relationship 
exists between development and the electoral component of 
democracy, but not – or at least less so –  between develop-
ment and other components of broader understandings of de-
mocracy. This is so because development enhances the power 
resources of citizens and elections provide a focal point for col-
lective action. The theory is tested with two new datasets – Va-
rieties of Democracy and lexical Index of electoral Democracy 
– that allow us to disaggregate the concept of democracy into 
meso- and micro-level indicators. Results of these tests cor-
roborate the theory: only election-centered indicators are ro-
bustly associated with economic development. This may help 
to account for apparent inconsistencies across extant studies 
and shed light on the mechanisms at work in a much-studied 
relationship. Further analysis shows that development affects 
electoral democracy by reducing electoral fraud, election vio-
lence, and vote buying.”
john  
gerring
carl-henrik  
Knutsen
jan  
teorell
Svend-erik 
Skaaning
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elections:  
At the Core of Democracy
public trust in manipulated elections: the 
role of election administration and media 
freedom
2017 | Electoral Studies 50: 50-67.
“As multiparty elections have become a global norm, scholars 
and policy experts regard public trust in elections as vital for 
regime legitimacy. However, very few cross-national studies 
have examined the consequences of electoral manipulation, 
including the manipulation of election administration and the 
media, on citizens’ trust in elections. This paper addresses this 
gap by exploring how autonomy of election management 
bodies (emBs) and media freedom individually and conjointly 
shape citizens’ trust in elections. Citizens are more likely to ex-
press confidence in elections when emBs display de-facto au-
tonomy, and less likely to do so when mass media disseminate 
information independent of government control. Additionally, 
we suggest that emB autonomy may not have a positive ef-
fect on public trust in elections if media freedom is low. em-
pirical findings based on recent survey data on public trust in 
47 elections and expert data on de-facto emB autonomy and 
media freedom support our hypotheses.”
Anna lührmannnicholas Kerr
When and where do elections matter? 
A global test of the democratization by 
elections hypothesis, 1900–2010
2017 | Democratization25(3): 422-444.
“Successive multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa are as-
sociated with incremental democratization. Yet tests in other 
regions are less than encouraging. non-significant findings 
on latin America and post-communist eurasia, as well as 
conceptual criticism regarding the theory’s application in the 
contemporary middle east, suggest that this may be a case 
of African exceptionalism. This article moves these debates 
forward by posing a comprehensive, global set of tests on 
the democratizing effect of elections. We seek to establish 
the scope conditions of the argument geographically, tem-
porally, and substantively. Although we find a correlation 
between reiterated multiparty elections and improvements 
in the liberal-democratic components of electoral regimes 
globally since 1900, the relationship is only substantial in the 
period since the onset of the third wave of democracy. expe-
riences with iterated multiparty elections have substantive 
importance for democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
post-communist region, latin America and the Caribbean, 
and Asia. For the middle east and north Africa, the relation-
ship is weaker and less robust. Finally, the results suggest that 
reiterated sequences of multiparty elections are associated 
with improvements to liberal and deliberative components 
of democracy more so than egalitarian components.”
Valeriya mechkovaAmanda b. edgell
michael bernhardDavid Altman
Staffan I. lindberg
Strong States, Weak elections? how State 
capacity in Authoritarian regimes conditions 
the Democratizing power of elections
2017 | International Political Science Review 39(1): 49-66.
“State capacity may be a crucial factor conditioning the de-
mocratizing power of elections in authoritarian regimes. This 
paper develops a two-phase theory considers the different 
effects of state capacity on turnover in elections and demo-
cratic change after elections. In regimes with limited state 
capacity, manipulating elections and repressing opposition 
is more difficult than in regimes with extensive state capac-
ity, rendering turnover in elections more likely in weak states. 
However, if the new incumbent has limited capacity to de-
liver public services and make policy changes after coming 
to power, sustainable democratic change is unlikely. Hence, 
state capacity is hypothesized to have a negative effect on 
turnover, but a positive effect on democratic change. These 
hypotheses are confirmed in a sample of 460 elections in 110 
authoritarian regimes taking place in the period 1974 to 2012 
64
from Sticks to carrots: electoral 
manipulation in Africa, 1986–2012
2015 | Government and Opposition 50(2): 521-548.
“over 90 per cent of the world’s states currently select their 
national leaders through multiparty elections. However, in 
Africa the quality of elections still varies widely, ranging from 
elections plagued by violence and fraud to elections that are 
relatively ‘free and fair’. Yet, little is known about trade-offs 
between different strategies of electoral manipulation and 
V-Dem puBlICATIonS
using the Varieties of Democracy dataset. The findings sug-
gest a need to revisit strong-state-first theories of democra-
tization.”
brigitte Seimcarolien van ham
When guardians matter most. exploring the 
conditions under which emb institutional 
design affects election integrity
2015 | Irish Political Studies 30(4): 454-481.
“problems with election fraud and election integrity are of in-
creasing interest in both established and transitional democ-
racies. In many transitional democracies, independent elec-
toral management bodies (emBs) have been championed as 
a key institutional reform measure to successfully strengthen 
election integrity. However, empirical findings regarding the 
impact of emB institutional design on election integrity are 
mixed. While regional studies have found a positive impact 
of independent emBs on election integrity in latin America 
and Africa, global comparative studies appear to show that 
emB institutional design is either negatively, or only very 
weakly related to election integrity. In this paper, we examine 
the effects of emB institutional design on election integrity 
using the new Varieties of Democracy dataset and data from 
the International IDeA. We find that the mixed findings on 
emB institutional design are due to the differences between 
transitional and established democracies on the one hand, 
and regimes with low and high quality of government on the 
other. The paper concludes with a reflection on results and a 
discussion of implications of these findings for the debate on 
electoral reform in Ireland.”
carolien van ham Staffan I. lindberg
the differences between incumbent and opposition actors’ 
strategies. We theorize that choices for specific types of ma-
nipulation are driven by available resources and cost consid-
erations for both incumbents and opposition actors, and are 
mutually responsive. We also suggest that costs of manipu-
lative strategies are shaped by the level of democratization. 
We test our hypotheses on a time series, cross-sectional data 
set with observations for 286 African elections from 1986 
to 2012. We find that democratization makes ‘cheap’ forms 
of electoral manipulation available to incumbents such as 
intimidation and manipulating electoral administration less 
viable, thus leading to increases in vote buying. The future 
of democracy in Africa thus promises elections where the 
administration of elections becomes better and better but 
at the same time vote buying will increase. not all things go 
together, at least not all the time. The future of democracy in 
Africa will mean more money in politics, more patronage and 
more clientelistic offers thrown around, at least in the short to 
medium term.”
carolien van ham Staffan I. lindberg
united nations’ electoral Assistance:  
more than a fig leaf?
2018 | International Political Science Review.
“Between 2007 and 2014 the un assisted more than one 
third of all national elections worldwide. Its experts routinely 
provide substantial technical advice on election manage-
ment, logistical support such as the procurement of ballot 
papers and financial assistance. However, it remains doubt-
ful if and under which conditions such assistance contributes 
to free and fair elections or has a positive long-term impact 
on democratization. This study assesses the impact of un 
electoral Assistance (uneA) in Sudan, nigeria and libya. It 
finds that such assistance contributed to election quality in 
the presence of regime elites prioritizing electoral credibility 
in nigeria (2011) and libya (2012). In nigeria, it seems plausible 
that uneA had a medium-term impact on democratization. 
However, if regime elites undermine electoral freedom and 
fairness - as in Sudan (2010) - such positive effects are unlikely. 
Furthermore, in such contexts, the involvement of the un 
may legitimize authoritarian practices.”
Anna lührmann
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In THe SpoTlIGHT | 
measuring Democracy:  
The V-Dem methodology and Indices
making embedded Knowledge transparent: 
how the V-Dem Dataset opens new Vistas in 
civil Society research
2017 | Perspectives on Politics 15(2): 342-360.
“We show how the V-Dem data opens new possibilities for 
studying civil society in comparative politics. We explain how 
V-Dem was able to extract embedded expert knowledge to 
create a novel set of civil society indicators for 173 countries 
from 1900 to the present. This data overcomes shortcomings in 
the basis on which inference has been made about civil soci-
ety in the past by avoiding problems of sample bias that make 
generalization difficult or tentative. We begin with a discus-
sion of the reemergence of civil society as a central concept in 
comparative politics. We then turn to the shortcomings of the 
existing data and discusses how the V-Dem data can over-
come them. We introduce the new data, highlighting two new 
indices—the core civil society index (CCSI) and the civil society 
participation index (CSpI)—and explain how the individual 
indicators and the indices were created. We then demonstrate 
how the CCSI uses embedded expert knowledge to capture 
the development of civil society on the national level in Ven-
ezuela, Ghana, and Russia. We close by using the new indices 
to examine the dispute over whether post-communist civil so-
ciety is “weak.” Time-series cross-sectional analysis using 2,999 
country-year observations between 1989 and 2012 fails to find 
that post-communist civil society is substantially different from 
other regions, but that there are major differences between 
the post-Soviet subsample and other post-communist coun-
tries both in relation to other regions and each other.”
Dong-joon jungmichael bernhard
michael coppedgeeitan tzelgov
Staffan I. lindberg
the potential of Direct Democracy: A global 
measure (1900-2014)
2017 | Social Indicators Research 133(3): 1207-1227.
“To what extent is direct democracy achieved in current polities? 
To answer this question, I develop an index, Direct Democracy 
practice potential, which is applied to 200 polities worldwide. 
This index results from the aggregation of the scores of four 
types of mechanisms of direct democracy: popular initiatives, 
popular referendums, obligatory referendums, and authorities’ 
plebiscites. This index measures: (1) how easy it is to initiate and 
approve each type of popular vote, and (2) how consequential 
that vote is (if approved). ease of initiation is measured by: (a) the 
existence of a direct democracy process, (b) the number of sig-
natures needed, and (c) time limits to collect signatures. ease of 
approval is measured by quorums pertaining to: (a) participation, 
(b) approval, (c) supermajority, and (d) district majority. Regard-
ing how consequential the vote is, it considers its decisiveness 
(whether the decision is binding), and the threat capability of cit-
izen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy as measured by 
the frequency with which direct popular votes have been used 
and approved in the past. Finally, the study tests the validity of 
the new measure, discussing its strengths and limitations.”
David Altman
going historical: measuring Democraticness 
before the Age of mass Democracy
2016 | International Political Science Review 37(5): 679-689.
“most studies of democratic developments are limited to the 
period after World War II. However, political regimes varied 
according to different aspects of democracy long before 
the establishment of modern liberal mass democracies. We 
come down strongly in favor of collecting disaggregate and 
fine-grained historical data on democratic features. Based on 
a distinction between competition, participation, and con-
straints on the executive, we discuss previous attempts at his-
torical measurement and address the specific challenges that 
pertain to scoring political regimes in, first, the “long 19th 
century” and, second, medieval and early modern europe.”
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ordinal Versions of V-Dem’s Indices: When 
Interval measures Are not useful for 
classification, Description, and Sequencing 
Analysis purposes
2016 | Geopolitics, History, and  International Relations 8(2): 76–111.
“In the wake of the Cold War democracy has gained the status 
of a mantra. The transition to democracy and its consolidation 
remain key issues in global development today. Yet, uncertainty 
persists over why some countries become and remain demo-
cratic and others do not. one of the obstacles to advancement 
in the field of democratization studies is the absence of a wide-
ranging database that tracks multifarious aspects of countries’ 
institutional histories. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) provides 
a new set of 350 indicators of various facets of democracy, 34 
indicies of various components building off these indicators, 
and five main democracy indices. All indices are interval rang-
ing from 0 to 1. Based on a conceptual discussion of the nature 
of the concept of “democracy,” this articles makes the argument 
that for many descriptive purposes, as well as a series of impor-
tant analytical endeavors, interval indices are not particularly 
useful (despite their many important advantages). Indices like all 
the ones V-Dem produces are thus in need of ordinal versions 
allowing for survival analyses, classification of regime catego-
ries, understanding and explaining successful transitions to de-
mocracy, breakdown of democratic regimes, as well as for the 
emerging area of sequence analysis. This article then advances 
a set of coding rules that transforms the existing, original V-
Dem indices to ordinal indices with three, four and five levels 
respectively. users can determine which level of distinction is 
most useful for the research project, or the task of descriptive 
representation at hand. For the democracy indices that V-Dem 
supplies at the highest level of aggregation, the paper also sug-
gests a classification of the levels into varying regime types.”
Staffan I. lindberg
measuring high level Democratic principles 
using the V-Dem Data
2016 | International Political Science Review 37(5): 580-593.
“While the definition of extended conceptions of democracy 
has been widely discussed, the measurement of these con-
structs has not attracted similar attention. In this article we 
present new measures of polyarchy, liberal democracy, de-
liberative democracy, egalitarian democracy, and participa-
tory democracy that cover most polities in the period 1900 to 
2013. These indices are based on data from a large number of 
indicators collected through the Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) project. We present and discuss the theoretical consid-
erations and the concrete formula underlying the aggrega-
tion of indicators and components into high level measures 
of democracy. In addition, we show how these measures re-
flect variations in quality of democracy, given the respective 
ideals, in 2012. In the conclusion scholars are encouraged to 
make use of the rich dataset made available by V-Dem.”
Staffan I. lindbergmichael coppedge
jan teorellSvend-erik Skaaning
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Democracy for All:  
Inclusion in political Decision making
Women’s rights in democratic transitions: A 
global sequence analysis, 1900–2012
2017 | European Journal of Political Research 56(4): 735-756.
“What determines countries’ successful transition to democ-
racy? This article explores the impact of granting civil rights 
in authoritarian regimes and especially the gendered aspect 
of this process. It argues that both men’s and women’s liberal 
rights are essential conditions for democratisation to take 
place: providing both women and men rights reduces an ine-
quality that affects half of the population, thus increasing the 
costs of repression and enabling the formation of women’s 
organising – historically important to spark protests in initial 
phases of democratisation. This argument is tested empiri-
cally using data that cover 173 countries over the years 1900–
2012 and contain more nuanced measures than commonly 
used. Through novel sequence analysis methods, the results 
suggest that in order to gain electoral democracy a country 
first needs to furnish civil liberties to both women and men.”
patrik lindenforsyi-ting Wang
fredrik janssonAksel Sundström
Staffan I. lindbergpamela paxton
Women’s political empowerment: A new 
global index, 1900-2012
2017 | World Development 94: 321–335.
“The political empowerment of women is a societal process 
crucial to development and progress. The V-Dem women’s 
political empowerment index (WpeI) provides information 
about women’s civil liberties, civil society participation, and 
political participation globally. Spanning from 1900 to 2012, 
three dimensions of empowerment, and over 170 countries, it 
is among the most comprehensive measures of women’s em-
powerment available. This paper presents a conceptualization 
of women’s political empowerment and provides an overview 
of the construction of the index and operationalization of its 
three sub-dimensions: Women’s civil liberties, civil society par-
ticipation, and political participation. Compared to other indi-
ces measuring women’s empowerment, such as the GDI, the 
Gem, the GII, and the CIRI data on human rights, the V-Dem 
index allows more precise measurement and is superior in 
temporal scope and coverage of countries of the Global South. 
The paper demonstrates the benefits of this new index and its 
sub-dimensions through several empirical illustrations.”
pamela p. paxtonAksel Sundström
Staffan I. lindbergyi-ting Wang
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fIgure A1.2: explAnAtIon ofthe V-Dem lIberAl DemocrAcy InDex
The V-Dem liberal Democracy Index (lDI)  captures both liberal and 
electoral aspects of democracy based on the 71 indicators included 
in the liberal Component Index (lCI) and the electoral Democracy 
Index (eDI). The eDI reflects a relatively ambitious idea of electoral de-
mocracy where a number of institutional features guarantee free and 
fair elections such as freedom of association and freedom of expres-
sion (see Appendix 2). The lCI goes even further and captures the 
limits placed on governments in terms of two key aspects: The pro-
tection of individual liberties; and the checks and balances between 
institutions (see Appendix 3).
Appendix 1: liberal 
Democracy Index
AppenDIx: CounTRY SCoReS FoR 2017
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table A1: country Scores for the liberal Democracy Index (lDI) and all components Indices 
AppenDIx: CounTRY SCoReS FoR 2017
liberal Democracy 
Index (lDI)
electoral Democracy 
Index (eDI)
liberal component 
Index (lcI)
egalitarian component 
Index (ecI)
participatory  
component Index (pcI)
Deliberative component 
Index (DcI)
country rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/-
Norway 1 0.867 0.05 2 0.904 0.05 1 0.973 0.02 1 0.963 0.03 23 0.657 0.01 1 0.987 0.01
Sweden 2 0.863 0.04 3 0.902 0.04 2 0.968 0.02 9 0.921 0.05 30 0.643 0.03  5 0.971 0.02
Estonia 3 0.860 0.04 1 0.913 0.04 9 0.949 0.03 13 0.909 0.06 49 0.604 0.06 20 0.921 0.04
Switzerland 4 0.853 0.05 5 0.897 0.04 5 0.960 0.02 8 0.929 0.03 1 0.876 0.02 4 0.974 0.02
Denmark 5 0.841 0.04 6 0.896 0.04 7 0.954 0.02 2 0.951 0.03 9 0.708 0.02 2 0.977 0.02
Costa Rica 6 0.830 0.04 7 0.888 0.04 12 0.943 0.03 18 0.888 0.05 16 0.680 0.04 7 0.951 0.02
Finland 7 0.827 0.06 10 0.876 0.05 6 0.960 0.02 7 0.930 0.04 29 0.646 0.02 13 0.930 0.04
Australia 8 0.827 0.04 12 0.875 0.04 4 0.960 0.02 32 0.857 0.05 19 0.666 0.03 14 0.928 0.03
New Zealand 9 0.825 0.05 9 0.878 0.05 8 0.950 0.03 22 0.880 0.06 3 0.763 0.03 96 0.666 0.12
Portugal 10 0.821 0.06 11 0.876 0.06 11 0.944 0.03 11 0.917 0.04 35 0.634 0.05 17 0.924 0.04
Belgium 11 0.819 0.06 8 0.886 0.04 18 0.927 0.03 5 0.934 0.04 24 0.654 0.02 11 0.933 0.03
Netherlands 12 0.813 0.05 18 0.860 0.05 3 0.961 0.02 6 0.933 0.04 18 0.673 0.04 9 0.945 0.03
France 13 0.812 0.05 4 0.899 0.05 27 0.897 0.05 15 0.907 0.05 39 0.625 0.05  27 0.899 0.05
Germany 14 0.809 0.05 16 0.863 0.05 10 0.948 0.02 4 0.939 0.03 27 0.652 0.02 6 0.952 0.03
Iceland 15 0.806 0.04 13 0.874 0.04 17 0.929 0.03 12 0.913 0.06 13 0.689 0.03  29 0.892 0.05
United Kingdom 16 0.806 0.05 14 0.873 0.04 16 0.931 0.03 28 0.862 0.06 14 0.684 0.02  40 0.856 0.06
Slovenia 17 0.792 0.06 22 0.856 0.05 13 0.940 0.03 27 0.866 0.06 4 0.758 0.03  37 0.867 0.06
Chile 18 0.787 0.06 15 0.864 0.04 21 0.924 0.04 92 0.631 0.09 47 0.605 0.04 24 0.904 0.04
Ireland 19 0.776 0.06 24 0.843 0.06 15 0.933 0.03 19 0.883 0.05 66 0.575 0.10 8 0.948 0.03 
Canada 20 0.770 0.06 21 0.857 0.05 26 0.903 0.05 35 0.834 0.08 26 0.652 0.02 18 0.922 0.04
Uruguay 21 0.768 0.06 19 0.860 0.05 30 0.892 0.04 41 0.813 0.08 2 0.814 0.03 19 0.922 0.04
Czech Republic 22 0.768 0.05 20 0.859 0.04 28 0.895 0.04 21 0.880 0.07 51 0.602 0.05 62 0.791 0.08
Italy 23 0.765 0.06 28 0.837 0.04 22 0.922 0.03 16 0.898 0.05 5 0.746 0.03 22 0.907 0.05
Austria 24 0.763 0.07 25 0.841 0.07 24 0.918 0.04 20 0.882 0.06 10 0.707 0.02  39 0.866 0.05
Japan 25 0.758 0.05 29 0.832 0.06 20 0.924 0.05 10 0.919 0.04 52 0.600 0.04 16 0.924 0.04
Luxembourg 26 0.757 0.06 17 0.863 0.05 37 0.869 0.04 3 0.949 0.02 99 0.496 0.08 3 0.974 0.02
Latvia 27 0.751 0.06 23 0.849 0.05 34 0.879 0.06 24 0.878 0.05 21 0.659 0.05 58 0.804 0.08
Cyprus 28 0.747 0.07 26 0.841 0.06 29 0.894 0.03 25 0.877 0.06 76 0.560 0.05 43 0.847 0.07
Lithuania 29 0.734 0.05 36 0.798 0.04 14 0.937 0.03 29 0.862 0.06 6 0.729 0.05 52 0.812 0.07
Slovakia 30 0.729 0.05 27 0.837 0.05 39 0.865 0.04 50 0.761 0.07 7 0.724 0.04 102 0.651 0.12
USA 31 0.727 0.06  32 0.822 0.04 33 0.879 0.04  67 0.695 0.09 22 0.659 0.01 94 0.669 0.10 
Jamaica 32 0.722 0.06 30 0.829 0.07 36 0.871 0.04 85 0.649 0.09 46 0.607 0.05 36 0.868 0.05
Cape Verde 33 0.715 0.06 38 0.790 0.06 23 0.919 0.04 40 0.816 0.07 90 0.522 0.07 57 0.804 0.08
South Korea 34 0.713 0.06 37 0.791 0.06 25 0.916 0.03 23 0.880 0.05 50 0.602 0.05 12 0.932 0.04
Spain 35 0.703 0.04 39 0.771 0.06 19 0.925 0.03 26 0.867 0.07 34 0.634 0.03 31 0.891 0.05
Mauritius 36 0.696 0.07 31 0.827 0.05 51 0.829 0.06 43 0.803 0.08 89 0.528 0.08 28 0.895 0.05
Greece 37 0.695 0.08 33 0.816 0.06 45 0.844 0.06 17 0.888 0.05 33 0.638 0.06 21 0.916 0.04
Taiwan 38 0.691 0.06 34 0.800 0.06 38 0.866 0.04 14 0.908 0.05 11 0.704 0.03 32 0.877 0.05
Barbados 39 0.668 0.06 40 0.768 0.06 35 0.872 0.06 44 0.803 0.08 145 0.278 0.04 66 0.763 0.09
Trinidad and Tobago 40 0.647 0.06 43 0.758 0.05 42 0.854 0.06 34 0.841 0.08 83 0.544 0.07 33 0.877 0.05
Vanuatu 41 0.636 0.06  45 0.743 0.07  43 0.854 0.05 65 0.705 0.07 96 0.505 0.08 25 0.904 0.05
Argentina 42 0.631 0.07 41 0.765 0.07 53 0.817 0.06 76 0.676 0.08 40 0.619 0.04 71 0.742 0.09
South Africa 43 0.622 0.06 50 0.730 0.06 40 0.859 0.06 100 0.599 0.08 58 0.587 0.06 35 0.869 0.06
Tunisia 44 0.621 0.06  57 0.702 0.08  31 0.891 0.03  47 0.780 0.08  104 0.484 0.04  10 0.940 0.03 
Suriname 45 0.614 0.05  35 0.798 0.06 68 0.743 0.08  48 0.775 0.08 55 0.594 0.05 56 0.810 0.07
Benin 46 0.612 0.06 52 0.724 0.08 46 0.838 0.06 42 0.803 0.07 44 0.608 0.05 38 0.866 0.06
Panama 47 0.611 0.06 42 0.762 0.08 59 0.786 0.06 58 0.728 0.11 72 0.564 0.06 41 0.856 0.06
S.Tomé & P. 48 0.609 0.07 54 0.714 0.06 41 0.854 0.04 80 0.669 0.10 68 0.569 0.05 55 0.810 0.07
Peru 49 0.603 0.07 46 0.740 0.06 54 0.807 0.05 113 0.560 0.10 15 0.682 0.05 61 0.792 0.08
Poland 50 0.596 0.07  49 0.731 0.06  56 0.803 0.07  31 0.860 0.05 36 0.630 0.06 116 0.575 0.12
Bulgaria 51 0.593 0.05 62 0.676 0.05 32 0.889 0.05 39 0.820 0.06 8 0.710 0.05  63 0.786 0.09
Namibia 52 0.578 0.07 48 0.736 0.07 61 0.770 0.06 77 0.675 0.06 84 0.543 0.07 49 0.819 0.07
Israel 53 0.577 0.06 59 0.693 0.05 47 0.837 0.05 53 0.747 0.09 56 0.593 0.05 67 0.762 0.09
Senegal 54 0.577 0.06 51 0.725 0.07 60 0.782 0.06 55 0.732 0.05 127 0.417 0.06 48 0.822 0.08
Botswana 55 0.576 0.05 55 0.710 0.05 55 0.807 0.05 62 0.713 0.07 71 0.565 0.04 53 0.811 0.08
Brazil 56 0.568 0.05  44 0.749 0.06  74 0.729 0.06  108 0.568 0.11 45 0.607 0.05  104 0.645 0.11 
Croatia 57 0.553 0.05 63 0.669 0.07  50 0.833 0.06 64 0.705 0.07  17 0.678 0.05  82 0.702 0.11
Georgia 58 0.550 0.06  47 0.737 0.08  80 0.716 0.05 46 0.792 0.08 101 0.488 0.07 47 0.826 0.07
Ghana 59 0.537 0.05 69 0.639 0.06 48 0.837 0.06 60 0.717 0.11 132 0.376 0.05 46 0.829 0.07 
Mongolia 60 0.531 0.07 61 0.683 0.06 67 0.752 0.05 52 0.754 0.07 74 0.564 0.05 44 0.847 0.06
hungary 61 0.522 0.05  73 0.630 0.05  52 0.822 0.05 36 0.830 0.06 31 0.643 0.07 123 0.532 0.14
Bhutan 62 0.521 0.05  77 0.613 0.08  44 0.846 0.04  33 0.847 0.08 54 0.597 0.05  34 0.877 0.06
Timor-Leste 63 0.510 0.06 53 0.715 0.05 89 0.671 0.08 109 0.568 0.09 81 0.545 0.07 78 0.716 0.10
Guatemala 64 0.506 0.06  64 0.669 0.06 75 0.729 0.08 164 0.290 0.09 77 0.559 0.06 112 0.593 0.12
Burkina Faso 65 0.503 0.08  56 0.709 0.07 91 0.661 0.06  101 0.590 0.09 78 0.558 0.05 45 0.833 0.08
Colombia 66 0.492 0.05 70 0.634 0.06 66 0.757 0.06 127 0.473 0.12 28 0.651 0.07 54 0.811 0.07
Liberia 67 0.490 0.05 74 0.625 0.05 64 0.763 0.06 96 0.616 0.11 116 0.469 0.03 84 0.698 0.11 
Guyana 68 0.488 0.07  58 0.696 0.07 90 0.664 0.08 74 0.676 0.08 79 0.552 0.05 106 0.636 0.12
Romania 69 0.487 0.05 60 0.687 0.05 88 0.672 0.07 59 0.722 0.07 61 0.582 0.08 142 0.403 0.13 
Nepal 70 0.484 0.05  76 0.617 0.07  63 0.764 0.06 81 0.667 0.07 113 0.474 0.06  80 0.708 0.10
Mexico 71 0.476 0.06 67 0.648 0.05 79 0.716 0.07 126 0.476 0.07 60 0.583 0.06 70 0.747 0.09
Indonesia 72 0.475 0.04 72 0.632 0.06 76 0.725 0.05 104 0.580 0.09 63 0.579 0.06 30 0.892 0.05
Malawi 73 0.474 0.06 79 0.598 0.09 58 0.788 0.07 133 0.433 0.11 62 0.580 0.06  65 0.766 0.10
Paraguay 74 0.468 0.06 66 0.650 0.07 84 0.680 0.07 156 0.342 0.06 64 0.577 0.08 127 0.495 0.14
Sri Lanka 75 0.465 0.04  71 0.633 0.05  82 0.709 0.06  103 0.586 0.10 67 0.572 0.05  51 0.812 0.07 
Albania 76 0.463 0.05 88 0.551 0.06 49 0.833 0.05 88 0.641 0.10 88 0.531 0.05 136 0.459 0.13 
El Salvador 77 0.459 0.04 65 0.661 0.06 93 0.657 0.04 159 0.306 0.07 92 0.517 0.06 105 0.639 0.11
Seychelles 78 0.452 0.05 85 0.560 0.04 57 0.791 0.05 73 0.677 0.10 147 0.276 0.05 64 0.766 0.09
Nigeria 79 0.451 0.07  81 0.587 0.07  69 0.742 0.07  120 0.520 0.09 41 0.619 0.04 68 0.755 0.09
Solomon Islands 80 0.447 0.05 75 0.620 0.06 83 0.681 0.06 111 0.560 0.11 98 0.501 0.07 101 0.651 0.12
India 81 0.429 0.05  82 0.571 0.07  78 0.722 0.06 110 0.561 0.08 82 0.545 0.07 128 0.494 0.15 
Lesotho 82 0.424 0.05 84 0.562 0.06 85 0.676 0.07 51 0.756 0.08 112 0.474 0.05 93 0.675 0.11
Moldova 83 0.420 0.03 86 0.559 0.06 72 0.732 0.06 86 0.648 0.11 97 0.504 0.07 118 0.560 0.13
Bolivia 84 0.397 0.05 68 0.647 0.07 107 0.564 0.08 70 0.689 0.06 12 0.694 0.05 111 0.606 0.13
Mali 85 0.393 0.06 89 0.547 0.06 86 0.673 0.06 66 0.699 0.09 106 0.481 0.08 60 0.793 0.08
Tanzania 86 0.386 0.04 96 0.493 0.06 70 0.736 0.05 56 0.730 0.07 125 0.431 0.08 76 0.725 0.09
Niger 87 0.376 0.04 91 0.541 0.07 101 0.636 0.05 79 0.672 0.09 20 0.661 0.06 26 0.904 0.05
Sierra Leone 88 0.372 0.05 80 0.589 0.07 108 0.561 0.05 106 0.579 0.09 37 0.629 0.03 23 0.906 0.04
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  indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
  indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty.
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Deliberative component 
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country rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/-
Ivory Coast 89 0.369 0.05 83 0.570 0.07  104 0.585 0.08 94 0.619 0.11 25 0.652 0.05 42 0.850 0.06 
Philippines 90 0.363 0.05 94 0.514 0.05 99 0.647 0.08 146 0.383 0.10 43 0.615 0.05 74 0.727 0.10
Ecuador 91 0.359 0.05  78 0.606 0.09 118 0.519 0.06 61 0.715 0.10 32 0.639 0.06 15 0.924 0.04
Singapore 92 0.357 0.03 107 0.453 0.05 73 0.730 0.07 45 0.801 0.06 167 0.181 0.05 69 0.751 0.10
Montenegro 93 0.352 0.04 110 0.446 0.06 81 0.715 0.07 75 0.676 0.12 48 0.605 0.06 89 0.688 0.12
Kyrgyzstan 94 0.339 0.04  97 0.484 0.06  102 0.634 0.06  69 0.691 0.08 122 0.454 0.08 59 0.804 0.07 
Macedonia 95 0.334 0.05  87 0.556 0.06 117 0.521 0.05  93 0.629 0.07 57 0.588 0.05 83 0.699 0.09
Kenya 96 0.333 0.04 103 0.461 0.04 97 0.650 0.06 128 0.467 0.07 42 0.615 0.05  139 0.424 0.15 
Fiji 97 0.329 0.04  106 0.455 0.05  92 0.657 0.09  98 0.608 0.09 151 0.262 0.06 120 0.546 0.13
Mozambique 98 0.327 0.04 102 0.462 0.04 100 0.642 0.07 118 0.539 0.10 73 0.564 0.07 99 0.655 0.11
Papua New Guinea 99 0.324 0.03 111 0.444 0.04 94 0.654 0.08 144 0.393 0.08 85 0.540 0.06 131 0.482 0.12
Guinea-Bissau 100 0.316 0.04 90 0.543 0.06 119 0.502 0.08 135 0.418 0.10 141 0.287 0.08 153 0.337 0.15
Lebanon 101 0.314 0.04 95 0.512 0.09 116 0.526 0.06 122 0.509 0.07 120 0.454 0.10 95 0.667 0.12
hong Kong 102 0.310 0.02 125 0.347 0.02 62 0.769 0.06 38 0.825 0.06 148 0.273 0.06 86 0.693 0.09
Serbia 103 0.305 0.04  108 0.452 0.05  103 0.595 0.06  84 0.652 0.10 59 0.586 0.06 72 0.742 0.09
The Gambia 104 0.296 0.03  129 0.326 0.03 65 0.759 0.06  87 0.648 0.10 111 0.476 0.09 73 0.739 0.09 
Somaliland 105 0.293 0.05 98 0.479 0.06 110 0.542 0.07 149 0.362 0.09 95 0.511 0.06 126 0.500 0.14
Kosovo 106 0.292 0.04 100 0.472 0.06 115 0.527 0.08 82 0.659 0.11 126 0.420 0.08 98 0.661 0.11
Iraq 107 0.290 0.04 118 0.396 0.05  106 0.576 0.07 153 0.352 0.09  94 0.512 0.06 121 0.543 0.14
Gabon 108 0.287 0.03 113 0.431 0.04 105 0.578 0.08 71 0.683 0.08 38 0.628 0.05 91 0.685 0.10
Pakistan 109 0.286 0.05 109 0.452 0.06 111 0.541 0.06 160 0.306 0.11 109 0.480 0.07 77 0.722 0.10
Kuwait 110 0.281 0.03 133 0.314 0.02 71 0.734 0.07 91 0.637 0.08 156 0.228 0.06 100 0.652 0.11
Uganda 111 0.279 0.03 121 0.359 0.03 95 0.654 0.06 125 0.486 0.09 65 0.576 0.06 79 0.716 0.11
Zambia 112 0.276 0.03  123 0.350 0.03  96 0.654 0.08  107 0.569 0.08 110 0.479 0.06  108 0.624 0.09 
Morocco 113 0.272 0.02 135 0.303 0.02 77 0.722 0.06 112 0.560 0.07 69 0.566 0.06  50 0.814 0.07
honduras 114 0.271 0.05 104 0.459 0.04 123 0.489 0.07 154 0.351 0.07 75 0.561 0.06 97 0.663 0.12
Bosnia and herzegovina 115 0.266 0.02 128 0.338 0.02 98 0.648 0.06 57 0.728 0.08 80 0.548 0.05 88 0.690 0.11
haiti 116 0.264 0.04 93 0.521 0.06 132 0.418 0.07 171 0.236 0.08 119 0.455 0.08 145 0.369 0.14
Madagascar 117 0.263 0.04 105 0.456 0.05 124 0.485 0.09 147 0.373 0.10 87 0.531 0.09 134 0.465 0.12
Myanmar 118 0.255 0.04  119 0.395 0.07  114 0.534 0.08  130 0.445 0.09  102 0.487 0.07  90 0.688 0.11 
Dominican Republic 119 0.255 0.03  92 0.535 0.06 138 0.375 0.06 157 0.331 0.09  114 0.473 0.07  81 0.706 0.10
Comoros 120 0.252 0.03 101 0.462 0.04 129 0.442 0.07 89 0.640 0.09 70 0.566 0.07 107 0.633 0.12
Togo 121 0.240 0.04  99 0.475 0.06  135 0.390 0.06 54 0.744 0.10 150 0.266 0.07 92 0.683 0.10
Armenia 122 0.239 0.03 117 0.399 0.03 125 0.482 0.06 63 0.712 0.09 105 0.484 0.08  113 0.591 0.13
Jordan 123 0.235 0.02 149 0.250 0.02 87 0.673 0.08 117 0.539 0.10 138 0.302 0.08 110 0.607 0.11
Ukraine 124 0.232 0.03  116 0.399 0.04  126 0.478 0.07  123 0.501 0.07 53 0.599 0.06 87 0.691 0.09
CAR 125 0.232 0.03 115 0.406 0.04 127 0.470 0.07 158 0.331 0.07 154 0.239 0.07 117 0.561 0.13
Afghanistan 126 0.216 0.03 126 0.345 0.03 121 0.495 0.06 166 0.281 0.08 149 0.273 0.07 122 0.537 0.13
Guinea 127 0.214 0.02  112 0.439 0.04  137 0.376 0.05 142 0.401 0.08 134 0.347 0.05 119 0.550 0.15
Malaysia 128 0.210 0.03 132 0.318 0.04 120 0.500 0.09 105 0.579 0.09 108 0.480 0.07 115 0.577 0.12
Rwanda 129 0.205 0.03 141 0.278 0.03  109 0.551 0.08 90 0.637 0.09 107 0.481 0.08 132 0.476 0.15
Zimbabwe 130 0.200 0.03  130 0.325 0.03  128 0.468 0.06 134 0.421 0.09 131 0.385 0.07 129 0.486 0.12
Vietnam 131 0.195 0.02  147 0.259 0.02  113 0.536 0.06  78 0.672 0.10 86 0.537 0.07 109 0.621 0.12
Palestine/West Bank 132 0.190 0.01  151 0.245 0.02  112 0.538 0.04  49 0.769 0.09 100 0.490 0.08 75 0.726 0.11
Libya 133 0.187 0.02  142 0.274 0.02  122 0.493 0.06  116 0.548 0.10 123 0.448 0.08  85 0.695 0.11 
Algeria 134 0.180 0.03 124 0.350 0.04 136 0.384 0.06 68 0.693 0.10 152 0.260 0.05 103 0.647 0.12
Bangladesh 135 0.177 0.02  120 0.360 0.03  140 0.361 0.07 162 0.299 0.09 91 0.521 0.08 135 0.460 0.13
Zanzibar 136 0.172 0.03 136 0.292 0.03 133 0.418 0.08 95 0.617 0.08 136 0.331 0.07 152 0.337 0.13
Mauritania 137 0.158 0.03  114 0.417 0.06 155 0.256 0.06  173 0.232 0.08  133 0.374 0.09 114 0.582 0.16
Cameroon 138 0.154 0.02 131 0.321 0.03 144 0.338 0.05 102 0.587 0.09 157 0.223 0.07 146 0.359 0.13
Iran 139 0.152 0.02 154 0.222 0.02 131 0.435 0.07 129 0.466 0.10 155 0.238 0.07 124 0.531 0.16
Maldives 140 0.150 0.02 122 0.352 0.03 150 0.299 0.06 121 0.509 0.10 118 0.456 0.07  140 0.420 0.14
Angola 141 0.141 0.02 148 0.252 0.03  139 0.363 0.07 169 0.262 0.09 165 0.191 0.07 149 0.344 0.11
Somalia 142 0.138 0.02 161 0.178 0.03 130 0.438 0.08 170 0.258 0.07  130 0.386 0.07 138 0.427 0.15 
Kazakhstan 143 0.131 0.02 150 0.246 0.03 143 0.343 0.05 99 0.600 0.08 158 0.217 0.08 158 0.278 0.11
Oman 144 0.131 0.02 159 0.190 0.02 134 0.391 0.05 97 0.610 0.09 137 0.312 0.06 165 0.188 0.10
Djibouti 145 0.126 0.02 146 0.260 0.03 148 0.309 0.05 119 0.531 0.09 121 0.454 0.08 137 0.454 0.14
Egypt 146 0.125 0.02 155 0.211 0.02 141 0.350 0.07 176 0.176 0.06 146 0.277 0.07 161 0.239 0.12 
Venezuela 147 0.123 0.02 143 0.272 0.03  151 0.286 0.06 114 0.551 0.08  93 0.514 0.07 174 0.117 0.09 
Belarus 148 0.120 0.01 145 0.268 0.03 152 0.281 0.03 30 0.860 0.05 142 0.287 0.08 160 0.241 0.11
Turkey 149 0.119 0.02  127 0.343 0.04  162 0.213 0.05  139 0.408 0.09  117 0.461 0.08 157 0.290 0.12 
Nicaragua 150 0.117 0.02  134 0.307 0.03  156 0.243 0.05  124 0.487 0.11 115 0.472 0.07 151 0.339 0.14 
Russia 151 0.115 0.01  144 0.270 0.02 153 0.262 0.04 115 0.549 0.10 135 0.332 0.07 150 0.341 0.13
Congo 152 0.110 0.02 139 0.281 0.03 158 0.240 0.06 167 0.277 0.09 103 0.485 0.08  144 0.377 0.15
United Arab Emirates 153 0.107 0.02 166 0.152 0.02  142 0.344 0.06 83 0.658 0.08 163 0.193 0.09 130 0.482 0.12
Ethiopia 154 0.107 0.01 152 0.242 0.03 154 0.261 0.04 145 0.389 0.10 144 0.278 0.09 141 0.408 0.12
Sudan 155 0.106 0.02  140 0.279 0.02  159 0.230 0.05 175 0.199 0.07 143 0.285 0.07 159 0.246 0.15
DRC 156 0.104 0.02  137 0.288 0.03 161 0.214 0.05 140 0.407 0.09 124 0.439 0.07 143 0.378 0.17
Thailand 157 0.101 0.01  170 0.142 0.02  145 0.329 0.05  131 0.445 0.10 139 0.301 0.08 168 0.171 0.10 
Swaziland 158 0.100 0.02 165 0.154 0.02 147 0.315 0.07 148 0.367 0.08 129 0.402 0.09 155 0.304 0.14
Chad 159 0.094 0.01 138 0.287 0.03 164 0.186 0.06 172 0.233 0.07 128 0.405 0.11 148 0.347 0.12
Laos 160 0.091 0.03 173 0.096 0.01 146 0.323 0.09 155 0.344 0.08 166 0.181 0.05 167 0.174 0.11
qatar 161 0.084 0.01 177 0.087 0.01 149 0.303 0.05 141 0.403 0.05 176 0.093 0.02 147 0.359 0.13
Cambodia 162 0.082 0.01  153 0.235 0.02  165 0.183 0.05 174 0.199 0.06 140 0.289 0.07 154 0.323 0.13
Cuba 163 0.081 0.01  160 0.190 0.02  160 0.221 0.04 37 0.828 0.06 169 0.171 0.05 156 0.298 0.11
Palestine/Gaza 164 0.078 0.02 169 0.144 0.02 157 0.240 0.06 137 0.414 0.09 153 0.254 0.06 162 0.228 0.12
Azerbaijan 165 0.067 0.01 157 0.202 0.02 167 0.164 0.04 161 0.303 0.08 164 0.192 0.04 166 0.176 0.10
Tajikistan 166 0.059 0.01  162 0.176 0.01  170 0.150 0.02 165 0.281 0.08 170 0.161 0.03 172 0.156 0.10
China 167 0.058 0.01 174 0.093 0.01 163 0.199 0.05 138 0.409 0.08 172 0.144 0.07 125 0.507 0.12
South Sudan 168 0.058 0.02 164 0.155 0.01 168 0.162 0.05 178 0.085 0.05 160 0.201 0.08 169 0.166 0.10
Burundi 169 0.055 0.01  163 0.159 0.01  171 0.149 0.04  150 0.360 0.07  162 0.195 0.06  164 0.191 0.11 
Bahrain 170 0.054 0.01  171 0.128 0.02  169 0.154 0.05 143 0.397 0.07 174 0.103 0.04  171 0.160 0.11 
Equatorial Guinea 171 0.053 0.01 158 0.195 0.02 174 0.119 0.04 163 0.298 0.08 168 0.177 0.05 170 0.162 0.09
Uzbekistan 172 0.052 0.01 156 0.203 0.02  175 0.111 0.03 132 0.434 0.07 173 0.131 0.04 133 0.466 0.12 
Turkmenistan 173 0.049 0.01  167 0.151 0.01  173 0.130 0.04  152 0.354 0.08 171 0.159 0.03 176 0.070 0.06
yemen 174 0.044 0.01  172 0.104 0.01  172 0.140 0.05  177 0.131 0.05 159 0.209 0.05  177 0.032 0.04 
Saudi Arabia 175 0.044 0.01 178 0.022 0.01 166 0.171 0.04 136 0.416 0.05 175 0.095 0.04 163 0.198 0.10
Syria 176 0.033 0.01  168 0.147 0.01 176 0.075 0.02  168 0.268 0.10 161 0.195 0.05 175 0.088 0.07
Eritrea 177 0.016 0.00 176 0.088 0.00 177 0.042 0.02 72 0.682 0.08  178 0.032 0.02 173 0.127 0.09
North Korea 178 0.010 0.00 175 0.088 0.01 178 0.019 0.01 151 0.358 0.06 177 0.060 0.03 178 0.026 0.03
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For several decades, scholars and practitioners alike have depict-
ed democracy in the world as though the extant measures really 
captured what is meant by the concept “electoral democracy”. Yet, 
we have all known that they did not.1 V-Dem is the first system-
atic effort to measure the de facto existence of all the institutions 
in Robert Dahl’s famous articulation of “polyarchy” as electoral de-
mocracy. The V-Dem electoral Democracy Index (eDI) captures not 
only the extent to which regimes hold clean, free and fair elections, 
but also their actual freedom of expression, alternative sources of 
information, and association, as well as male and female suffrage 
and the degree to which government policy is vested in elected 
political officials (Figure 2.1).
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WorlD AnD regIonAl AVerAgeS, 1900 to 2017.
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table A2: country Scores for the electoral Democracy Index (eDI) and its main components
AppenDIx: CounTRY SCoReS FoR 2017
electoral Democracy  
Index (eDI)
freedom of Association  
Index
clean election  
Index
freedom of  
expression Index
country rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/-
Estonia 1 0.913 0.04 10 0.910 0.04 1 0.977 0.01 3 0.973 0.01
Norway 2 0.904 0.05 15 0.905 0.04 4 0.973 0.02 1 0.978 0.01
Sweden 3 0.902 0.04 11 0.910 0.04 3 0.973 0.01 8 0.964 0.02
France 4 0.899 0.05 3 0.926 0.03 14 0.955 0.02 7 0.964 0.02
Switzerland 5 0.897 0.04 5 0.920 0.04 21 0.943 0.03 4 0.970 0.01
Denmark 6 0.896 0.04 4 0.921 0.04 17 0.950 0.03 2 0.975 0.01
Costa Rica 7 0.888 0.04 2 0.926 0.04 9 0.962 0.02 20 0.946 0.02
Belgium 8 0.886 0.04 32 0.887 0.05 8 0.962 0.02 6 0.965 0.02
New Zealand 9 0.878 0.05 9 0.911 0.04 11 0.957 0.02 25 0.939 0.03
Finland 10 0.876 0.05 31 0.889 0.05 10 0.961 0.02 17 0.947 0.02
Portugal 11 0.876 0.06 36 0.884 0.05 2 0.976 0.01 21 0.945 0.02
Australia 12 0.875 0.04 6 0.915 0.04 7 0.963 0.02 24 0.939 0.03
Iceland 13 0.874 0.04 18 0.901 0.04 5 0.965 0.02 23 0.941 0.02
United Kingdom 14 0.873 0.04 12 0.910 0.04 30 0.927 0.04 12 0.955 0.02
Chile 15 0.864 0.04 35 0.885 0.05 6 0.965 0.02 19 0.947 0.02
Germany 16 0.863 0.05 51 0.870 0.05 18 0.947 0.03 5 0.965 0.02
Luxembourg 17 0.863 0.05 23 0.896 0.05 15 0.955 0.02 15 0.953 0.02
Netherlands 18 0.860 0.05 52 0.870 0.05 13 0.957 0.02 16 0.948 0.02
Uruguay 19 0.860 0.05 29 0.890 0.05 12 0.957 0.02 18 0.947 0.02
Czech Republic 20 0.859 0.04 30 0.890 0.05 19 0.947 0.03 29 0.931 0.03
Canada 21 0.857 0.05 47 0.875 0.05 16 0.954 0.03 26 0.937 0.03
Slovenia 22 0.856 0.05 13 0.906 0.04 20 0.946 0.03 47 0.872 0.04
Latvia 23 0.849 0.05 16 0.904 0.04 36 0.912 0.05 27 0.937 0.03
Ireland 24 0.843 0.06 25 0.894 0.05 33 0.922 0.05 10 0.955 0.02
Austria 25 0.841 0.07 39 0.883 0.05 37 0.910 0.04 9 0.956 0.02
Cyprus 26 0.841 0.06 43 0.881 0.06 29 0.929 0.03 22 0.943 0.03
Slovakia 27 0.837 0.05 61 0.851 0.06 23 0.937 0.03 28 0.937 0.03
Italy 28 0.837 0.04 33 0.885 0.06 27 0.932 0.04 31 0.925 0.03
Japan 29 0.832 0.06 17 0.903 0.04 32 0.922 0.04 45 0.877 0.04
Jamaica 30 0.829 0.07 24 0.896 0.05 42 0.871 0.06 14 0.954 0.02
Mauritius 31 0.827 0.05 26 0.893 0.05 31 0.924 0.04 37 0.895 0.04
USA 32 0.822 0.04 1 0.934 0.03 46 0.859 0.06 32 0.911 0.04
Greece 33 0.816 0.06 27 0.892 0.05 24 0.935 0.04 40 0.889 0.04 
Taiwan 34 0.800 0.06 40 0.883 0.05 34 0.916 0.04 41 0.887 0.04
Suriname 35 0.798 0.06 58 0.855 0.06 26 0.932 0.04 64 0.830 0.05
Lithuania 36 0.798 0.04 62 0.849 0.06 35 0.916 0.04 33 0.911 0.04
South Korea 37 0.791 0.06 75 0.827 0.06 28 0.931 0.04 13 0.954 0.02
Cape Verde 38 0.790 0.06 7 0.914 0.04 41 0.877 0.05 49 0.868 0.05
Spain 39 0.771 0.06 65 0.844 0.06 22 0.941 0.03 34 0.905 0.03 
Barbados 40 0.768 0.06 53 0.869 0.05 57 0.799 0.08 30 0.928 0.03
Argentina 41 0.765 0.07 14 0.905 0.04 54 0.823 0.07 44 0.883 0.04
Panama 42 0.762 0.08 46 0.876 0.05 44 0.867 0.06 59 0.839 0.06
Trinidad and Tobago 43 0.758 0.05 34 0.885 0.05 47 0.858 0.07 50 0.863 0.05
Brazil 44 0.749 0.06  45 0.879 0.06 39 0.883 0.05 73 0.803 0.07 
Vanuatu 45 0.743 0.07  37 0.884 0.05 60 0.787 0.09  36 0.899 0.04
Peru 46 0.740 0.06 73 0.835 0.06 40 0.878 0.06 39 0.889 0.04
Georgia 47 0.737 0.08  20 0.899 0.04 66 0.759 0.09 53 0.851 0.05
Namibia 48 0.736 0.07 28 0.891 0.05 62 0.780 0.08 38 0.890 0.04
Poland 49 0.731 0.06  79 0.818 0.07 25 0.934 0.03 106 0.698 0.08 
South Africa 50 0.730 0.06 21 0.898 0.04 59 0.791 0.10 52 0.856 0.05
Senegal 51 0.725 0.07 63 0.847 0.07 67 0.742 0.10 11 0.955 0.02 
Benin 52 0.724 0.08 8 0.912 0.04 63 0.774 0.09 61 0.835 0.05
Timor-Leste 53 0.715 0.05 68 0.842 0.07 43 0.867 0.06 84 0.777 0.06
S.Tomé & P. 54 0.714 0.06 69 0.840 0.06 52 0.830 0.07 60 0.838 0.05
Botswana 55 0.710 0.05 44 0.880 0.05 51 0.831 0.07 68 0.812 0.06
Burkina Faso 56 0.709 0.07 74 0.828 0.07 61 0.781 0.09  35 0.903 0.03
Tunisia 57 0.702 0.08  59 0.853 0.06  65 0.761 0.09  43 0.883 0.05 
Guyana 58 0.696 0.07 22 0.896 0.04 72 0.717 0.10 66 0.823 0.06 
Israel 59 0.693 0.05 102 0.765 0.08 45 0.860 0.05 71 0.809 0.06
Romania 60 0.687 0.05 84 0.812 0.06 49 0.852 0.07  90 0.764 0.06
Mongolia 61 0.683 0.06 55 0.861 0.05 81 0.683 0.11 48 0.870 0.05
Bulgaria 62 0.676 0.05 49 0.872 0.05 64 0.764 0.09 85 0.773 0.06
Croatia 63 0.669 0.07  76 0.823 0.07 38 0.890 0.05 110 0.678 0.08 
Guatemala 64 0.669 0.06 50 0.870 0.05 69 0.723 0.11 72 0.806 0.05
El Salvador 65 0.661 0.06 54 0.862 0.06 82 0.670 0.11 46 0.872 0.05
Paraguay 66 0.650 0.07 64 0.846 0.06 73 0.709 0.11 87 0.766 0.06
Mexico 67 0.648 0.05 80 0.818 0.06 68 0.737 0.10 75 0.800 0.06
Bolivia 68 0.647 0.07 86 0.808 0.07 74 0.705 0.09 82 0.780 0.06
Ghana 69 0.639 0.06 38 0.883 0.05 86 0.645 0.11 51 0.860 0.05
Colombia 70 0.634 0.06 19 0.901 0.04 88 0.639 0.10 65 0.824 0.05
Sri Lanka 71 0.633 0.05  71 0.838 0.07 76 0.699 0.09 86 0.767 0.08 
Indonesia 72 0.632 0.06 104 0.759 0.09 71 0.719 0.09 56 0.850 0.05
hungary 73 0.630 0.05  90 0.794 0.08 53 0.828 0.08 108 0.690 0.08 
Liberia 74 0.625 0.05 41 0.883 0.05 94 0.583 0.13 54 0.850 0.06
Solomon Islands 75 0.620 0.06 70 0.839 0.07 91 0.616 0.12 58 0.843 0.05
Nepal 76 0.617 0.07  66 0.844 0.06 89 0.636 0.10  74 0.803 0.06
Bhutan 77 0.613 0.08  116 0.659 0.11  50 0.833 0.07  91 0.763 0.07
Ecuador 78 0.606 0.09 109 0.707 0.11 70 0.723 0.10 76 0.794 0.06
Malawi 79 0.598 0.09 60 0.853 0.06 105 0.528 0.12 55 0.850 0.05
Sierra Leone 80 0.589 0.07 88 0.798 0.07 93 0.590 0.10 63 0.830 0.05
Nigeria 81 0.587 0.07  87 0.804 0.09 98 0.566 0.11  42 0.884 0.04
India 82 0.571 0.07  106 0.725 0.10 77 0.698 0.11 123 0.639 0.09 
Ivory Coast 83 0.570 0.07  85 0.811 0.08 79 0.685 0.10  109 0.680 0.08
Lesotho 84 0.562 0.06 42 0.883 0.05 56 0.800 0.09 101 0.713 0.08
Seychelles 85 0.560 0.04 99 0.773 0.08 78 0.694 0.10 105 0.700 0.07
Moldova 86 0.559 0.06 95 0.775 0.08 85 0.651 0.11 103 0.710 0.08
Macedonia 87 0.556 0.06 81 0.816 0.07 80 0.684 0.10 100 0.716 0.07
Albania 88 0.551 0.06 57 0.859 0.06 106 0.526 0.13 98 0.721 0.06
Mali 89 0.547 0.06 92 0.788 0.09 110 0.501 0.12 57 0.848 0.05
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  indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
  indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty.
electoral Democracy  
Index (eDI)
freedom of Association  
Index
clean election  
Index
freedom of  
expression Index
country rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/-
Guinea-Bissau 90 0.543 0.06 96 0.775 0.09 97 0.574 0.11 107 0.695 0.09
Niger 91 0.541 0.07 83 0.813 0.07 109 0.501 0.13 62 0.832 0.05
Dominican Republic 92 0.535 0.06 98 0.773 0.08 100 0.536 0.13 94 0.759 0.07
haiti 93 0.521 0.06 48 0.873 0.06 121 0.370 0.12 79 0.790 0.08
Philippines 94 0.514 0.05 91 0.789 0.07 111 0.472 0.12 77 0.793 0.07
Lebanon 95 0.512 0.09 103 0.760 0.09 103 0.531 0.12 89 0.764 0.06
Tanzania 96 0.493 0.06 107 0.724 0.08 99 0.550 0.12 117 0.667 0.09
Kyrgyzstan 97 0.484 0.06  122 0.634 0.12 104 0.530 0.12  92 0.762 0.07 
Somaliland 98 0.479 0.06 112 0.699 0.11 102 0.532 0.12 113 0.672 0.09
Togo 99 0.475 0.06  113 0.679 0.10 115 0.454 0.13  81 0.787 0.07
Kosovo 100 0.472 0.06 94 0.777 0.08 92 0.611 0.12 111 0.677 0.08
Comoros 101 0.462 0.04 93 0.784 0.08 117 0.405 0.12  96 0.729 0.07
Mozambique 102 0.462 0.04 72 0.838 0.07 134 0.292 0.11 80 0.788 0.07
Kenya 103 0.461 0.04 77 0.823 0.07 135 0.291 0.13 93 0.760 0.07
honduras 104 0.459 0.04 67 0.843 0.05 120 0.377 0.12 102 0.712 0.08
Madagascar 105 0.456 0.05 56 0.861 0.06 132 0.302 0.13 78 0.790 0.07
Fiji 106 0.455 0.05  105 0.748 0.08 83 0.654 0.11  137 0.463 0.10 
Singapore 107 0.453 0.05 120 0.640 0.10 48 0.856 0.07 143 0.387 0.12
Serbia 108 0.452 0.05  101 0.765 0.08 107 0.525 0.13 133 0.539 0.09 
Pakistan 109 0.452 0.06 121 0.639 0.12 125 0.358 0.14 83 0.779 0.07
Montenegro 110 0.446 0.06 78 0.818 0.06 136 0.290 0.09 95 0.733 0.08
Papua New Guinea 111 0.444 0.04 89 0.796 0.07 142 0.280 0.12 67 0.814 0.06
Guinea 112 0.439 0.04  100 0.770 0.09  128 0.329 0.13  99 0.719 0.08
Gabon 113 0.431 0.04 97 0.774 0.08 151 0.237 0.12 69 0.812 0.06
Mauritania 114 0.417 0.06 140 0.509 0.14 113 0.460 0.13 120 0.648 0.10 
CAR 115 0.406 0.04 114 0.679 0.11 131 0.302 0.13 104 0.706 0.08
Ukraine 116 0.399 0.04  124 0.606 0.11  122 0.368 0.12 116 0.668 0.08 
Armenia 117 0.399 0.03 110 0.703 0.09 129 0.312 0.11 122 0.643 0.08
Iraq 118 0.396 0.05  133 0.550 0.14 119 0.380 0.12 114 0.671 0.09
Myanmar 119 0.395 0.07  123 0.609 0.12  101 0.536 0.12  129 0.586 0.09 
Bangladesh 120 0.360 0.03  118 0.645 0.11 140 0.282 0.12  127 0.608 0.09
Uganda 121 0.359 0.03 128 0.586 0.10 155 0.213 0.09 97 0.724 0.08
Maldives 122 0.352 0.03 134 0.548 0.12 114 0.455 0.15 141 0.426 0.09
Zambia 123 0.350 0.03  119 0.643 0.11 148 0.246 0.11  125 0.628 0.08
Algeria 124 0.350 0.04 142 0.454 0.13 123 0.360 0.12 126 0.621 0.08
hong Kong 125 0.347 0.02 108 0.711 0.09 75 0.700 0.11 70 0.811 0.06
Afghanistan 126 0.345 0.03 117 0.648 0.10 156 0.188 0.10 115 0.668 0.09
Turkey 127 0.343 0.04  127 0.599 0.12 96 0.579 0.11  157 0.255 0.07 
Bosnia and herzegovina 128 0.338 0.02 82 0.815 0.08 87 0.642 0.12 88 0.766 0.07
The Gambia 129 0.326 0.03 130 0.567 0.11 116 0.422 0.15 147 0.342 0.10
Zimbabwe 130 0.325 0.03  111 0.701 0.10 150 0.242 0.12 139 0.441 0.11 
Cameroon 131 0.321 0.03 137 0.518 0.12 154 0.214 0.12 124 0.632 0.08
Malaysia 132 0.318 0.04 125 0.605 0.11 133 0.301 0.12 145 0.361 0.10
Kuwait 133 0.314 0.02 164 0.119 0.06 55 0.806 0.08 119 0.656 0.08
Nicaragua 134 0.307 0.03  148 0.362 0.10  143 0.279 0.10 131 0.559 0.09
Morocco 135 0.303 0.02 115 0.676 0.09 84 0.652 0.11 118 0.665 0.07
Zanzibar 136 0.292 0.03 136 0.535 0.12 159 0.167 0.11 136 0.496 0.10
DRC 137 0.288 0.03 146 0.436 0.12 157 0.179 0.10 130 0.583 0.10
Chad 138 0.287 0.03 135 0.540 0.12 163 0.098 0.08 134 0.523 0.11
Congo 139 0.281 0.03 139 0.509 0.12 160 0.156 0.11 140 0.438 0.12
Sudan 140 0.279 0.02  145 0.438 0.13 126 0.347 0.12  149 0.318 0.10
Rwanda 141 0.278 0.03  155 0.251 0.10 108 0.521 0.14  150 0.315 0.09
Libya 142 0.274 0.02  126 0.603 0.10  171 0.000 0.00 121 0.645 0.07 
Venezuela 143 0.272 0.03  141 0.499 0.12 139 0.283 0.11  144 0.376 0.09 
Russia 144 0.270 0.02 147 0.370 0.10 124 0.359 0.13 151 0.312 0.09
Belarus 145 0.268 0.03 144 0.441 0.10 145 0.258 0.11 148 0.335 0.10
Djibouti 146 0.260 0.03 143 0.453 0.12 146 0.253 0.10 155 0.294 0.08
Vietnam 147 0.259 0.02  169 0.077 0.05 90 0.619 0.13 153 0.298 0.09
Angola 148 0.252 0.03  131 0.567 0.10 147 0.252 0.10  135 0.510 0.10
Jordan 149 0.250 0.02 138 0.509 0.11 112 0.471 0.11 132 0.546 0.10
Kazakhstan 150 0.246 0.03 157 0.215 0.10 137 0.290 0.12 146 0.359 0.10
Palestine/West Bank 151 0.245 0.02  132 0.564 0.13 176 0.000 0.00  112 0.676 0.08
Ethiopia 152 0.242 0.03 154 0.278 0.10 141 0.281 0.11 154 0.298 0.10
Cambodia 153 0.235 0.02  153 0.297 0.11  144 0.258 0.13 156 0.267 0.09 
Iran 154 0.222 0.02 159 0.172 0.09 118 0.390 0.12 138 0.442 0.12
Egypt 155 0.211 0.02 156 0.251 0.11 153 0.231 0.11  161 0.175 0.09 
Uzbekistan 156 0.203 0.02  160 0.167 0.10 130 0.309 0.13 164 0.168 0.07 
Azerbaijan 157 0.202 0.02 150 0.335 0.11 166 0.062 0.05 159 0.214 0.09
Equatorial Guinea 158 0.195 0.02 152 0.306 0.11 165 0.079 0.07 166 0.163 0.07
Oman 159 0.190 0.02 172 0.060 0.04 58 0.797 0.08 167 0.162 0.07
Cuba 160 0.190 0.02  176 0.040 0.03 127 0.346 0.15 173 0.079 0.05
Somalia 161 0.178 0.03 129 0.575 0.11 158 0.175 0.09  128 0.598 0.09
Tajikistan 162 0.176 0.01  161 0.154 0.08  167 0.055 0.05 165 0.167 0.08 
Burundi 163 0.159 0.01  162 0.135 0.08  168 0.026 0.03  171 0.130 0.06 
South Sudan 164 0.155 0.01 151 0.313 0.11 174 0.000 0.00 162 0.170 0.08
Swaziland 165 0.154 0.02 171 0.064 0.05 149 0.243 0.14 142 0.401 0.11 
United Arab Emirates 166 0.152 0.02  167 0.094 0.07 95 0.581 0.14 160 0.185 0.09
Turkmenistan 167 0.151 0.01  174 0.058 0.05 164 0.097 0.09 176 0.034 0.03
Syria 168 0.147 0.01 166 0.097 0.06 172 0.000 0.00  174 0.078 0.05
Palestine/Gaza 169 0.144 0.02 149 0.352 0.13 173 0.000 0.00 152 0.304 0.09
Thailand 170 0.142 0.02  165 0.097 0.07  138 0.288 0.12 158 0.240 0.08 
Bahrain 171 0.128 0.02  163 0.122 0.09  152 0.235 0.11 169 0.136 0.06 
yemen 172 0.104 0.01  158 0.192 0.08  175 0.000 0.00  170 0.133 0.06 
Laos 173 0.096 0.01 170 0.074 0.05 161 0.138 0.09 175 0.040 0.03
China 174 0.093 0.01 168 0.089 0.06 177 0.000 0.00 163 0.168 0.07
North Korea 175 0.088 0.01 178 0.026 0.02 162 0.136 0.10 177 0.025 0.02
Eritrea 176 0.088 0.00 175 0.049 0.04 178 0.000 0.00 178 0.023 0.02
qatar 177 0.087 0.01 173 0.060 0.05 169 0.000 0.00 168 0.137 0.06
Saudi Arabia 178 0.022 0.01 177 0.037 0.03 170 0.000 0.00 172 0.124 0.07
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In V-Dem’s conceptual scheme the liberal principle of democra-
cy embodiesthe importance of protecting individual and minor-
ity rights against both the tyranny ofthe state and the tyranny 
of the majority. It also captures the “horizontal” methods of ac-
countability between more or less equally standing institutions 
that ensure the effectivechecks and balances between institu-
tions and in particular, limit the exercise of executivepower. This is 
achieved by strong rule of law and constitutionally protected civil 
liberties,independent judiciary and strong parliament that are able 
to hold the executive to accountand limit its powers. The three in-
dices that capture these dimensions are: the equalitybefore the 
law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the 
executive(v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive 
(v2xlg_legcon). Taken togetherthey measure the V-Dem liberal 
Component Index (v2x_liberal).
Appendix 3: The 
liberal Component 
Index 
equality before the law and individual liberty index
Rigorous and impartial 
public administration
Transparent laws with 
predictable enforcement
Access to justice 
for men
Access to justice 
for women
Property rights 
for men
Property rights for 
women
Freedom from 
torture
Freedom from 
political killings
Freedom from forced 
labor for men
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Legislature questions 
officials in practice
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table A3: country Scores for the liberal component Index (lcI) and its main components  
AppenDIx: CounTRY SCoReS FoR 2017
liberal component  
Index (lcI)
equality before the law and  
individual liberty index
legislative constrains on  
the executive index
judicial constraints on  
the executive index
country rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/-
Norway 1 0.973 0.02 2 0.986 0.01 1 0.974 0.02 2 0.983 0.01
Sweden 2 0.968 0.02 6 0.977 0.01 3 0.967 0.02 9 0.963 0.02
Netherlands 3 0.961 0.02 10 0.974 0.02 5 0.965 0.02 7 0.965 0.02
Australia 4 0.960 0.02 39 0.931 0.03  4 0.965 0.02 1 0.985 0.01
Switzerland 5 0.960 0.02 7 0.977 0.01 10 0.946 0.03 4 0.973 0.02
Finland 6 0.960 0.02 8 0.977 0.01 2 0.971 0.02 18 0.948 0.03
Denmark 7 0.954 0.02 1 0.986 0.01 21 0.925 0.04 5 0.971 0.02
New Zealand 8 0.950 0.03 13 0.969 0.02 14 0.935 0.04 3 0.975 0.02
Estonia 9 0.949 0.03 5 0.980 0.01 19 0.931 0.04 13 0.955 0.03
Germany 10 0.948 0.02 3 0.984 0.01 6 0.959 0.03 28 0.909 0.05
Portugal 11 0.944 0.03 4 0.982 0.01 22 0.919 0.04 10 0.963 0.02
Costa Rica 12 0.943 0.03 20 0.964 0.02 8 0.948 0.03 11 0.959 0.02
Slovenia 13 0.940 0.03 21 0.962 0.02 7 0.953 0.03 23 0.929 0.04
Lithuania 14 0.937 0.03 29 0.950 0.02 12 0.942 0.03 19 0.946 0.03
Ireland 15 0.933 0.03 11 0.971 0.01 26 0.899 0.05 8 0.964 0.02
United Kingdom 16 0.931 0.03 25 0.958 0.02 11 0.944 0.03 31 0.900 0.05
Iceland 17 0.929 0.03 16 0.968 0.01 37 0.858 0.07 15 0.952 0.03
Belgium 18 0.927 0.03 17 0.966 0.02 27 0.898 0.06 26 0.913 0.04
Spain 19 0.925 0.03 14 0.968 0.01 35 0.864 0.05 17 0.951 0.03
Japan 20 0.924 0.05 15 0.968 0.02 9 0.948 0.03 43 0.875 0.07
Chile 21 0.924 0.04 36 0.935 0.03 20 0.926 0.04 6 0.969 0.02
Italy 22 0.922 0.03 18 0.966 0.02 17 0.931 0.04 36 0.888 0.05
Cape Verde 23 0.919 0.04 38 0.933 0.03 23 0.918 0.05 21 0.938 0.04
Austria 24 0.918 0.04 12 0.970 0.01 29 0.888 0.06 24 0.925 0.04
South Korea 25 0.916 0.03 35 0.940 0.03 25 0.907 0.05 20 0.938 0.03
Canada 26 0.903 0.05 26 0.956 0.02 40 0.847 0.08 27 0.912 0.05
France 27 0.897 0.05 22 0.960 0.02 32 0.882 0.06 40 0.882 0.06
Czech Republic 28 0.895 0.04 34 0.940 0.03 58 0.800 0.10 38 0.883 0.06
Cyprus 29 0.894 0.03 33 0.941 0.03 39 0.848 0.07 34 0.892 0.05
Uruguay 30 0.892 0.04 23 0.960 0.02 52 0.812 0.09 25 0.922 0.04
Tunisia 31 0.891 0.03  45 0.913 0.04  16 0.932 0.04  44 0.865 0.06 
Bulgaria 32 0.889 0.05 49 0.898 0.04 30 0.887 0.06 32 0.896 0.05
USA 33 0.879 0.04  31 0.943 0.02 62 0.787 0.10  22 0.933 0.04
Latvia 34 0.879 0.06 28 0.952 0.02 65 0.768 0.10 14 0.953 0.03
Barbados 35 0.872 0.06 30 0.943 0.02 75 0.727 0.11 16 0.952 0.03
Jamaica 36 0.871 0.04 60 0.863 0.06 44 0.842 0.08 33 0.894 0.05
Luxembourg 37 0.869 0.04 9 0.976 0.01 15 0.932 0.04 71 0.753 0.09
Taiwan 38 0.866 0.04 19 0.965 0.02 45 0.836 0.08 52 0.819 0.08
Slovakia 39 0.865 0.04 41 0.926 0.03 46 0.828 0.08 41 0.877 0.06
South Africa 40 0.859 0.06 69 0.826 0.06 28 0.891 0.06 37 0.883 0.06
S.Tomé & P. 41 0.854 0.04 37 0.933 0.03 18 0.931 0.04 84 0.702 0.10
Trinidad and Tobago 42 0.854 0.06 42 0.920 0.03 42 0.845 0.09 49 0.836 0.08
Vanuatu 43 0.854 0.05 51 0.894 0.04 36 0.860 0.07 46 0.852 0.08
Bhutan 44 0.846 0.04  61 0.855 0.06 50 0.816 0.08  29 0.907 0.05
Greece 45 0.844 0.06 24 0.958 0.02 38 0.852 0.08 65 0.767 0.10
Benin 46 0.838 0.06 27 0.952 0.02 72 0.738 0.11 54 0.811 0.09
Israel 47 0.837 0.05 59 0.865 0.05 24 0.914 0.04 78 0.721 0.12
Ghana 48 0.837 0.06 43 0.919 0.04 51 0.813 0.08 55 0.810 0.10
Albania 49 0.833 0.05 44 0.917 0.04 33 0.880 0.06 91 0.667 0.11
Croatia 50 0.833 0.06 52 0.885 0.05 56 0.803 0.10 56 0.803 0.10
Mauritius 51 0.829 0.06 53 0.885 0.05 49 0.820 0.08 50 0.831 0.08
hungary 52 0.822 0.05 40 0.929 0.03 70 0.750 0.10 48 0.837 0.08
Argentina 53 0.817 0.06 68 0.839 0.05 48 0.822 0.09 59 0.778 0.09
Peru 54 0.807 0.05 94 0.738 0.08 13 0.942 0.04  72 0.750 0.11
Botswana 55 0.807 0.05 56 0.877 0.05 53 0.809 0.08 66 0.765 0.09
Poland 56 0.803 0.07  65 0.842 0.06  79 0.713 0.12 81 0.708 0.11 
Seychelles 57 0.791 0.05 66 0.842 0.05 89 0.677 0.13 45 0.858 0.08
Malawi 58 0.788 0.07 91 0.746 0.07 34 0.868 0.06 67 0.764 0.09
Panama 59 0.786 0.06 47 0.905 0.04 59 0.796 0.10 88 0.676 0.12
Senegal 60 0.782 0.06 55 0.878 0.05 68 0.763 0.09 82 0.704 0.11
Namibia 61 0.770 0.06 54 0.883 0.05 102 0.603 0.13 42 0.875 0.07
hong Kong 62 0.769 0.06 32 0.942 0.02 118 0.484 0.13 35 0.889 0.06
Nepal 63 0.764 0.06 103 0.710 0.08 41 0.846 0.08 70 0.754 0.09
Liberia 64 0.763 0.06 58 0.867 0.06 57 0.803 0.09 73 0.750 0.11
The Gambia 65 0.759 0.06  78 0.804 0.06  113 0.538 0.15  12 0.957 0.03 
Colombia 66 0.757 0.06 98 0.720 0.08 80 0.696 0.13 58 0.780 0.10
Mongolia 67 0.752 0.05 73 0.817 0.06 90 0.672 0.13 75 0.739 0.11
Suriname 68 0.743 0.08  63 0.847 0.06 54 0.805 0.09 98 0.623 0.14 
Nigeria 69 0.742 0.07  83 0.782 0.07 47 0.826 0.08 102 0.593 0.16
Tanzania 70 0.736 0.05 86 0.775 0.07 73 0.733 0.10 60 0.776 0.10
Kuwait 71 0.734 0.07 104 0.706 0.09 63 0.776 0.09 61 0.773 0.10
Moldova 72 0.732 0.06 74 0.813 0.06 101 0.604 0.14 53 0.815 0.09
Singapore 73 0.730 0.07 48 0.902 0.04 81 0.694 0.13 90 0.667 0.12
Brazil 74 0.729 0.06  85 0.776 0.08 94 0.650 0.12 68 0.763 0.11
Guatemala 75 0.729 0.08 111 0.676 0.09 67 0.763 0.10 69 0.757 0.10
Indonesia 76 0.725 0.05 99 0.718 0.09 66 0.767 0.10 63 0.768 0.10
Morocco 77 0.722 0.06 97 0.731 0.08 69 0.752 0.11 80 0.709 0.12
India 78 0.722 0.06 122 0.614 0.10 78 0.715 0.11 74 0.749 0.10
Mexico 79 0.716 0.07 113 0.669 0.09 77 0.722 0.11 64 0.767 0.09
Georgia 80 0.716 0.05 81 0.793 0.08 60 0.792 0.09 101 0.602 0.14
Montenegro 81 0.715 0.07 67 0.840 0.06 106 0.586 0.16 57 0.797 0.10
Sri Lanka 82 0.709 0.06  79 0.800 0.07  129 0.402 0.16 30 0.903 0.05
Solomon Islands 83 0.681 0.06 80 0.799 0.07 107 0.584 0.14 51 0.830 0.08
Paraguay 84 0.680 0.07 84 0.777 0.07 96 0.635 0.13 99 0.616 0.15
Lesotho 85 0.676 0.07 96 0.733 0.08 103 0.596 0.14 47 0.846 0.07
Mali 86 0.673 0.06 106 0.704 0.08 88 0.680 0.11 103 0.590 0.16
Jordan 87 0.673 0.08 90 0.748 0.08 104 0.594 0.14 92 0.654 0.14
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  indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
  indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty.
liberal component  
Index (lcI)
equality before the law and  
individual liberty index
legislative constrains on  
the executive index
judicial constraints on  
the executive index
country rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/- rank Score SD	+/-
Romania 88 0.672 0.07 72 0.818 0.07 116 0.515 0.15 76 0.734 0.11
Timor-Leste 89 0.671 0.08 87 0.762 0.08 99 0.606 0.13 93 0.648 0.14
Guyana 90 0.664 0.08 57 0.876 0.05  124 0.438 0.17 87 0.686 0.12
Burkina Faso 91 0.661 0.06  71 0.821 0.06 117 0.491 0.16 97 0.626 0.14
Fiji 92 0.657 0.09  76 0.808 0.06 95 0.642 0.13 112 0.478 0.18
El Salvador 93 0.657 0.04 117 0.653 0.08 91 0.654 0.14 85 0.696 0.12
Papua New Guinea 94 0.654 0.08 101 0.714 0.09 98 0.612 0.14 83 0.702 0.10
Uganda 95 0.654 0.06 120 0.624 0.11 64 0.774 0.09 94 0.633 0.13
Zambia 96 0.654 0.08  93 0.738 0.08 84 0.684 0.12 107 0.536 0.15 
Kenya 97 0.650 0.06 142 0.434 0.10 55 0.805 0.09 62 0.770 0.10 
Bosnia and herzegovina 98 0.648 0.06 62 0.853 0.05 122 0.459 0.14 100 0.614 0.13
Philippines 99 0.647 0.08 102 0.713 0.08 108 0.581 0.14 86 0.695 0.14
Mozambique 100 0.642 0.07 100 0.718 0.09 114 0.534 0.16 79 0.709 0.12
Niger 101 0.636 0.05 64 0.844 0.06 74 0.730 0.12 127 0.366 0.13
Kyrgyzstan 102 0.634 0.06  108 0.686 0.08 61 0.788 0.09  108 0.533 0.13 
Serbia 103 0.595 0.06  70 0.824 0.06 120 0.475 0.14 113 0.474 0.15
Ivory Coast 104 0.585 0.08 92 0.745 0.08 105 0.589 0.14 117 0.453 0.14
Gabon 105 0.578 0.08 50 0.895 0.05  125 0.438 0.17 120 0.421 0.15
Iraq 106 0.576 0.07 150 0.321 0.09 43 0.842 0.08 104 0.583 0.16
Bolivia 107 0.564 0.08 82 0.792 0.08 128 0.407 0.15 111 0.491 0.15
Sierra Leone 108 0.561 0.05 88 0.755 0.07 97 0.625 0.13 130 0.341 0.15
Rwanda 109 0.551 0.08 114 0.666 0.11 109 0.578 0.14 145 0.226 0.15
Somaliland 110 0.542 0.07 121 0.615 0.11 87 0.681 0.12 131 0.331 0.12
Pakistan 111 0.541 0.06 153 0.308 0.12 85 0.682 0.13 77 0.722 0.11
Palestine/West Bank 112 0.538 0.04  89 0.750 0.08 178 39 0.882 0.06 
Vietnam 113 0.536 0.06  112 0.671 0.10 92 0.653 0.14 134 0.304 0.17
Myanmar 114 0.534 0.08  143 0.432 0.11  111 0.547 0.14 89 0.675 0.13 
Kosovo 115 0.527 0.08 127 0.586 0.11 110 0.572 0.15 105 0.575 0.17
Lebanon 116 0.526 0.06 115 0.665 0.11 112 0.544 0.15 129 0.346 0.15
Macedonia 117 0.521 0.05  77 0.807 0.07 93 0.651 0.12 156 0.129 0.11 
Ecuador 118 0.519 0.06 46 0.906 0.04 123 0.440 0.17 140 0.237 0.15
Guinea-Bissau 119 0.502 0.08 130 0.549 0.10 142 0.266 0.12 96 0.627 0.14
Malaysia 120 0.500 0.09 116 0.660 0.08 131 0.368 0.14 109 0.503 0.15
Afghanistan 121 0.495 0.06 148 0.351 0.12 71 0.740 0.12 118 0.437 0.16
Libya 122 0.493 0.06  173 0.136 0.07 31 0.887 0.06  116 0.457 0.16 
honduras 123 0.489 0.07 109 0.683 0.09 133 0.354 0.16 124 0.395 0.16
Madagascar 124 0.485 0.09 126 0.592 0.11 126 0.436 0.12 122 0.414 0.17
Armenia 125 0.482 0.06 75 0.811 0.06 135 0.333 0.16 137 0.282 0.15
Ukraine 126 0.478 0.07  128 0.569 0.10  82 0.691 0.12 147 0.187 0.10
CAR 127 0.470 0.07 147 0.352 0.12 86 0.681 0.14 125 0.381 0.15
Zimbabwe 128 0.468 0.06 139 0.451 0.11  83 0.689 0.12  106 0.565 0.13
Comoros 129 0.442 0.07 110 0.681 0.10 144 0.222 0.15 115 0.459 0.17
Somalia 130 0.438 0.08 159 0.293 0.11  76 0.727 0.11 133 0.326 0.14
Iran 131 0.435 0.07 138 0.464 0.12 100 0.605 0.15 143 0.234 0.13
haiti 132 0.418 0.07 132 0.537 0.11 115 0.529 0.16 151 0.152 0.11 
Zanzibar 133 0.418 0.08 125 0.601 0.09 139 0.305 0.17  135 0.292 0.13
Oman 134 0.391 0.05 124 0.609 0.09 153 0.158 0.11 123 0.403 0.13
Togo 135 0.390 0.06 118 0.643 0.11 130 0.397 0.15 163 0.111 0.10
Algeria 136 0.384 0.06 119 0.633 0.11 145 0.222 0.17 136 0.290 0.18
Guinea 137 0.376 0.05 131 0.545 0.10 137 0.317 0.16 142 0.236 0.11
Dominican Republic 138 0.375 0.06 107 0.694 0.09 164 0.075 0.10 128 0.361 0.16
Angola 139 0.363 0.07 136 0.491 0.11 149 0.168 0.10 110 0.491 0.17
Bangladesh 140 0.361 0.07 140 0.451 0.12 147 0.209 0.15 126 0.368 0.15
Egypt 141 0.350 0.07 166 0.211 0.09 121 0.465 0.15 119 0.432 0.16
United Arab Emirates 142 0.344 0.06 95 0.734 0.10 148 0.178 0.13 159 0.124 0.12
Kazakhstan 143 0.343 0.05 123 0.611 0.10 150 0.164 0.12 144 0.230 0.10
Cameroon 144 0.338 0.05 137 0.477 0.13 134 0.353 0.16 153 0.148 0.11
Thailand 145 0.329 0.05  163 0.265 0.10  169 0.063 0.08  95 0.631 0.14
Laos 146 0.323 0.09 171 0.152 0.07 136 0.321 0.19 114 0.468 0.15
Swaziland 147 0.315 0.07 149 0.341 0.12 132 0.363 0.14 139 0.260 0.14
Djibouti 148 0.309 0.05 133 0.536 0.12 157 0.136 0.10 146 0.219 0.14
qatar 149 0.303 0.05 144 0.423 0.12 176 0.038 0.06 121 0.418 0.14
Maldives 150 0.299 0.06 154 0.300 0.10 127 0.418 0.14 149 0.165 0.13
Venezuela 151 0.286 0.06 160 0.287 0.09  119 0.476 0.17  171 0.058 0.07
Belarus 152 0.281 0.03 105 0.704 0.09 170 0.061 0.06 172 0.058 0.07
Russia 153 0.262 0.04 135 0.495 0.11 151 0.161 0.13 158 0.128 0.10
Ethiopia 154 0.261 0.04 134 0.516 0.11 159 0.105 0.10 157 0.129 0.12
Mauritania 155 0.256 0.06  158 0.295 0.11  158 0.123 0.11  138 0.261 0.14
Nicaragua 156 0.243 0.05  129 0.565 0.10 165 0.075 0.07  169 0.063 0.08
Palestine/Gaza 157 0.240 0.06 146 0.354 0.12 177 132 0.327 0.15
Congo 158 0.240 0.06 152 0.313 0.10 146 0.219 0.16 161 0.119 0.11
Sudan 159 0.230 0.05 168 0.182 0.08 140 0.298 0.16 150 0.163 0.13
Cuba 160 0.221 0.04 141 0.443 0.11 163 0.076 0.07 160 0.119 0.09
DRC 161 0.214 0.05 172 0.152 0.07 138 0.310 0.16 148 0.181 0.10
Turkey 162 0.213 0.05  157 0.299 0.10  152 0.158 0.13  162 0.113 0.10 
China 163 0.199 0.05 156 0.299 0.09 161 0.092 0.09 154 0.148 0.09
Chad 164 0.186 0.06 161 0.267 0.11 154 0.147 0.13 164 0.103 0.09
Cambodia 165 0.183 0.05 151 0.318 0.10 162 0.091 0.09 155 0.131 0.11
Saudi Arabia 166 0.171 0.04 170 0.160 0.08 168 0.063 0.07 141 0.237 0.13
Azerbaijan 167 0.164 0.04 145 0.358 0.11 160 0.092 0.09 176 0.019 0.03
South Sudan 168 0.162 0.05 174 0.080 0.05 143 0.232 0.13 152 0.150 0.10
Bahrain 169 0.154 0.05 162 0.266 0.12  174 0.044 0.06 170 0.059 0.11
Tajikistan 170 0.150 0.02 155 0.300 0.12 167 0.064 0.06 173 0.056 0.06
Burundi 171 0.149 0.04  167 0.203 0.10  155 0.139 0.12  166 0.086 0.07 
yemen 172 0.140 0.05  176 0.054 0.03  141 0.279 0.19 167 0.082 0.08
Turkmenistan 173 0.130 0.04  165 0.231 0.10 172 0.048 0.07 165 0.094 0.09
Equatorial Guinea 174 0.119 0.04 169 0.161 0.07 156 0.137 0.12 174 0.038 0.04
Uzbekistan 175 0.111 0.03 164 0.258 0.10 173 0.044 0.05 175 0.021 0.03
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The egalitarian principle of democracy measures to what extent all 
social groups enjoy equal capabilities to participate in the political 
arena. It relies on the idea that democracy is a system of rule “by the 
people” where citizens participate in various ways, such as mak-
ing informed voting decisions, expressing opinions, demonstrat-
ing, running for office or influencing policy-making in other ways. 
The egalitarian principle of democracy is fundamentally related to 
political participation, as systematic inequalities in the rights and 
resources of citizens of specific social groups limit capabilities to 
participate in the political and governing processes. Therefore, a 
more equal distribution of resources across groups results in politi-
cal equality and hence democracy.
Appendix 4: 
The egalitarian 
Component Index
equal protection index
Social class equality in 
respect for civil liberties
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egalitarian component  
Index (ecI)
equal protection  
index
equal distribution  
of resources index
equal access  
index
country rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-)
Norway 1 0.963 0.03 2 0.969 0.02 1 0.978 0.01 2 0.955 0.03
Denmark 2 0.951 0.03 5 0.962 0.03 9 0.949 0.03 1 0.972 0.02
Luxembourg 3 0.949 0.02 1 0.977 0.02 15 0.944 0.03 4 0.952 0.03
Germany 4 0.939 0.03 10 0.953 0.03 16 0.942 0.03 3 0.954 0.03
Belgium 5 0.934 0.04 9 0.955 0.03 5 0.960 0.02 12 0.927 0.05
Netherlands 6 0.933 0.04 24 0.924 0.05 10 0.949 0.03 7 0.947 0.04
Finland 7 0.930 0.04 11 0.951 0.03 14 0.944 0.03 8 0.939 0.04
Switzerland 8 0.929 0.03 16 0.937 0.05 8 0.950 0.03 5 0.949 0.04
Sweden 9 0.921 0.05 19 0.934 0.05 19 0.934 0.04 6 0.949 0.04
Japan 10 0.919 0.04 3 0.967 0.02 3 0.966 0.02 24 0.875 0.07
Portugal 11 0.917 0.04 4 0.965 0.03 38 0.884 0.05 10 0.931 0.04
Iceland 12 0.913 0.06 26 0.909 0.06 2 0.971 0.02 16 0.908 0.06
Estonia 13 0.909 0.06 13 0.944 0.04 6 0.959 0.03 26 0.865 0.08
Taiwan 14 0.908 0.05 15 0.942 0.04 11 0.948 0.03 22 0.877 0.07
France 15 0.907 0.05 28 0.906 0.05 17 0.938 0.04 11 0.928 0.05
Italy 16 0.898 0.05 12 0.945 0.04 33 0.897 0.06 13 0.926 0.05
Greece 17 0.888 0.05 33 0.892 0.07 29 0.907 0.04 9 0.934 0.04
Costa Rica 18 0.888 0.05 18 0.934 0.04 25 0.914 0.04 29 0.862 0.09
Ireland 19 0.883 0.05 6 0.959 0.03 47 0.842 0.07 19 0.888 0.07
Austria 20 0.882 0.06 7 0.958 0.03 22 0.920 0.04 52 0.809 0.10
Czech Republic 21 0.880 0.07 23 0.925 0.05 7 0.953 0.03 33 0.850 0.10
New Zealand 22 0.880 0.06 27 0.907 0.06 27 0.910 0.05 20 0.881 0.07
South Korea 23 0.880 0.05 42 0.851 0.07 4 0.964 0.02 30 0.860 0.09
Latvia 24 0.878 0.05 8 0.956 0.03 41 0.874 0.07 44 0.824 0.10
Cyprus 25 0.877 0.06 30 0.897 0.07 13 0.945 0.03 54 0.806 0.10
Spain 26 0.867 0.07 17 0.935 0.05 40 0.882 0.05 23 0.876 0.08
Slovenia 27 0.866 0.06 25 0.924 0.05 35 0.890 0.05  27 0.864 0.07
United Kingdom 28 0.862 0.06 32 0.894 0.06 31 0.900 0.05 41 0.826 0.09
Lithuania 29 0.862 0.06 43 0.843 0.08 28 0.908 0.04 15 0.912 0.06
Belarus 30 0.860 0.05 35 0.886 0.07 32 0.899 0.05 40 0.828 0.11
Poland 31 0.860 0.05 21 0.930 0.05 46 0.853 0.07 38 0.833 0.10
Australia 32 0.857 0.05 20 0.930 0.05 45 0.855 0.06 35 0.844 0.10
Bhutan 33 0.847 0.08 31 0.894 0.07 20 0.932 0.04 55 0.801 0.11
Trinidad and Tobago 34 0.841 0.08 40 0.856 0.08 37 0.886 0.07 60 0.776 0.13
Canada 35 0.834 0.08 46 0.829 0.09 24 0.917 0.04 47 0.818 0.11
hungary 36 0.830 0.06 51 0.815 0.09 51 0.818 0.07 34 0.849 0.08
Cuba 37 0.828 0.06 76 0.733 0.14 18 0.937 0.04 46 0.819 0.09
hong Kong 38 0.825 0.06 54 0.800 0.10 21 0.926 0.04 64 0.757 0.11
Bulgaria 39 0.820 0.06 39 0.862 0.09 65 0.754 0.10 32 0.855 0.09
Cape Verde 40 0.816 0.07 48 0.828 0.10 48 0.834 0.08 42 0.825 0.11
Uruguay 41 0.813 0.08 34 0.888 0.07 49 0.828 0.08 61 0.771 0.13
Benin 42 0.803 0.07 56 0.789 0.10 63 0.756 0.11 17 0.906 0.06
Mauritius 43 0.803 0.08 37 0.875 0.08 30 0.901 0.05 91 0.643 0.17
Barbados 44 0.803 0.08 75 0.739 0.14 34 0.896 0.05 51 0.811 0.09
Singapore 45 0.801 0.06 14 0.942 0.04 23 0.919 0.05 93 0.636 0.18
Georgia 46 0.792 0.08 87 0.698 0.14 39 0.883 0.06 63 0.761 0.13
Tunisia 47 0.780 0.08  22 0.926 0.05 86 0.644 0.14 48 0.818 0.10 
Suriname 48 0.775 0.08 47 0.829 0.09 74 0.713 0.11 43 0.825 0.11
Palestine/West Bank 49 0.769 0.09 68 0.748 0.13 60 0.772 0.10 50 0.812 0.11
Slovakia 50 0.761 0.07 64 0.765 0.11 56 0.788 0.09 53 0.808 0.10
Lesotho 51 0.756 0.08 72 0.740 0.12 79 0.666 0.12 18 0.895 0.07
Mongolia 52 0.754 0.07 58 0.788 0.11 61 0.764 0.10 62 0.763 0.12
Israel 53 0.747 0.09 61 0.770 0.12 57 0.784 0.10 72 0.713 0.13
Togo 54 0.744 0.10 74 0.739 0.14 66 0.748 0.10 58 0.785 0.13
Senegal 55 0.732 0.05 60 0.777 0.12 83 0.659 0.10 49 0.817 0.11
Tanzania 56 0.730 0.07 95 0.646 0.15 76 0.691 0.13 21 0.878 0.07
Bosnia and herzegovina 57 0.728 0.08 81 0.708 0.13 68 0.735 0.11 82 0.685 0.16
Panama 58 0.728 0.11 62 0.769 0.13 71 0.725 0.11 70 0.720 0.15
Romania 59 0.722 0.07 29 0.898 0.07 98 0.560 0.14  84 0.679 0.16
Ghana 60 0.717 0.11 73 0.740 0.12 101 0.540 0.15 31 0.856 0.09
Ecuador 61 0.715 0.10 109 0.608 0.16 75 0.709 0.12 45 0.824 0.10
Botswana 62 0.713 0.07 83 0.707 0.13 62 0.757 0.10 80 0.694 0.14
Armenia 63 0.712 0.09 59 0.783 0.11 50 0.819 0.08 102 0.604 0.18
Croatia 64 0.705 0.07  93 0.659 0.15 43 0.864 0.07 95 0.634 0.15
Vanuatu 65 0.705 0.07 45 0.833 0.09 116 0.450 0.14 25 0.866 0.09
Mali 66 0.699 0.09 53 0.803 0.13 96 0.581 0.15 59 0.784 0.11
USA 67 0.695 0.09 78 0.728 0.13 89 0.628 0.11 57 0.791 0.11
Algeria 68 0.693 0.10 69 0.747 0.13 54 0.802 0.09 97 0.624 0.17
Kyrgyzstan 69 0.691 0.08 80 0.711 0.14 77 0.677 0.10 76 0.702 0.16
Bolivia 70 0.689 0.06 49 0.822 0.09 121 0.425 0.14 36 0.838 0.09
Gabon 71 0.683 0.08 55 0.794 0.12 82 0.661 0.13 101 0.606 0.18
Eritrea 72 0.682 0.08  86 0.702 0.15 58 0.781 0.10  122 0.525 0.17
Seychelles 73 0.677 0.10 96 0.643 0.16 36 0.887 0.06 120 0.532 0.20
Guyana 74 0.676 0.08 57 0.788 0.12 102 0.539 0.12 67 0.742 0.13
Montenegro 75 0.676 0.12 71 0.743 0.13 52 0.817 0.08 121 0.527 0.17
Argentina 76 0.676 0.08 90 0.670 0.14 85 0.653 0.13 68 0.737 0.15
Namibia 77 0.675 0.06 97 0.640 0.15 84 0.654 0.13 66 0.748 0.15
Vietnam 78 0.672 0.10 38 0.871 0.09 94 0.592 0.16 111 0.579 0.20
Niger 79 0.672 0.09 41 0.852 0.08 114 0.465 0.14 77 0.701 0.13
S.Tomé & P. 80 0.669 0.10 85 0.702 0.13 95 0.588 0.11 65 0.750 0.14
Nepal 81 0.667 0.07 44 0.841 0.09 135 0.357 0.14 39 0.829 0.10
Kosovo 82 0.659 0.11 100 0.631 0.18 88 0.633 0.13 85 0.674 0.16
United Arab Emirates 83 0.658 0.08 107 0.614 0.18 59 0.773 0.08 113 0.560 0.19
Serbia 84 0.652 0.10 103 0.622 0.17 73 0.716 0.10 89 0.651 0.17
Jamaica 85 0.649 0.09 129 0.486 0.17 99 0.557 0.14 14 0.916 0.05
Moldova 86 0.648 0.11 88 0.686 0.12 91 0.619 0.12 90 0.646 0.14
The Gambia 87 0.648 0.10 67 0.750 0.13 87 0.640 0.11 110 0.579 0.18
Albania 88 0.641 0.10 106 0.617 0.16 80 0.665 0.13 78 0.696 0.16
Comoros 89 0.640 0.09 98 0.638 0.16 108 0.515 0.14 56 0.801 0.13
AppenDIx: CounTRY SCoReS FoR 2017
table A4: country Scores for the egalitarian component Index (ecI) and its main components 
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egalitarian component  
Index (ecI)
equal protection  
index
equal distribution  
of resources index
equal access  
index
country rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-)
Rwanda 90 0.637 0.09 112 0.602 0.17 67 0.744 0.11 119 0.542 0.21
Kuwait 91 0.637 0.08 117 0.582 0.16 12 0.945 0.03 143 0.422 0.18
Chile 92 0.631 0.09 65 0.755 0.13 107 0.517 0.14 98 0.620 0.16
Macedonia 93 0.629 0.07 114 0.586 0.17 70 0.726 0.09 115 0.559 0.19
Ivory Coast 94 0.619 0.11 63 0.768 0.11 129 0.382 0.15 71 0.715 0.15
Zanzibar 95 0.617 0.08 124 0.520 0.17 93 0.598 0.12 79 0.696 0.15
Liberia 96 0.616 0.11 89 0.681 0.16 139 0.343 0.13 28 0.864 0.08
Oman 97 0.610 0.09 120 0.564 0.18 42 0.868 0.06 155 0.340 0.22
Fiji 98 0.608 0.09 66 0.754 0.13 97 0.579 0.13 128 0.484 0.23
Kazakhstan 99 0.600 0.08 113 0.599 0.19 64 0.755 0.09 133 0.466 0.21
South Africa 100 0.599 0.08 50 0.815 0.11 143 0.297 0.15 73 0.710 0.15
Burkina Faso 101 0.590 0.09 36 0.879 0.08 141 0.317 0.15 99 0.618 0.17
Cameroon 102 0.587 0.09 91 0.667 0.13 112 0.493 0.15 118 0.551 0.19
Sri Lanka 103 0.586 0.10 121 0.563 0.15 90 0.622 0.15 103 0.600 0.18
Indonesia 104 0.580 0.09 102 0.623 0.15 111 0.495 0.14 94 0.635 0.14
Malaysia 105 0.579 0.09 139 0.394 0.18 53 0.803 0.08 112 0.573 0.18
Sierra Leone 106 0.579 0.09 119 0.569 0.17 122 0.423 0.13 75 0.704 0.15
Zambia 107 0.569 0.08 52 0.814 0.11 146 0.264 0.13 92 0.640 0.18
Brazil 108 0.568 0.11 116 0.583 0.16 125 0.402 0.16 74 0.710 0.16
Timor-Leste 109 0.568 0.09 79 0.719 0.13 138 0.345 0.16 83 0.683 0.16
India 110 0.561 0.08 77 0.732 0.13 132 0.375 0.16 107 0.593 0.19
Solomon Islands 111 0.560 0.11 82 0.708 0.14 134 0.360 0.14 86 0.664 0.15
Morocco 112 0.560 0.07 70 0.747 0.13 131 0.378 0.14 106 0.596 0.19
Peru 113 0.560 0.10 105 0.618 0.16 130 0.382 0.16 69 0.729 0.14
Venezuela 114 0.551 0.08  92 0.659 0.14 168 0.147 0.12  37 0.837 0.10
Russia 115 0.549 0.10 140 0.392 0.20 69 0.733 0.10 116 0.558 0.16
Libya 116 0.548 0.10 125 0.512 0.19 105 0.521 0.14 87 0.660 0.17
Jordan 117 0.539 0.10 108 0.609 0.16 81 0.664 0.10 145 0.403 0.22
Mozambique 118 0.539 0.10 94 0.652 0.17 152 0.246 0.16 81 0.685 0.16
Djibouti 119 0.531 0.09 104 0.621 0.16 123 0.418 0.15 117 0.551 0.17
Nigeria 120 0.520 0.09 84 0.705 0.14 133 0.371 0.15 123 0.521 0.21
Maldives 121 0.509 0.10 110 0.607 0.16 119 0.442 0.13 127 0.485 0.19
Lebanon 122 0.509 0.07 122 0.532 0.17 100 0.542 0.12 139 0.442 0.19
Ukraine 123 0.501 0.07 142 0.371 0.19 72 0.719 0.09 132 0.475 0.20
Nicaragua 124 0.487 0.11 126 0.504 0.21 104 0.527 0.17 137 0.444 0.23
Uganda 125 0.486 0.09 135 0.428 0.19 118 0.449 0.16 100 0.614 0.18
Mexico 126 0.476 0.07 128 0.493 0.17 127 0.398 0.12 108 0.585 0.18
Colombia 127 0.473 0.12 134 0.428 0.17 115 0.451 0.19 124 0.508 0.19
Kenya 128 0.467 0.07 138 0.400 0.17 120 0.428 0.14 114 0.560 0.18
Iran 129 0.466 0.10 130 0.479 0.16 103 0.530 0.16 153 0.363 0.20
Myanmar 130 0.445 0.09  127 0.497 0.17 151 0.248 0.14 96 0.624 0.15
Thailand 131 0.445 0.10 164 0.203 0.15 110 0.508 0.15 105 0.597 0.16
Uzbekistan 132 0.434 0.07 163 0.206 0.16 78 0.668 0.12 147 0.394 0.19
Malawi 133 0.433 0.11 145 0.369 0.20 140 0.328 0.13 109 0.582 0.18
Zimbabwe 134 0.421 0.09 133 0.447 0.18 126 0.400 0.16 165 0.275 0.21
Guinea-Bissau 135 0.418 0.10 101 0.625 0.15 165 0.168 0.14 148 0.393 0.18
Saudi Arabia 136 0.416 0.05 167 0.185 0.14 44 0.857 0.07 171 0.161 0.14
Palestine/Gaza 137 0.414 0.09 148 0.357 0.20 109 0.510 0.18 157 0.318 0.18
China 138 0.409 0.08 153 0.305 0.17 117 0.449 0.12 146 0.394 0.20
Turkey 139 0.408 0.09  123 0.524 0.17 128 0.385 0.15  159 0.308 0.24
DRC 140 0.407 0.09 147 0.363 0.22 145 0.289 0.11 130 0.482 0.20
qatar 141 0.403 0.05 172 0.149 0.16 26 0.911 0.05 173 0.148 0.15
Guinea 142 0.401 0.08 115 0.584 0.17 162 0.194 0.13 136 0.449 0.20
Bahrain 143 0.397 0.07 162 0.220 0.19 55 0.800 0.09 170 0.169 0.18
Papua New Guinea 144 0.393 0.08 111 0.605 0.15 174 0.121 0.12 141 0.439 0.22
Ethiopia 145 0.389 0.10 132 0.459 0.19 124 0.417 0.16 166 0.257 0.19
Philippines 146 0.383 0.10 146 0.368 0.22 142 0.310 0.14 140 0.440 0.17
Madagascar 147 0.373 0.10 143 0.370 0.20 175 0.117 0.09 104 0.599 0.16
Swaziland 148 0.367 0.08 141 0.379 0.22 113 0.475 0.15 164 0.285 0.22
Somaliland 149 0.362 0.09 137 0.408 0.22 160 0.196 0.12 131 0.478 0.20
Burundi 150 0.360 0.07  99 0.635 0.16 161 0.194 0.13 163 0.288 0.17
North Korea 151 0.358 0.06 176 0.097 0.12 92 0.599 0.14 149 0.385 0.19
Turkmenistan 152 0.354 0.08 149 0.353 0.19 106 0.517 0.18 176 0.141 0.16
Iraq 153 0.352 0.09  152 0.314 0.23 136 0.355 0.13 144 0.420 0.22
honduras 154 0.351 0.07 154 0.305 0.18 159 0.208 0.12 125 0.506 0.20
Laos 155 0.344 0.08 151 0.335 0.19 137 0.346 0.16 151 0.382 0.18
Paraguay 156 0.342 0.06 144 0.370 0.19 166 0.164 0.10 138 0.444 0.19
Dominican Republic 157 0.331 0.09  157 0.255 0.19 155 0.232 0.13 126 0.502 0.18
CAR 158 0.331 0.07 175 0.134 0.14 169 0.143 0.12  88 0.657 0.16
El Salvador 159 0.306 0.07 161 0.227 0.15 153 0.245 0.13 129 0.484 0.21
Pakistan 160 0.306 0.11 169 0.168 0.18 163 0.193 0.13 135 0.455 0.20
Azerbaijan 161 0.303 0.08 118 0.575 0.17 164 0.176 0.14 172 0.159 0.18
Bangladesh 162 0.299 0.09 159 0.230 0.18 150 0.250 0.16 154 0.361 0.21
Equatorial Guinea 163 0.298 0.08 155 0.304 0.17 147 0.262 0.12 156 0.330 0.19
Guatemala 164 0.290 0.09 165 0.201 0.18 157 0.215 0.10 142 0.432 0.23
Tajikistan 165 0.281 0.08 131 0.476 0.22 149 0.257 0.12 178 0.079 0.12
Afghanistan 166 0.281 0.08 168 0.171 0.17 148 0.261 0.13 150 0.383 0.19
Congo 167 0.277 0.09 171 0.153 0.20 144 0.296 0.14 160 0.305 0.17
Syria 168 0.268 0.10 136 0.417 0.18 158 0.213 0.13  175 0.142 0.16
Angola 169 0.262 0.09 170 0.160 0.20 156 0.217 0.11 152 0.382 0.24
Somalia 170 0.258 0.07  156 0.302 0.18  176 0.096 0.08 134 0.456 0.19
haiti 171 0.236 0.08 166 0.192 0.18 167 0.154 0.13 161 0.304 0.23
Chad 172 0.233 0.07 160 0.228 0.18 154 0.238 0.13 168 0.196 0.18
Mauritania 173 0.232 0.08  150 0.338 0.26 171 0.135 0.11  167 0.199 0.20
Cambodia 174 0.199 0.06 173 0.148 0.13 173 0.123 0.10 158 0.316 0.21
Sudan 175 0.199 0.07 158 0.238 0.20 172 0.134 0.09 177 0.140 0.17
Egypt 176 0.176 0.06 174 0.146 0.14 170 0.135 0.10 162 0.296 0.19
yemen 177 0.131 0.05 177 0.069 0.11 177 0.079 0.09 169 0.190 0.22
South Sudan 178 0.085 0.05 178 0.052 0.09 178 0.026 0.04 174 0.144 0.15
V-Dem AnnuAl RepoRT 2018
  indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
  indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty.
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The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active par-
ticipation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-
electoral. This principle prefers direct rule by citizens as practicable. 
The V-Dem participatory Component Index (pCI) takes into account 
four important aspects of citizen participation: civil society organ-
izations, mechanisms of direct democracy, and participation and 
representation through local and regional governments (Figure 
5.1). Four different V-Dem indices capture these aspects and are the 
basis for the pCI.
Appendix 5: The participatory 
Component Index
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fIgure A5.1: the V-Dem pArtIcIpAtory component 
InDex: WorlD AnD regIonAl AVerAgeS, 1900 to 2017.
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table A5: country Scores for the participatory component Index (pcI) and its main components
participatory component 
Index (pcI)
civil Society participation 
Index
Direct popular Vote 
Index
local government  
Index
regional government 
Index
country rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-)
Switzerland 1 0.876 0.02 4 0.968 0.02 1 0.679 0.00 21 0.981 0.019 9 0.989 0.011
Uruguay 2 0.814 0.03 23 0.897 0.07 2 0.547 0.00 29 0.973 0.027  5 0.993 0.007
New Zealand 3 0.763 0.03 21 0.906 0.06 4 0.406 0.00 20 0.981 0.019 178
Slovenia 4 0.758 0.03  38 0.864 0.08 3 0.418 0.00 37 0.957 0.043 154 0.000 0.000
Italy 5 0.746 0.03 33 0.880 0.07 7 0.379 0.00 33 0.969 0.031 28 0.965 0.035
Lithuania 6 0.729 0.05 52 0.830 0.09 6 0.389 0.00 3 0.994 0.006 166 0.000 0.000 
Slovakia 7 0.724 0.04 58 0.821 0.10 10 0.332 0.00 4 0.991 0.009 23 0.971 0.029
Bulgaria 8 0.710 0.05  79 0.769 0.12 5 0.395 0.00 35 0.959 0.041  120 0.056 0.025
Denmark 9 0.708 0.02 7 0.960 0.03 37 0.185 0.00 6 0.990 0.010 12 0.985 0.015
Austria 10 0.707 0.02  12 0.946 0.04 31 0.193 0.00 22 0.980 0.020 14 0.982 0.018
Taiwan 11 0.704 0.03 17 0.925 0.05 40 0.179 0.00 9 0.989 0.011 20 0.975 0.025
Bolivia 12 0.694 0.05 50 0.838 0.08 11 0.310 0.00 39 0.953 0.046 59 0.810 0.077
Iceland 13 0.689 0.03  8 0.958 0.03 50 0.154 0.00 25 0.979 0.021 163 0.000 0.000
United Kingdom 14 0.684 0.02  6 0.963 0.03 55 0.135 0.00 76 0.845 0.083 26 0.968 0.032
Peru 15 0.682 0.05 90 0.741 0.13 16 0.250 0.00 28 0.977 0.023 11 0.988 0.012
Costa Rica 16 0.680 0.04 22 0.899 0.06 43 0.174 0.00 36 0.959 0.041 174 0.000 0.000
Croatia 17 0.678 0.05  72 0.792 0.12 12 0.307 0.00 60 0.886 0.112 35 0.930 0.070 
Netherlands 18 0.673 0.04 24 0.895 0.06 39 0.183 0.00 71 0.857 0.128 37 0.917 0.082
Australia 19 0.666 0.03 19 0.914 0.06 46 0.167 0.00 23 0.980 0.020 3 0.993 0.007
Niger 20 0.661 0.06 28 0.888 0.06 38 0.185 0.00 116 0.475 0.025 32 0.949 0.051
Latvia 21 0.659 0.05 62 0.811 0.11 21 0.213 0.00 30 0.972 0.028 151 0.000 0.000 
USA 22 0.659 0.01 1 0.983 0.01 166 0.000 0.00 49 0.928 0.063 1 0.998 0.002
Norway 23 0.657 0.01 2 0.982 0.01 127 0.015 0.00 34 0.965 0.035 31 0.952 0.047
Belgium 24 0.654 0.02 9 0.956 0.03 125 0.017 0.00 2 0.994 0.006 19 0.976 0.024
Ivory Coast 25 0.652 0.05 44 0.851 0.08 18 0.244 0.00 75 0.849 0.123 65 0.679 0.138
Canada 26 0.652 0.02 3 0.973 0.02 128 0.015 0.00 32 0.971 0.029 10 0.988 0.012
Germany 27 0.652 0.02 5 0.967 0.02 145 0.011 0.00 38 0.955 0.045 4 0.993 0.007
Colombia 28 0.651 0.07 88 0.744 0.13 20 0.215 0.00 17 0.984 0.016 22 0.973 0.027
Finland 29 0.646 0.02 14 0.943 0.04 131 0.015 0.00 1 0.996 0.004 86 0.364 0.102 
Sweden 30 0.643 0.03  16 0.937 0.04 107 0.028 0.00 24 0.979 0.021 43 0.884 0.084
hungary 31 0.643 0.07 119 0.650 0.17 8 0.365 0.00 53 0.920 0.076 33 0.947 0.052
Ecuador 32 0.639 0.06 111 0.674 0.15 9 0.350 0.00 70 0.859 0.129 40 0.900 0.100
Greece 33 0.638 0.06 34 0.877 0.07 28 0.200 0.00 124 0.341 0.170 52 0.850 0.146
Spain 34 0.634 0.03 57 0.825 0.09 68 0.091 0.00 10 0.988 0.012 34 0.939 0.056
Portugal 35 0.634 0.05 63 0.811 0.10 62 0.112 0.00 7 0.989 0.011 150 0.000 0.000
Poland 36 0.630 0.06 107 0.681 0.13 44 0.169 0.00 11 0.987 0.013 49 0.860 0.072
Sierra Leone 37 0.629 0.03 13 0.945 0.04 149 0.009 0.00 42 0.944 0.056 54 0.840 0.160
Gabon 38 0.628 0.05 30 0.884 0.07 100 0.033 0.00 26 0.977 0.023  96 0.209 0.077
France 39 0.625 0.05  48 0.843 0.10 95 0.033 0.00 31 0.971 0.029 27 0.967 0.033
Argentina 40 0.619 0.04 47 0.844 0.10 130 0.015 0.00 57 0.909 0.067 7 0.992 0.008
Nigeria 41 0.619 0.04 27 0.888 0.08 150 0.007 0.00 41 0.945 0.055  15 0.981 0.019 
Kenya 42 0.615 0.05  37 0.866 0.08 57 0.131 0.00 77 0.841 0.134  62 0.760 0.137 
Philippines 43 0.615 0.05 64 0.807 0.10 77 0.070 0.00 65 0.873 0.086 30 0.963 0.037
Benin 44 0.608 0.05 25 0.893 0.07 122 0.020 0.00 45 0.938 0.062 125 0.047 0.029
Brazil 45 0.607 0.05  97 0.725 0.15 63 0.104 0.00 16 0.985 0.015 21 0.973 0.027
Jamaica 46 0.607 0.05 45 0.846 0.09 109 0.026 0.00 12 0.987 0.013 175 0.000 0.000
Chile 47 0.605 0.04 39 0.862 0.08 126 0.015 0.00 47 0.931 0.069 79 0.435 0.159
Montenegro 48 0.605 0.06 76 0.775 0.13 61 0.116 0.00 51 0.927 0.073 177 0.000 0.000
Estonia 49 0.604 0.06 93 0.729 0.14 69 0.090 0.00 15 0.985 0.015 74 0.484 0.016
South Korea 50 0.602 0.05 40 0.860 0.09 103 0.031 0.00 18 0.984 0.016  2 0.996 0.004
Czech Republic 51 0.602 0.05 51 0.832 0.08 87 0.053 0.00 55 0.917 0.071 36 0.927 0.051
Japan 52 0.600 0.04 60 0.813 0.10 136 0.013 0.00 13 0.987 0.013 6 0.992 0.008
Ukraine 53 0.599 0.06 86 0.746 0.12 67 0.096 0.00 52 0.925 0.075 100 0.178 0.078
Bhutan 54 0.597 0.05  41 0.856 0.08 111 0.020 0.00 50 0.928 0.072 57 0.823 0.129 
Suriname 55 0.594 0.05 35 0.874 0.07 117 0.020 0.00 91 0.716 0.222 55 0.834 0.092
Israel 56 0.593 0.05 75 0.781 0.12 140 0.013 0.00 27 0.977 0.023 153 0.000 0.000
Macedonia 57 0.588 0.05 114 0.667 0.15 45 0.169 0.00 19 0.982 0.018 171 0.000 0.000
South Africa 58 0.587 0.06 46 0.845 0.08 114 0.020 0.00 59 0.904 0.096 44 0.879 0.100
Serbia 59 0.586 0.06 134 0.591 0.16 49 0.156 0.00 54 0.920 0.080 29 0.965 0.035
Mexico 60 0.583 0.06 103 0.692 0.15 84 0.055 0.00 8 0.989 0.011 8 0.990 0.010
Romania 61 0.582 0.08 109 0.681 0.14 15 0.251 0.00 99 0.657 0.124 53 0.847 0.147
Malawi 62 0.580 0.06  31 0.883 0.07 134 0.013 0.00 69 0.859 0.130  164 0.000 0.000
Indonesia 63 0.579 0.06 56 0.825 0.10 159 0.000 0.00 67 0.864 0.122 24 0.969 0.031
Paraguay 64 0.577 0.08 135 0.587 0.17 48 0.158 0.00 14 0.987 0.013 17 0.980 0.020
Uganda 65 0.576 0.06 61 0.812 0.11 47 0.161 0.00 105 0.622 0.262 63 0.736 0.174
Ireland 66 0.575 0.10 10 0.953 0.03 25 0.208 0.00 108 0.585 0.308 162 0.000 0.000
Sri Lanka 67 0.572 0.05  55 0.826 0.10  104 0.031 0.00 93 0.708 0.130 46 0.868 0.109
S.Tomé & P. 68 0.569 0.05 92 0.733 0.13 119 0.020 0.00 40 0.945 0.055 25 0.969 0.031
Morocco 69 0.566 0.06  96 0.727 0.12 33 0.189 0.00 109 0.581 0.281  61 0.774 0.141 
Comoros 70 0.566 0.07 130 0.612 0.17 66 0.100 0.00 43 0.942 0.057 13 0.983 0.017
Botswana 71 0.565 0.04 65 0.804 0.11 93 0.037 0.00 81 0.796 0.084  58 0.816 0.109
Panama 72 0.564 0.06 94 0.728 0.13 64 0.100 0.00 44 0.941 0.059  84 0.397 0.091
Mozambique 73 0.564 0.07 66 0.801 0.10 106 0.031 0.00 62 0.879 0.121 148 0.000 0.000 
Mongolia 74 0.564 0.05 67 0.801 0.11 35 0.186 0.00 98 0.672 0.143  71 0.567 0.159 
honduras 75 0.561 0.06 83 0.759 0.12 81 0.068 0.00 66 0.870 0.106 78 0.438 0.049
Cyprus 76 0.560 0.05 42 0.854 0.09 175 0.000 0.00 79 0.820 0.154 82 0.415 0.085
Guatemala 77 0.559 0.06 91 0.741 0.13 101 0.033 0.00 56 0.915 0.085 156 0.000 0.000
Burkina Faso 78 0.558 0.05 20 0.913 0.06 94 0.033 0.00 87 0.734 0.119 72 0.541 0.085 
Guyana 79 0.552 0.05 80 0.769 0.12 142 0.013 0.00 90 0.730 0.148 48 0.861 0.126
Bosnia and herzegovina 80 0.548 0.05 110 0.675 0.15 161 0.000 0.00 64 0.873 0.115 18 0.979 0.021
Timor-Leste 81 0.545 0.07 101 0.698 0.15 124 0.018 0.00 46 0.934 0.066  75 0.474 0.026
India 82 0.545 0.07 122 0.638 0.17 177 0.000 0.00 83 0.779 0.079 16 0.980 0.020
Trinidad and Tobago 83 0.544 0.07 82 0.766 0.13 156 0.000 0.00 73 0.854 0.146 161 0.000 0.000
Namibia 84 0.543 0.07 85 0.754 0.13 105 0.031 0.00 88 0.734 0.110 50 0.858 0.117
Papua New Guinea 85 0.540 0.06 117 0.659 0.15 135 0.013 0.00 48 0.929 0.071 41 0.899 0.092
Vietnam 86 0.537 0.07 106 0.683 0.15 121 0.020 0.00 78 0.827 0.112 39 0.900 0.099
Madagascar 87 0.531 0.09 71 0.793 0.11 41 0.177 0.00 103 0.636 0.227  132 0.025 0.021
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Albania 88 0.531 0.05 137 0.580 0.18 86 0.053 0.00 5 0.990 0.010 42 0.891 0.106 
Mauritius 89 0.528 0.08 74 0.785 0.11 147 0.009 0.00 72 0.854 0.146 142 0.000 0.000
Cape Verde 90 0.522 0.07 53 0.829 0.09 82 0.063 0.00 95 0.696 0.218 167 0.000 0.000
Bangladesh 91 0.521 0.08 105 0.691 0.13 167 0.000 0.00 68 0.859 0.131 173 0.000 0.000
El Salvador 92 0.517 0.06 120 0.650 0.18 137 0.013 0.00 63 0.877 0.117 152 0.000 0.000 
Venezuela 93 0.514 0.07 150 0.470 0.18 17 0.250 0.00 82 0.789 0.076 68 0.616 0.088 
Iraq 94 0.512 0.06 116 0.663 0.16 79 0.068 0.00 129 0.283 0.124 45 0.876 0.118
Somaliland 95 0.511 0.06 100 0.701 0.14 89 0.042 0.00 84 0.776 0.143 77 0.447 0.053
Vanuatu 96 0.505 0.08 32 0.881 0.07 141 0.013 0.00 102 0.640 0.251 145 0.000 0.000
Moldova 97 0.504 0.07 115 0.666 0.15 53 0.144 0.00 104 0.634 0.193 64 0.679 0.170
Solomon Islands 98 0.501 0.07 125 0.632 0.16 152 0.000 0.00 168 0.000 0.000 51 0.858 0.109
Luxembourg 99 0.496 0.08 15 0.943 0.04 27 0.203 0.00 122 0.378 0.166 144 0.000 0.000
Palestine/West Bank 100 0.490 0.08 112 0.674 0.16 178 0.000 0.00 74 0.850 0.148 159 0.000 0.000
Georgia 101 0.488 0.07 49 0.839 0.09 36 0.185 0.00 118 0.468 0.178  99 0.185 0.092
Myanmar 102 0.487 0.07  140 0.560 0.19  148 0.009 0.00 111 0.525 0.169  38 0.907 0.070 
Congo 103 0.485 0.08  104 0.692 0.17 51 0.151 0.00 96 0.687 0.044  109 0.096 0.060
Tunisia 104 0.484 0.04  18 0.921 0.05  72 0.081 0.00 138 0.196 0.087 76 0.472 0.028 
Armenia 105 0.484 0.08  131 0.602 0.14 54 0.141 0.00 86 0.749 0.165  114 0.085 0.038
Mali 106 0.481 0.08 54 0.828 0.11 96 0.033 0.00 106 0.603 0.187 117 0.077 0.033
Rwanda 107 0.481 0.08 69 0.793 0.10 24 0.211 0.00 119 0.463 0.200  97 0.206 0.079
Malaysia 108 0.480 0.07 118 0.652 0.15 160 0.000 0.00 177 56 0.830 0.125
Pakistan 109 0.480 0.07 149 0.476 0.18 80 0.068 0.00 110 0.538 0.215  47 0.867 0.133
Zambia 110 0.479 0.06  78 0.770 0.12 56 0.133 0.00 113 0.521 0.127  133 0.025 0.022 
The Gambia 111 0.476 0.09 87 0.744 0.13 108 0.026 0.00 121 0.427 0.137 66 0.669 0.168
Lesotho 112 0.474 0.05 36 0.874 0.07 138 0.013 0.00 120 0.455 0.173 73 0.486 0.014
Nepal 113 0.474 0.06  29 0.886 0.07 120 0.020 0.00 112 0.525 0.145  87 0.340 0.129 
Dominican Republic 114 0.473 0.07  102 0.696 0.12 102 0.032 0.00 94 0.704 0.140  83 0.409 0.069
Nicaragua 115 0.472 0.07 128 0.623 0.19 74 0.080 0.00 85 0.764 0.105 176 0.000 0.000
Liberia 116 0.469 0.03 81 0.766 0.11 75 0.079 0.00 123 0.359 0.078 80 0.428 0.057
Turkey 117 0.461 0.08 163 0.306 0.20 13 0.259 0.00 80 0.796 0.197  126 0.041 0.046
Maldives 118 0.456 0.07  159 0.348 0.20  58 0.121 0.00 58 0.906 0.090  98 0.204 0.090 
haiti 119 0.455 0.08 147 0.484 0.19 174 0.000 0.00 61 0.883 0.117 67 0.667 0.219
Lebanon 120 0.454 0.10 73 0.786 0.11 165 0.000 0.00 107 0.602 0.250 157 0.000 0.000
Djibouti 121 0.454 0.08 121 0.647 0.18 90 0.040 0.00 92 0.710 0.127 93 0.233 0.114
Kyrgyzstan 122 0.454 0.08 95 0.727 0.14 30 0.195 0.00 117 0.469 0.161 121 0.056 0.028
Libya 123 0.448 0.08  126 0.625 0.18  146 0.011 0.00 89 0.730 0.183  170 0.000 0.000
DRC 124 0.439 0.07 153 0.441 0.19 70 0.088 0.00 139 0.192 0.068 60 0.777 0.120
Tanzania 125 0.431 0.08 70 0.793 0.11 129 0.015 0.00 115 0.498 0.164 90 0.301 0.058
Kosovo 126 0.420 0.08 133 0.596 0.17 162 0.000 0.00 97 0.681 0.115 172 0.000 0.000
Senegal 127 0.417 0.06 26 0.889 0.07 52 0.151 0.00 130 0.270 0.104 101 0.176 0.075 
Chad 128 0.405 0.11 124 0.637 0.17 71 0.088 0.00 114 0.511 0.352  110 0.095 0.066
Swaziland 129 0.402 0.09 141 0.559 0.19 133 0.013 0.00 101 0.644 0.142 115 0.083 0.038
Somalia 130 0.386 0.07 113 0.672 0.15 98 0.033 0.00 134 0.223 0.143 81 0.428 0.069
Zimbabwe 131 0.385 0.07 98 0.722 0.16 29 0.200 0.00 135 0.212 0.101 102 0.158 0.078
Ghana 132 0.376 0.05 11 0.948 0.04 110 0.024 0.00 141 0.176 0.106 140 0.009 0.012
Mauritania 133 0.374 0.09 138 0.577 0.17 22 0.213 0.00 127 0.309 0.172 88 0.320 0.135
Guinea 134 0.347 0.05 68 0.798 0.11 78 0.069 0.00 147 0.113 0.074 129 0.036 0.031
Russia 135 0.332 0.07 160 0.334 0.19 85 0.055 0.00 125 0.331 0.137 69 0.597 0.130 
Zanzibar 136 0.331 0.07 136 0.584 0.19 26 0.205 0.00 145 0.130 0.086 168 0.000 0.000
Oman 137 0.312 0.06 161 0.325 0.18 169 0.000 0.00 100 0.655 0.132  119 0.077 0.034
Jordan 138 0.302 0.08 123 0.637 0.16 154 0.000 0.00 133 0.229 0.089 112 0.086 0.056
Thailand 139 0.301 0.08 129 0.614 0.17 164 0.000 0.00 126 0.320 0.133 158 0.000 0.000 
Cambodia 140 0.289 0.07 146 0.484 0.21 173 0.000 0.00 128 0.297 0.127  91 0.280 0.128 
Guinea-Bissau 141 0.287 0.08 99 0.707 0.13 112 0.020 0.00 150 0.090 0.059 105 0.155 0.101
Belarus 142 0.287 0.08 148 0.483 0.18 65 0.100 0.00 143 0.141 0.059  95 0.210 0.104
Sudan 143 0.285 0.07 143 0.525 0.19 118 0.020 0.00 151 0.084 0.045 89 0.311 0.137
Ethiopia 144 0.278 0.09 167 0.243 0.17 139 0.013 0.00 152 0.082 0.061 70 0.580 0.226
Barbados 145 0.278 0.04 43 0.852 0.09 155 0.000 0.00 178 147 0.000 0.000
Egypt 146 0.277 0.07 154 0.429 0.19 23 0.213 0.00 155 0.058 0.054 106 0.120 0.047 
Seychelles 147 0.276 0.05 77 0.774 0.12 143 0.012 0.00 166 0.005 0.008 149 0.000 0.000
hong Kong 148 0.273 0.06 59 0.819 0.11 170 0.000 0.00 169 0.000 0.000 160 0.000 0.000
Afghanistan 149 0.273 0.07 89 0.743 0.15 115 0.020 0.00 160 0.032 0.046 123 0.048 0.042
Togo 150 0.266 0.07 108 0.681 0.15 88 0.042 0.00 173 113 0.085 0.034
Fiji 151 0.262 0.06 84 0.756 0.12 151 0.007 0.00 172 135 0.023 0.018
Algeria 152 0.260 0.05 152 0.452 0.18 59 0.117 0.00 140 0.179 0.091 118 0.077 0.042
Palestine/Gaza 153 0.254 0.06 127 0.624 0.17 163 0.000 0.00 144 0.134 0.068 143 0.000 0.000
CAR 154 0.239 0.07 132 0.598 0.16 132 0.013 0.00 176 107 0.109 0.066
Iran 155 0.238 0.07 155 0.413 0.19 99 0.033 0.00 136 0.209 0.079 130 0.031 0.029
Kuwait 156 0.228 0.06 142 0.541 0.16 168 0.000 0.00 142 0.151 0.067 146 0.000 0.000
Cameroon 157 0.223 0.07 144 0.515 0.18 116 0.020 0.00 159 0.033 0.034 131 0.028 0.022
Kazakhstan 158 0.217 0.08 151 0.453 0.20 91 0.037 0.00 158 0.036 0.035 108 0.097 0.056
yemen 159 0.209 0.05  170 0.220 0.17 92 0.037 0.00 137 0.208 0.084 85 0.369 0.106 
South Sudan 160 0.201 0.08 157 0.376 0.21 113 0.020 0.00 162 0.019 0.023 94 0.230 0.116
Syria 161 0.195 0.05 175 0.130 0.14 34 0.188 0.00 132 0.235 0.117 124 0.047 0.030
Burundi 162 0.195 0.06  164 0.288 0.15  60 0.117 0.00 148 0.106 0.070 139 0.011 0.016 
United Arab Emirates 163 0.193 0.09 145 0.502 0.20 157 0.000 0.00 175 138 0.011 0.012
Azerbaijan 164 0.192 0.04 174 0.162 0.16 19 0.218 0.00 156 0.057 0.036 104 0.155 0.071
Angola 165 0.191 0.07 156 0.405 0.19 123 0.018 0.00 174 103 0.155 0.088
Laos 166 0.181 0.05 165 0.264 0.17 176 0.000 0.00 131 0.255 0.119 122 0.050 0.048
Singapore 167 0.181 0.05 139 0.561 0.18 144 0.011 0.00 171 0.000 0.000 165 0.000 0.000
Equatorial Guinea 168 0.177 0.05 171 0.206 0.17 42 0.176 0.00 154 0.070 0.058 136 0.015 0.019
Cuba 169 0.171 0.05 173 0.188 0.20 97 0.033 0.00 146 0.127 0.065 92 0.265 0.112
Tajikistan 170 0.161 0.03 166 0.251 0.16 32 0.193 0.00 163 0.018 0.018 134 0.023 0.027
Turkmenistan 171 0.159 0.03 176 0.091 0.12 14 0.258 0.00 153 0.072 0.037 116 0.079 0.038
China 172 0.144 0.07 158 0.368 0.17 171 0.000 0.00 149 0.106 0.037 127 0.038 0.018
Uzbekistan 173 0.131 0.04 162 0.307 0.18 76 0.073 0.00 161 0.029 0.028 128 0.037 0.037
Bahrain 174 0.103 0.04  168 0.237 0.18 83 0.056 0.00 165 0.008 0.014 155 0.000 0.000
Saudi Arabia 175 0.095 0.04 169 0.231 0.19 172 0.000 0.00 164 0.009 0.012 141 0.009 0.010
qatar 176 0.093 0.02 172 0.199 0.16 73 0.080 0.00 170 0.000 0.000 169 0.000 0.000
North Korea 177 0.060 0.03 178 0.035 0.06 153 0.000 0.00 157 0.054 0.036 111 0.094 0.050
Eritrea 178 0.032 0.02 177 0.055 0.09 158 0.000 0.00 167 0.004 0.008 137 0.014 0.020
participatory component 
Index (pcI)
civil Society participation 
Index
Direct popular Vote 
Index
local government  
Index
regional government 
Index
country rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-) rank Score SD	(+/-)
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  indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
  indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty.
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TV-Dem Deliberative Component Index (DCI) captures to what ex-
tent the deliberative principle of democracy is achieved. It assess-
es the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A delib-
erative process is one in which public reasoning, focused on the 
common good, motivates political decisions—as contrasted with 
emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or co-
ercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than 
an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be re-
spectful dialogue at all levels —from preference formation to final 
decision— among informed and competent participants who are 
open to persuasion.
Appendix 6: The Deliberative 
Component Index
Reasoned justification Common good Respect counterarguments Range of consultation Engaged society
fIgure A6.2: the V-Dem DelIberAtIVe component InDex (DcI)
Deliberate component index
AppenDIx: CounTRY SCoReS FoR 2017
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table A6: country Scores for the Deliberative component Index (DcI) and its components   
Deliberative component 
Index (DcI)
reasoned 
justification
common good 
justification
respect for 
counterarguments
range of 
consultation
engaged 
society
country rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/- rank Score SD+/-
Norway 1 0.987 0.01 1 2.902 0.10 10 3.742 0.25 4 4.204 0.32 1 4.933 0.07 2 4.620 0.36
Denmark 2 0.977 0.02 12 2.734 0.24 3 3.851 0.15 3 4.208 0.43 6 4.643 0.35 1 4.663 0.33
Luxembourg 3 0.974 0.02 8 2.797 0.20 13 3.711 0.29 1 4.622 0.29 2 4.785 0.22 39 3.688 0.43
Switzerland 4 0.974 0.02 3 2.873 0.13 50 3.312 0.39 10 3.680 0.36 4 4.738 0.26 6 4.461 0.40
Sweden 5 0.971 0.02 10 2.749 0.23 2 3.903 0.10 18 3.458 0.42 3 4.743 0.23 4 4.469 0.40
Germany 6 0.952 0.03 9 2.758 0.24 36 3.438 0.29 25 3.314 0.33  5 4.663 0.29 18 4.072 0.30
Costa Rica 7 0.951 0.02 6 2.831 0.17 4 3.851 0.15 6 3.829 0.40 24 4.007 0.33 17 4.079 0.42
Ireland 8 0.948 0.03  2 2.886 0.11 106 2.718 0.56 17 3.485 0.47  11 4.302 0.47 15 4.099 0.47 
Netherlands 9 0.945 0.03 62 2.023 0.26 33 3.468 0.33 19 3.428 0.36 7 4.608 0.35 8 4.342 0.37
Tunisia 10 0.940 0.03  51 2.145 0.23  5 3.835 0.16  26 3.311 0.46  15 4.256 0.46  7 4.376 0.44 
Belgium 11 0.933 0.03 16 2.645 0.26 82 2.994 0.63 28 3.254 0.41 8 4.561 0.38 35 3.804 0.42
South Korea 12 0.932 0.04 31 2.399 0.37 34 3.467 0.37 15 3.566 0.45 18 4.135 0.55 11 4.213 0.50
Finland 13 0.930 0.04 20 2.565 0.26 130 2.323 0.52 22 3.340 0.40 16 4.256 0.40 5 4.465 0.41
Australia 14 0.928 0.03 43 2.251 0.25 15 3.691 0.29 14 3.588 0.39 10 4.330 0.44 27 3.883 0.41
Ecuador 15 0.924 0.04 67 1.978 0.29 1 3.932 0.07  41 3.019 0.48  13 4.265 0.55  13 4.186 0.56
Japan 16 0.924 0.04 4 2.866 0.13 43 3.389 0.28 9 3.711 0.35 34 3.798 0.38 43 3.598 0.30
Portugal 17 0.924 0.04 17 2.598 0.35 8 3.775 0.22 8 3.792 0.33 14 4.262 0.48 73 3.183 0.40
Canada 18 0.922 0.04 23 2.535 0.37 16 3.677 0.32 73 2.620 0.70 9 4.391 0.47  16 4.092 0.45
Uruguay 19 0.922 0.04 21 2.563 0.37 53 3.299 0.46 12 3.640 0.63 19 4.111 0.60 19 4.036 0.41
Estonia 20 0.921 0.04 5 2.839 0.16  69 3.133 0.37 51 2.869 0.42 27 3.949 0.49 10 4.217 0.43
Greece 21 0.916 0.04 47 2.184 0.39 60 3.212 0.45 2 4.352 0.48  31 3.838 0.52 37 3.732 0.55
Italy 22 0.907 0.05 25 2.481 0.32 93 2.845 0.52 34 3.079 0.46 12 4.280 0.43 24 3.954 0.52
Sierra Leone 23 0.906 0.04 18 2.567 0.32  96 2.823 0.70  24 3.320 0.47 26 3.966 0.64 14 4.123 0.56 
Chile 24 0.904 0.04 24 2.482 0.33 26 3.556 0.34 46 2.917 0.39  17 4.226 0.42  29 3.871 0.42
Vanuatu 25 0.904 0.05 33 2.384 0.43 97 2.803 0.44 29 3.241 0.50 22 4.034 0.54 22 3.976 0.59
Niger 26 0.904 0.05 40 2.305 0.31 30 3.507 0.48 27 3.270 0.45 25 4.005 0.45 33 3.810 0.44
France 27 0.899 0.05 7 2.805 0.19 31 3.504 0.41 119 1.949 0.56 21 4.045 0.58 32 3.819 0.52
Mauritius 28 0.895 0.05 14 2.660 0.28 128 2.402 0.52  11 3.676 0.43 49 3.490 0.49  26 3.907 0.54
Iceland 29 0.892 0.05 11 2.738 0.26 21 3.642 0.33 63 2.745 0.37 44 3.569 0.42 44 3.597 0.41
Indonesia 30 0.892 0.05 64 2.015 0.23  12 3.715 0.28 16 3.554 0.48 32 3.813 0.50 23 3.968 0.58
Spain 31 0.891 0.05 45 2.243 0.29 11 3.733 0.27 79 2.560 0.59  48 3.506 0.44  9 4.324 0.44
Taiwan 32 0.877 0.05 19 2.565 0.27 89 2.905 0.35 20 3.367 0.43 39 3.679 0.44 41 3.635 0.32
Trinidad and Tobago 33 0.877 0.05 36 2.333 0.31 57 3.228 0.45 58 2.785 0.53 20 4.094 0.58  25 3.942 0.51
Bhutan 34 0.877 0.06 38 2.319 0.29  22 3.642 0.36  5 4.008 0.51  30 3.856 0.62 81 3.019 0.53
South Africa 35 0.869 0.06 15 2.654 0.32 71 3.103 0.37 50 2.877 0.56 36 3.759 0.43 56 3.414 0.40
Jamaica 36 0.868 0.05 42 2.272 0.25 39 3.410 0.35 7 3.810 0.49 69 3.151 0.43  62 3.338 0.45
Slovenia 37 0.867 0.06 28 2.422 0.27 40 3.402 0.43 53 2.837 0.37 38 3.710 0.34 45 3.575 0.41
Benin 38 0.866 0.06 13 2.701 0.25  32 3.470 0.32 71 2.629 0.35  113 2.196 0.33  3 4.470 0.45 
Austria 39 0.866 0.05 29 2.407 0.36 29 3.514 0.37 80 2.551 0.34 41 3.606 0.41 28 3.877 0.37
United Kingdom 40 0.856 0.06 37 2.332 0.25 44 3.388 0.35 37 3.061 0.35 37 3.727 0.36 42 3.613 0.34
Panama 41 0.856 0.06 49 2.166 0.40 83 2.990 0.35 42 3.016 0.45 35 3.778 0.58 38 3.726 0.60
Ivory Coast 42 0.850 0.06  30 2.401 0.33  19 3.664 0.32  70 2.632 0.53 47 3.542 0.41 58 3.385 0.50 
Cyprus 43 0.847 0.07 26 2.467 0.26 104 2.725 0.62 76 2.597 0.45 45 3.558 0.48 48 3.549 0.55
Mongolia 44 0.847 0.06 96 1.619 0.20  79 3.012 0.46 13 3.618 0.39 59 3.241 0.48 12 4.200 0.30 
Burkina Faso 45 0.833 0.08 94 1.633 0.40 64 3.179 0.39  35 3.063 0.43 28 3.940 0.56 55 3.419 0.57
Ghana 46 0.829 0.07  72 1.875 0.25  52 3.300 0.34 93 2.339 0.32  29 3.873 0.42  40 3.681 0.28 
Georgia 47 0.826 0.07 70 1.896 0.24 6 3.810 0.19  30 3.132 0.33 61 3.223 0.34  46 3.573 0.32
Senegal 48 0.822 0.08 46 2.194 0.29 66 3.157 0.52 45 2.924 0.50 58 3.253 0.45 60 3.351 0.36 
Namibia 49 0.819 0.07 60 2.033 0.26 84 2.974 0.42 59 2.785 0.36 42 3.604 0.51 66 3.289 0.42
Morocco 50 0.814 0.07 48 2.177 0.30 23 3.638 0.34  61 2.758 0.38  97 2.607 0.31 63 3.323 0.31
Sri Lanka 51 0.812 0.07  39 2.313 0.29  28 3.515 0.36  57 2.792 0.30  88 2.783 0.46  52 3.491 0.41 
Lithuania 52 0.812 0.07 74 1.865 0.18  9 3.755 0.24 68 2.666 0.31  40 3.613 0.35  64 3.313 0.28
Botswana 53 0.811 0.08 90 1.678 0.18 49 3.312 0.29 36 3.062 0.32 33 3.802 0.53 67 3.282 0.37
Colombia 54 0.811 0.07 58 2.043 0.36  121 2.534 0.68 31 3.127 0.50 52 3.377 0.52  51 3.515 0.34 
S.Tomé & P. 55 0.810 0.07 52 2.134 0.24 85 2.946 0.30 56 2.797 0.35 50 3.419 0.39 70 3.241 0.41
Suriname 56 0.810 0.07 116 1.473 0.33  24 3.591 0.40 83 2.502 0.32 43 3.576 0.51 31 3.862 0.56
Cape Verde 57 0.804 0.08 35 2.347 0.31 7 3.799 0.20 75 2.612 0.33 65 3.210 0.56  106 2.613 0.31
Latvia 58 0.804 0.08 44 2.247 0.30 86 2.942 0.45 69 2.644 0.35 57 3.266 0.38 54 3.439 0.33
Kyrgyzstan 59 0.804 0.07  32 2.394 0.31  80 3.008 0.28 47 2.912 0.47  79 2.925 0.42 75 3.162 0.33 
Mali 60 0.793 0.08 92 1.657 0.29 73 3.086 0.47 87 2.458 0.41 55 3.334 0.45 34 3.804 0.45
Peru 61 0.792 0.08 61 2.024 0.20 41 3.400 0.40 44 2.944 0.43 89 2.747 0.48 65 3.299 0.45
Czech Republic 62 0.791 0.08 73 1.873 0.23 45 3.385 0.48 60 2.776 0.46 67 3.171 0.48  59 3.369 0.35
Bulgaria 63 0.786 0.09 100 1.587 0.20 117 2.580 0.52 90 2.405 0.43 23 4.016 0.38 57 3.405 0.47
Seychelles 64 0.766 0.09 68 1.947 0.25 72 3.097 0.32 21 3.356 0.48 90 2.745 0.47 90 2.851 0.39
Malawi 65 0.766 0.10 82 1.805 0.22  35 3.445 0.45 52 2.864 0.36 76 2.978 0.59 87 2.898 0.44
Barbados 66 0.763 0.09 104 1.555 0.20  135 2.213 0.48  84 2.492 0.44 135 1.693 0.39  72 3.189 0.39
Israel 67 0.762 0.09 85 1.764 0.37 20 3.660 0.34 62 2.746 0.40 92 2.676 0.34 71 3.205 0.48
Nigeria 68 0.755 0.09 69 1.923 0.33 115 2.642 0.27 48 2.903 0.34 74 2.995 0.32 76 3.160 0.31
Singapore 69 0.751 0.10 27 2.443 0.45 27 3.540 0.42 65 2.710 0.59 84 2.844 0.63 119 2.340 0.58
Mexico 70 0.747 0.09 81 1.811 0.20 78 3.030 0.34 49 2.891 0.35 71 3.112 0.44 96 2.763 0.39
Argentina 71 0.742 0.09 75 1.858 0.42 101 2.777 0.51 39 3.036 0.43  107 2.361 0.38 69 3.259 0.41
Serbia 72 0.742 0.09 93 1.649 0.48  113 2.652 0.95 125 1.892 0.45 83 2.844 0.56 30 3.866 0.63
The Gambia 73 0.739 0.09  53 2.119 0.42  108 2.702 0.67 32 3.118 0.39  85 2.811 0.58  100 2.696 0.33 
Philippines 74 0.727 0.10 66 1.983 0.30 18 3.665 0.33 107 2.080 0.41  111 2.236 0.47  50 3.522 0.49
Palestine/West Bank 75 0.726 0.11 22 2.536 0.37 90 2.880 0.95 33 3.116 0.78 103 2.445 0.57 123 2.306 0.57
Tanzania 76 0.725 0.09 97 1.602 0.18 77 3.041 0.25 74 2.616 0.53 53 3.364 0.42 114 2.404 0.44
Pakistan 77 0.722 0.10 149 1.066 0.28 147 2.013 0.71 54 2.822 0.46 73 3.006 0.55 20 4.021 0.65
Timor-Leste 78 0.716 0.10 88 1.692 0.26 46 3.368 0.45 55 2.815 0.34 82 2.853 0.53 98 2.704 0.33
Uganda 79 0.716 0.11 41 2.299 0.25 91 2.864 0.40 94 2.285 0.40 70 3.124 0.46 113 2.413 0.35 
Nepal 80 0.708 0.10 98 1.590 0.25 105 2.721 0.45 99 2.199 0.30 63 3.219 0.47 83 2.990 0.63
Dominican Republic 81 0.706 0.10 107 1.537 0.37 165 1.152 0.71 115 1.972 0.43 75 2.978 0.47 21 3.992 0.62
Croatia 82 0.702 0.11 63 2.021 0.35 127 2.405 0.56 143 1.479 0.48 64 3.217 0.84 85 2.945 0.36
Macedonia 83 0.699 0.09 77 1.846 0.37 58 3.225 0.36 43 2.946 0.42  117 2.133 0.36  79 3.069 0.53
Liberia 84 0.698 0.11  34 2.373 0.35 56 3.263 0.62 85 2.469 0.63 123 2.018 0.71  86 2.909 0.39 
Libya 85 0.695 0.11  118 1.449 0.21  129 2.336 0.37 78 2.565 0.34  51 3.405 0.52  102 2.679 0.38 
hong Kong 86 0.693 0.09 50 2.150 0.27 141 2.192 0.35 122 1.918 0.32 60 3.231 0.38 92 2.796 0.30
Ukraine 87 0.691 0.09 54 2.102 0.33 14 3.707 0.29 100 2.194 0.29 101 2.521 0.60 111 2.457 0.47 
Bosnia and herzegovina 88 0.690 0.11 108 1.526 0.44 167 1.098 0.53 64 2.728 0.49 112 2.225 0.62 36 3.778 0.61
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Montenegro 89 0.688 0.12 79 1.823 0.25 131 2.316 0.35 88 2.443 0.38 86 2.799 0.44 94 2.768 0.35
Myanmar 90 0.688 0.11  111 1.503 0.20  99 2.783 0.62  23 3.320 0.57  105 2.395 0.32  99 2.697 0.37 
Gabon 91 0.685 0.10 137 1.268 0.42  111 2.674 0.84 95 2.260 0.49 72 3.066 0.50 74 3.166 0.45 
Togo 92 0.683 0.10 56 2.084 0.35 92 2.863 0.43 81 2.536 0.51  62 3.221 0.45 131 1.894 0.25 
Lesotho 93 0.675 0.11 83 1.791 0.19 118 2.573 0.60 142 1.510 0.63 66 3.192 0.49  78 3.105 0.41
USA 94 0.669 0.10  89 1.680 0.17  145 2.110 0.59  109 2.070 0.32  115 2.152 0.35  49 3.533 0.37 
Lebanon 95 0.667 0.12 76 1.854 0.39 109 2.688 0.58  111 2.025 0.56 54 3.349 0.69 126 2.190 0.42 
New Zealand 96 0.666 0.12 57 2.078 0.34 67 3.156 0.41 130 1.792 0.73  102 2.475 0.77 91 2.815 0.58
honduras 97 0.663 0.12 119 1.447 0.36 144 2.150 0.50 117 1.967 0.33 96 2.608 0.45  53 3.467 0.43
Kosovo 98 0.661 0.11 109 1.519 0.44 75 3.077 0.58 103 2.128 0.56 78 2.936 0.49 107 2.598 0.42
Mozambique 99 0.655 0.11 55 2.098 0.30 51 3.305 0.54 40 3.019 0.46  81 2.859 0.65 104 2.639 0.29
Kuwait 100 0.652 0.11 87 1.709 0.43 81 3.002 0.39 112 1.994 0.32 131 1.833 0.36 61 3.342 0.47
Solomon Islands 101 0.651 0.12 133 1.278 0.39 76 3.044 0.41 97 2.258 0.46 104 2.439 0.33 82 3.014 0.46 
Slovakia 102 0.651 0.12 106 1.544 0.25 132 2.284 0.38 102 2.134 0.45 80 2.924 0.44 89 2.874 0.50
Algeria 103 0.647 0.12 95 1.624 0.35 47 3.365 0.38 120 1.932 0.36 94 2.629 0.39 103 2.664 0.46
Brazil 104 0.645 0.11  113 1.482 0.24  119 2.564 0.40  66 2.689 0.36 68 3.160 0.56  121 2.316 0.51 
El Salvador 105 0.639 0.11 117 1.470 0.19 123 2.461 0.39  108 2.076 0.43 46 3.543 0.57 128 2.130 0.41
Guyana 106 0.636 0.12 112 1.501 0.23 98 2.801 0.30  126 1.877 0.41 56 3.295 0.46  88 2.892 0.40
Comoros 107 0.633 0.12 141 1.220 0.29 151 1.824 0.43 38 3.046 0.45 77 2.938 0.57 120 2.319 0.54
Zambia 108 0.624 0.09  78 1.832 0.25 122 2.496 0.30  127 1.867 0.29  109 2.330 0.37  93 2.780 0.33
Vietnam 109 0.621 0.12 91 1.678 0.29 162 1.264 0.72  82 2.515 0.47 87 2.794 0.49 115 2.402 0.70
Jordan 110 0.607 0.11 115 1.476 0.32 112 2.672 0.53 67 2.681 0.41 120 2.111 0.28 105 2.614 0.34
Bolivia 111 0.606 0.13 114 1.479 0.21  74 3.084 0.54 138 1.559 0.27 140 1.640 0.35 47 3.569 0.36 
Guatemala 112 0.593 0.12 127 1.337 0.26 149 1.873 0.60 114 1.975 0.34 93 2.655 0.50 95 2.765 0.34
Armenia 113 0.591 0.13 126 1.355 0.40 61 3.206 0.37 98 2.201 0.39 136 1.693 0.36 77 3.115 0.41
Mauritania 114 0.582 0.16 80 1.815 0.39 103 2.749 0.63 118 1.957 0.51  110 2.258 0.69 125 2.256 0.57 
Malaysia 115 0.577 0.12 71 1.893 0.31 94 2.842 0.63 104 2.108 0.47 139 1.648 0.46  116 2.393 0.53
Poland 116 0.575 0.12 148 1.102 0.30  48 3.313 0.34 136 1.595 0.48 121 2.086 0.40 68 3.273 0.44
CAR 117 0.561 0.13 132 1.286 0.49 158 1.467 0.76 72 2.628 0.65 98 2.605 0.68 110 2.465 0.64
Moldova 118 0.560 0.13 122 1.408 0.28 124 2.418 0.61 101 2.156 0.36 106 2.367 0.48 124 2.296 0.41
Guinea 119 0.550 0.15 103 1.559 0.35  70 3.114 0.53 105 2.106 0.65 118 2.133 0.61 134 1.842 0.44
Fiji 120 0.546 0.13 101 1.583 0.25  42 3.396 0.48  110 2.062 0.46 134 1.705 0.50 127 2.145 0.62
Iraq 121 0.543 0.14 65 2.005 0.36 152 1.714 0.59 135 1.690 0.52  157 1.188 0.40  80 3.022 0.48
Afghanistan 122 0.537 0.13 159 0.783 0.32 139 2.195 0.83 89 2.437 0.33 127 1.985 0.51 84 2.972 0.36
hungary 123 0.532 0.14 105 1.548 0.32 146 2.020 0.57  96 2.259 0.28 126 1.988 0.44 143 1.524 0.36 
Iran 124 0.531 0.16 86 1.764 0.53 95 2.835 0.67 91 2.372 0.57 122 2.082 0.57 145 1.416 0.38
China 125 0.507 0.12 102 1.566 0.23  88 2.926 0.26  152 1.255 0.25 128 1.974 0.49 112 2.414 0.57
Somaliland 126 0.500 0.14 153 1.001 0.24 120 2.558 0.53 86 2.461 0.43 114 2.173 0.41 136 1.705 0.43 
Paraguay 127 0.495 0.14 162 0.722 0.28 160 1.365 0.53 116 1.970 0.27 91 2.676 0.42 109 2.543 0.39
India 128 0.494 0.15  128 1.323 0.27  59 3.225 0.37 134 1.713 0.45  95 2.610 0.64  157 1.227 0.45 
Zimbabwe 129 0.486 0.12 134 1.277 0.30 110 2.678 0.39 158 1.032 0.36 100 2.523 0.38 129 2.046 0.42
United Arab Emirates 130 0.482 0.12 147 1.138 0.45 138 2.196 0.89 155 1.168 0.40 99 2.580 0.70 108 2.595 0.75
Papua New Guinea 131 0.482 0.12 129 1.323 0.26 134 2.227 0.45 106 2.100 0.38 124 2.016 0.33 139 1.651 0.38
Rwanda 132 0.476 0.15 123 1.405 0.67 140 2.194 0.83 77 2.595 0.50  133 1.760 0.54 150 1.334 0.58
Uzbekistan 133 0.466 0.12  140 1.261 0.25  17 3.669 0.32  123 1.912 0.29  125 2.003 0.39  151 1.333 0.35 
Madagascar 134 0.465 0.12 110 1.510 0.23 125 2.412 0.47 144 1.477 0.48 146 1.414 0.36 117 2.375 0.51
Bangladesh 135 0.460 0.13 151 1.043 0.29 126 2.408 0.39  150 1.345 0.30 132 1.808 0.30  97 2.736 0.62
Albania 136 0.459 0.13  124 1.395 0.26  143 2.174 0.58 124 1.909 0.55 148 1.394 0.37  130 1.966 0.50 
Djibouti 137 0.454 0.14 120 1.425 0.23 136 2.207 0.66 147 1.415 0.34 142 1.501 0.37 122 2.315 0.38
Somalia 138 0.427 0.15  99 1.589 0.30  166 1.125 0.37  148 1.383 0.42 129 1.941 0.35  141 1.589 0.56 
Kenya 139 0.424 0.15  84 1.789 0.37 102 2.775 0.49 141 1.529 0.43  161 1.101 0.44  140 1.613 0.57 
Maldives 140 0.420 0.14 135 1.275 0.22 54 3.296 0.51  137 1.576 0.36 145 1.448 0.35 142 1.574 0.29
Ethiopia 141 0.408 0.12 144 1.193 0.25  65 3.172 0.43 129 1.849 0.42 137 1.678 0.36 148 1.357 0.30
Romania 142 0.403 0.13  145 1.176 0.33 63 3.194 0.36  145 1.470 0.32  158 1.185 0.37  135 1.798 0.36 
DRC 143 0.378 0.17 146 1.141 0.41 161 1.329 0.57 113 1.976 0.66 108 2.358 0.61 172 0.671 0.30 
Congo 144 0.377 0.15 168 0.531 0.24  159 1.421 0.50 121 1.931 0.47 130 1.881 0.41 132 1.889 0.71
haiti 145 0.369 0.14 152 1.024 0.38 171 0.941 0.44 160 1.020 0.41  149 1.376 0.44  101 2.682 0.34
Cameroon 146 0.359 0.13 175 0.251 0.12  174 0.729 0.43 132 1.776 0.33 116 2.139 0.46 118 2.346 0.36
qatar 147 0.359 0.13 155 0.911 0.30 87 2.929 0.35 92 2.350 0.28  155 1.288 0.32 162 1.062 0.33
Chad 148 0.347 0.12 157 0.858 0.27 172 0.900 0.45 133 1.753 0.39 144 1.495 0.35 133 1.881 0.54
Angola 149 0.344 0.11 139 1.263 0.24  116 2.595 0.37 131 1.777 0.32 150 1.376 0.26 163 1.046 0.33
Russia 150 0.341 0.13 150 1.061 0.37  38 3.421 0.44 149 1.356 0.44 168 0.880 0.35  137 1.695 0.51
Nicaragua 151 0.339 0.14  125 1.390 0.28  100 2.780 0.32 156 1.164 0.36 153 1.308 0.39  147 1.401 0.33 
Zanzibar 152 0.337 0.13 130 1.321 0.39 133 2.260 0.78 140 1.541 0.56 152 1.320 0.40 156 1.228 0.45
Guinea-Bissau 153 0.337 0.15 161 0.738 0.34  168 1.038 0.46 139 1.547 0.35 119 2.131 0.54 152 1.326 0.34
Cambodia 154 0.323 0.13 136 1.269 0.23 157 1.517 0.45 157 1.136 0.27 151 1.331 0.32 158 1.184 0.32 
Swaziland 155 0.304 0.14 138 1.265 0.44 153 1.672 0.44 128 1.855 0.34 160 1.156 0.35 165 0.960 0.39
Cuba 156 0.298 0.11 59 2.034 0.30 25 3.581 0.33 172 0.381 0.17 156 1.263 0.30 170 0.687 0.28
Turkey 157 0.290 0.12  142 1.212 0.26 114 2.648 0.46 146 1.439 0.38 169 0.826 0.23  149 1.355 0.36 
Kazakhstan 158 0.278 0.11 131 1.308 0.29 150 1.855 0.43 154 1.195 0.33 171 0.718 0.26 146 1.406 0.32
Sudan 159 0.246 0.15 160 0.743 0.35 170 0.972 0.37 161 0.937 0.39 159 1.165 0.45 138 1.674 0.52
Belarus 160 0.241 0.11 164 0.711 0.37 37 3.434 0.35 163 0.842 0.37 170 0.779 0.37 144 1.444 0.39
Egypt 161 0.239 0.12  143 1.199 0.39  137 2.198 0.50 167 0.689 0.28  164 0.988 0.29  160 1.109 0.46 
Palestine/Gaza 162 0.228 0.12 121 1.416 0.18  62 3.202 0.52 153 1.246 0.44  174 0.495 0.21 171 0.684 0.32 
Saudi Arabia 163 0.198 0.10 156 0.898 0.35 177 0.348 0.20 169 0.558 0.24 143 1.501 0.43 166 0.932 0.34
Burundi 164 0.191 0.11  169 0.460 0.21  163 1.244 0.50 162 0.849 0.34  162 1.088 0.35  153 1.301 0.41 
Oman 165 0.188 0.10 163 0.717 0.32  169 1.020 0.41 168 0.666 0.36 165 0.916 0.27 154 1.291 0.36
Azerbaijan 166 0.176 0.10 170 0.459 0.23 155 1.614 0.42  159 1.024 0.32 154 1.299 0.30 169 0.701 0.41
Laos 167 0.174 0.11 176 0.169 0.13 55 3.274 0.52 170 0.455 0.22 141 1.507 0.35 168 0.721 0.29
Thailand 168 0.171 0.10  154 0.940 0.24  68 3.146 0.50 151 1.312 0.35  172 0.660 0.26  177 0.439 0.24 
South Sudan 169 0.166 0.10 173 0.324 0.14 175 0.728 0.35 165 0.760 0.26 147 1.410 0.47 159 1.175 0.24
Equatorial Guinea 170 0.162 0.09 166 0.686 0.25 173 0.882 0.32 166 0.739 0.35 166 0.907 0.25 161 1.065 0.28
Bahrain 171 0.160 0.11  172 0.380 0.20  154 1.669 0.59 176 0.134 0.12  138 1.656 0.44 155 1.244 0.46 
Tajikistan 172 0.156 0.10 158 0.857 0.25 107 2.710 0.46 174 0.276 0.13  163 1.057 0.31 175 0.474 0.21
Eritrea 173 0.127 0.09 165 0.694 0.29 164 1.162 0.46 173 0.330 0.18 167 0.892 0.31 167 0.757 0.40
Venezuela 174 0.117 0.09  167 0.654 0.26  142 2.175 0.51  171 0.452 0.22  176 0.349 0.17  164 0.987 0.38 
Syria 175 0.088 0.07 171 0.410 0.24 176 0.640 0.28 164 0.772 0.32 175 0.447 0.23  176 0.451 0.20
Turkmenistan 176 0.070 0.06 174 0.281 0.11 156 1.548 0.40 175 0.222 0.12 173 0.558 0.23 173 0.602 0.27
yemen 177 0.032 0.04  178 0.115 0.08  178 0.064 0.07  177 0.133 0.11  177 0.316 0.16  174 0.543 0.25 
North Korea 178 0.026 0.03 177 0.139 0.09 148 1.901 0.53 178 0.061 0.06 178 0.191 0.10 178 0.181 0.09
V-Dem AnnuAl RepoRT 2018
  indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
  indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years at a statistically significant level. 
SD+/- reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty.
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AppenDIx: CounTRY SCoReS FoR 2017
Note:  The countries are sorted by regime type in 2007, and after that in alphabetical order.  They are 
classified based on the Regimes of the World measure, where LD stands for Liberal Democracy; 
ED - Electoral Democracy; EA - Electoral Autocracy; and CA- Closed Autocracy. 
We incorporate V-Dem’s confidence estimates in order to account for the uncertainty and potential 
measurement error due to the nature of the data but also to underline that some countries are placed in 
the grey zone between regime types.  
The sign “-” indicates that taking uncertainty into account, the country could belong to the lower 
category, while “+” signifies that the country could also belong to the higher category. The countries 
that see a movement upwards or downwards from one level to another are displayed in bold. 
This builds on the regime-classification by Lührmann et al. (2018). While using V-Dem’s data, this 
measure is not officially endorsed by the Steering Committee of V-Dem (only the main V-Dem 
democracy indices have such an endorsement).
country 2007 2017 country 2007 2017 country 2007 2017 country 2007 2017
Australia LD LD Namibia ED+ ED Solomon Isl. ED- ED Singapore EA EA+
Austria LD LD Panama ED+ ED+ tanzania eD-  EA+ Somaliland EA EA+
Belgium LD LD São Tomé and Pr. ED+ ED+ zambia eD-  eA Sri lanka eA  eD
Canada LD LD Vanuatu ED+ ED+ guinea-biss. EA+ eD- Sudan EA EA
Costa Rica LD LD- Argentina ED ED Kosovo EA+ EA+ Syria eA  cA
Cyprus LD LD Benin ED ED+ lebanon EA+ eD- Tajikistan EA EA
Denmark LD LD Bolivia ED ED Madagascar EA+ EA+ The Gambia EA EA
Estonia LD LD Brazil ED ED Mauritania EA+ EA Togo EA EA+
Finland LD LD Bulgaria ED ED+ moldova EA+ eD- tunisia eA  lD-
France LD LD Burkina Faso ED ED Montenegro EA+ EA Uganda EA EA
Germany LD LD Croatia ED ED Mozambique EA+ EA+ yemen eA  cA
Greece LD LD- Dominican Rep. ED ED- Seychelles EA+ eD- Zanzibar EA EA
hungary lD  eD Ecuador ED ED Venezuela EA+ EA Zimbabwe EA EA
Iceland LD LD El Salvador ED ED Afghanistan EA EA uzbekistan eA-  cA
Ireland LD LD Georgia ED ED Algeria EA EA Kuwait CA+ CA+
Japan LD LD Guatemala ED ED Armenia EA EA maldives CA+ eA
lithuania lD  eD Guyana ED ED Azerbaijan EA EA Angola CA CA
Luxembourg LD LD India ED ED Belarus EA EA Bahrain CA CA
Netherlands LD LD Indonesia ED ED Bih EA EA bangladesh cA  eA
New Zealand LD LD Jamaica ED ED Burundi EA EA bhutan cA  ED+
Norway LD LD Lesotho ED ED Cambodia EA EA myanmar cA  eA
Portugal LD LD Liberia ED ED+ Cameroon EA EA China CA CA
Slovenia LD LD- Macedonia ED ED- CAR EA EA Cuba CA CA
South Korea LD LD Mali ED ED- Chad EA EA DR of Vietnam CA CA+
Sweden LD LD Mexico ED ED DRC EA EA Eritrea CA CA
Switzerland LD LD Mongolia ED ED Djibouti EA EA fiji cA  EA+
Taiwan LD LD Niger ED ED- Egypt EA EA hong Kong CA CA
Trinidad and Tobago LD LD Paraguay ED ED Eq. Guinea EA EA Jordan CA CA
UK LD LD Peru ED ED Ethiopia EA EA Laos CA CA
USA LD LD Romania ED ED Gabon EA EA Libya CA CA
Uruguay LD LD Senegal ED ED+ Guinea EA EA Morocco CA CA
Cape Verde LD- LD- Serbia eD  EA+ Iran EA EA nepal cA  eD
Chile LD- LD- Sierra Leone ED ED Ivory coast eA  eD North Korea CA CA
Czechia LD- LD Suriname ED ED Kazakhstan EA EA Oman CA CA
Ghana LD- LD- Timor-Leste ED ED Kenya EA EA Palest. Gaza CA CA
Israel lD-  ED+ turkey eD  eA Kyrgyzstan EA EA+ qatar CA CA
Italy LD- LD- ukraine eD  eA malawi eA  eD Saudi Arabia CA CA
Latvia LD- LD- Albania eD- lD- Malaysia EA EA Somalia CA CA
mauritius lD-  ED+ Colombia ED- ED nigeria eA  eD- Swaziland CA CA
poland lD-  eD comoros eD- EA+ Pakistan EA EA+ Thailand CA CA
Slovakia lD-  ED+ haiti ED- ED- palestine Wb eA  cA Turkmenistan CA CA+
South Africa lD-  ED+ honduras eD- eA Papua New G. EA EA UAE CA CA
Spain LD- LD Iraq eD- eA R Congo EA EA South Sudan CA
barbados ED+ lD- nicaragua eD- eA Russia EA EA
Botswana ED+ ED Philippines ED- ED- Rwanda EA EA
table A7: regimes of the World 2007/2017.  
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